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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the organizational strengths and competitive strategies exhibited by 
British Independent Petroleum Exploration and Production Companies. Fieldwork 
methods were used to obtain new primary source data (quantitative and qualitative) on
these companies. These were gathered through a series of semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews with fourteen Independents, representing a large component of the population 
and seven international drilling contractors. The research topic is developed along four 
principal channels of inquiry: 1) Strategic Decision-making Speed and Rapidity of Action, 
2) Utilisation of Contractors 3) Negotiation 4) International Strategy.
The main organizational strength is identified as the ability of the Independent to be fast 
in its decision-making speed. In explaining this finding, a range of structural variables 
are investigated, and shown to be of potential influence. Further, the in-house functional 
strengths possessed by Independents are examined, and differing reasons for their 
internalisation are delineated. Another organizational strength is shown to lie in the less 
formalized approach to business deals adopted by Independents. In particular, the 
emphasis which Independents place upon developing relationships is found to fit the 
‘non-ideal’ operating disposition of Non-Western government bureaucracies.
It is shown that, being free of the inertia which may induce formalized systems and 
bureaucratic controls in larger firms, the Independent cultivates more flexible systems, 
which foster its manoeuvrability. A potentially fruitful competitive strategy recognised 
for such firms is found to be their ability to seize windows of opportunity, in terms of 
concluding deals. Being small and of limited resources, the international strategy 
exhibited by several Independents is shown to be one which builds upon existing 
capabilities. As a consequence, countries where existing company knowledge and 
experience can be most readily applied, are targeted. Indeed, some Independents’ 
capabilities appear to reside in operating in high political/corruption risk countries. In 
entering countries often avoided by larger competitors, Independents may reasonably be 
characterised as clandestine prospectors of the petroleum world.
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PART 1 KEY CONCEPTS AND FRAMEWORK
1. INTRODUCTION
1. 1 The Areas of Inquiry
Situated within the context of growing research into Small and Medium sized Enterprises 
(SMEs), this study focuses upon a particular set of companies that traditionally have 
received minimal attention from the research fields of Management, Economics, or 
International Relations. These firms are the ‘Independent’ exploration and production 
petroleum companies. Positioned in an industry often characterised for its large, ‘Major’ 
sized enterprises, the Independents are shown in this study to act as a novel research 
vehicle for revealing the organizational strengths and competitive strategies, that can be 
deployed by smaller firms.
An ‘Independent’ is defined in this study as a company with its predominant focus upon 
petroleum exploration and production (see Section 2.1). Independents have traditionally 
been distinguished from the larger Majors through not being vertically integrated; 
Independents do not possess a ‘global system of production, transport, refining and 
marketing.’ (Sampson, 1975, p. 143)*.
A paucity of research towards Independents1 2 dictated an exploratory approach. In 
accordance with the writings of Ragin (1994, p.47) this thesis embraces the concept that 
social research should involve the simultaneous interplay of both inductive and deductive 
methods. The research findings emanate from a series of semi-structured, face-to-face 
interviews conducted by the author with fourteen British Independents between 
December 2003 and April 2004. The design of the accompanying interview 
questionnaire incorporated both inductive and deductive aspects. It explores along four 
primary channels of inquiry, the organizational strengths and competitive strategies
1 Deviating from Landeau’s (1977) ‘operational defintion’, this study does not restrict Independents purely 
to those operating internationally. Non-international domestic enterprises offer valuable insight into the 
origins and spectrum of business models that constitute the Independent sector and therefore have been 
included.
2 To the author’s knowledge only two pieces of academic research have ever specifically targeted 
‘Independents’. The first is McKie, J.W. (I960) ‘Market Structure and Uncertainty in Oil and Gas 
Exploration’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 74 , No. 4, 543-571. The second is Landeau, J-F. 
G. (1977) Strategies of US Independent Oil Companies AbroadUMi Research Press, Michigan.
2
which Independents can leverage. These channels, derived as a consequence of initial 
inductive research, are 1) Strategic Decision-making Speed and Rapidity of Action, 2) 
Utilisation of Contractors 3) Negotiation 4) International Strategy. To enhance the 
comprehensiveness of ttf srhey, North American Independents were incorporated via a 
postal questionnaire. The twelve responding NortC American Independents assisted in 
both raising the sample size and permitring, on occasion, a comparison to bf drawn wish 
the British Indesfneenrt. Further, to corroborate Independents’ responses through 
‘triangulation’ (Yin, 1994; Punch, 1998)3, a series of facf-So-face sfmi-srtucthred 
interviews were undertaken with seven International Drilling Contractors.
1.2 1) Strategic Decision-making Speed and Rapidity of Action
This area of inquiry was based upon the House of Commons Energy Committee 1988 
reports on the ‘The UK Independent Oil Sector’. One conclusion posited by the 
Committee’s First and Second reports was that Independents were rapid in their decision­
making and action. From the Second report ‘Independent companies may bf able to 
move more swiftly than tteir Major compf 1^01-8..^^ take quick decisions’ (HCSC, 
1988a, p.viii). It was suggested that decision-making spffd was strucrhraliy determined, 
ttere being ‘a short path from idea to execution, rathfr than stifled by layers of 
bureaucratic management’ (Tricentrol, 1988, p.53). FuitCftmorf, Independents were 
reported to ‘move quickly’ as a corsfqhencf of ttf ‘financial pressures’ they faced 
(HCSC, 1988a, p^ii). To test and develop hypotheses suggested by these reports 
(Section 3.1), this thesis draws from specialist research on strategic decision-making 
speed (Bourgeois and Eisenharet, 1988; EitenCardt, 1989; EisenCardt, 1990; Judge and 
Miller, 1991; Wally and Baum, 1994) to formulate a novel set of exploratory research 
questions specific to Independents. Some of the key questions explored were (Sections 
3.1, 5.3, 6.1):
- For which operations are the differentials in decision-making speed between 
Independents and Majors greatest?
3 ‘Triangulation’ is the process by which existing findings can receive further validation through 
conducting a separate study that approaches the same queries from a different direction or source (Punch, 
1998, p.247).
3
- Do structural variables, such as the number of personnel consulted for a given 
decision (Spectrum of Consultation), or the level of focus exhibited by the key 
decision-maker, influence decision-making speed? Furthermore, does either of 
these variables alter in accordance with firm size?
- Assuming rapid decisions are made by Independents, what is the quality of the 
final decision made?
- What are the pressures that stimulate Independents to act quickly? Are ‘financial 
pressures,’ such as the cost of capital, the fundamental stimulus?
- Can the time taken for particular actions be measured?
In tackling these research questions, the most powerful method, given small samples, is 
to look at extremes; Major vs. Independent. Indeed, such comparison was attempted. 
However, insufficient Majors were willing to participate in this research for quantitative 
comparisons to be made4. Incorporation of the seven International Drilling Contractors 
surmounted this obstacle. Qualitative results, obtained, from the impartial Drilling 
Contractor interviewees, serve usefully to ‘triangulate’ and confirm the decision-making 
speed differential observed to exist between Majors and Independents. Beyond the 
Majors vs. Independents comparison, the quantitative and qualitative results collected 
present opportunity for reflection on the actions within the Independent population itself. 
Relative to decision-making speed, rapidity of action, and other areas of inquiry, larger 
sized Independents may exhibit characteristics that differ from those of smaller 
Independents. Such differences are likely to be more difficult to detect than for the 
Major / Independent comparison, due to the smaller absolute difference in features 
between firms in the Independent population. Nevertheless, should size-based 
differences in decision-making speed be displayed for Independents, as is the finding ( 
Section 6.1), this would emphasise the primary role that firm size plays.
1.3 2) Utilisation of Contractors
Drawing from Richardson’s (1972, p.231) rasourca-basad concept of ‘capability’ and 
Williamson’s transactions cost economics (1975; 1985; 1986; 1989; 2002), this second
4 Only three of the Majors contacted were willing to be interviewed.
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area of inquiry^ (Section 3.2, 5.4, 6.2), seeks to determine and analyse the particular in­
house functions provided by Independents. Richardson’s and Williamson's alternative 
schemata are each utilised to explain the sourcing of various functions. With both 
schemta shown to be capable of application (Section 6.2.1 & 6.2.4), reconciliation of the 
differing models may be analysed from the perspective of a firm’s process of 
internalising new functions (Section 6.2.5). Nevertheless, whilst reconciliation may be 
established for this aspect, it is shown not to be possible for all. Williamson’s concept of 
‘opportunism’ is diametrically opposite to Richardson’s ‘co-operation’. As demonstrated 
(Section 6.2.7-8) analysis of British Independents’ incentivisation procedures may be 
used to test the validity of both concepts.
1.4 3) Negotiation
Strength in negotiations is noted as a feature central to Independents’ abilities to 
‘cultivate their connections’ with foreign governments (Economist, 1998, p.34). 
Emphasis is placed upon the low turnover of managers within Independents, as a primary 
element in successful relations with host nations. They report the seniority of 
Independents’ negotiating personnel to confer advantage; ‘politicians in developing 
countries sometimes prefer to deal with the boss of an Independent than a mere manager 
of an oil giant.’ (Economist, 1998, p.34). Such proposed strengths all pertain to what this 
thesis will term negotiating approach factors (Section 3.3); these are the methods used to 
channel firms’ efforts to achieve advantageous positions from which to proceed to the 
final bargaining stage. This study tests the two proposed Independent approach 
strengths, seniority of company representatives (Kapoor et al, 1991; Marsh, 2001) and 
low turnover of company representatives (Ring and van de Ven, 1992; Child, 1998; 
Yoshino and Rangan, 1995; Kelly et al., 2000; Salacuse, 1991), relative to other approach 
factors. Whilst approach is the method, negotiation must have substance; the work 
proposed by a firm to be undertaken is referred to in this thesis as content. The content 
of an Independent’s exploration proposal to a host nation, is the technical action that will 
be implemented by a firm. The relative influence of approach and content factors may *
2 This was incorporated following the recommendation of Professor Kemp, University of Aberdeen. He 
regarded Independents “use of contractors to be key” to their functioning.
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vary according to the negotiating context in which they are applied (Section 3,3). In this 
research, context relates to the licensing authorities of differing host governments with 
whom Independents engage. The current research aims to determine the typical 
approach and content strengths which Independents typically leverage and to which 
contexts they are most applicable (Sections 3.3, 5.5 and 6.3). Whilst focused upon the 
Independents, tCis research may be considered, in a broader context, as seeking to initiate 
further consideration of the strengths SMEs in general can leverage in negotiation 
scenarios. It appears this aspect has been neglected in existing SME literature.
1.5 4) Irrfrratioral Strategy
A characteristic of the current British Independent is that ttf majority hold no sftroifhm 
licences in Britain; they are international in their operations6 (Sections 3.4, 5.6 and 6.4). 
Landfau’s (1977) published Harvard PhD thesis specifically focused on the rationale for 
US Independents seeking to irrfrratioraiise. Following a similar qualitative analysis to 
Landeau, this research probes whether the principal internationalising factors identified 
by Laneeah also Cold for British Independents’ first international move. Since initial 
inductive research reported that countries entered by Independents were ‘basket-cases’ 
(Analyst A, 2003), this thesis also seeks to determine the predominant reason given for 
country choice (Jotanson and Vatlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Pahl, 1975). 
The Independents’ ability to operate in ‘basket-case’ countries may indeed be a source of 
competitive strength ratter than weakness. Unlike Landeau, this research also 
incorporates the ron-irtemational Independents, and seeks to determine the validity of 
their reasoning for not internationalising. Finally, following Miles and Huberman’s 
(1994) recommendation, the differing international orientation of Independents is 
categorised into ‘families’ of business models, and justification for thfir separate designs 
is sought.
6 For this thesis the term ‘international’ is understood as applicable to any firm that undertakes licence 
interests in two or more countries.
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1,6 The Necessity of Fieldwork
Despite its significance to world economies, there have been ‘in reality...relatively few 
academic economists interested in the international oil industry’ (Stevens, 1995, p. 129). 
The cause of this limited interest is reported to be due to a lack of data. The ‘extremely 
secretive’ nature of the oil industry has traditionally prevented sufficient data becoming 
available, on which theories could be tested (Stevens, 1995, p. 129). In accordance with 
Stevens (1995, p. 137), this thesis overcomes the ‘great danger in economics that only that 
which can be put into an equation is considered’, to explore a set of companies neglected 
by both economics and the wider social sciences. This research seeks solution to data 
limitation, through direct fieldwork, using company interviews. The history of economic 
analysis was originally grounded in fieldwork; as Reid (1993, p.6) reports, both Adam 
Smith and Alfred Marshall held strong concern for the ‘realities of business activity’. 
Economic inquiry must challenge the neglected frontiers, for it is often in these 
disregarded areas where such research is required most.
Set within the inter-disciplinary framework of Management, Economics, and 
International Relations this thesis employs a broad set of conceptual tools in its 
exploratory analysis of the British Independent Exploration and Production Companies.
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2. POIUL. ATI ONSI NV ESTIGATED
2.1 The US Population - McKie’s (I960, Study
Apart from Landeau’s (1977) targeted research into US Independents’ moves abroad1, 
the only recorded research broadly investigating Independents’ positioning relative to 
Majors, was initiated by James McKie (1960) in the Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
McKie focused on Independents exploring within the US. From his analysis of 
exploration success rates in the American Association of Petroleum Geologists’ statistical 
data set, he derived interesting conclusions2:
1. Majors drill most of the expensive, deep exploration wells. Independents favour 
ventures with lower initial outlay (McKie, 1960, p. 552).
2. Uncertainty, in the sense of Knight (1921), places exploration success rates of 
Independents and Majors on an even footing: ‘while the major companies, by and 
large, have better access to superior prospects, they cannot identify the superior 
chances with certainty simply by spending money on exploratory work. Their 
information is far from perfect. In some cases the small company’s information 
may be as good as, or no worse than, that of a large corporation.’ (McKie, 1960, 
p.559). Inadvertent support may be noted in contemporary writings. For 
example, Masseron (1990, p. 17) states ‘uncertainty’ to prevail, ‘all the methods 
employed provide only a general ideal of the structure of the subsurface.’
McKie also summarised received industry wisdom regarding US Independents that 
proliferated at the time2.
1. ‘Independents congregate in areas where the relative advantages of the Major 
firms are weakest’ (McKie, 1960, p.570).
2. ‘[Independents] take advantage of flexibility and speed in detecting and seizing 
available opportunities in these areas' (McKie, 1960, p.570). * 2 *
’ In spite of Landeau’s (1977) extended literature review, it appears he was not aware of McKie’s (1960) 
article, for no reference to it is made by Landeau.
2 Unfortunately, an equivalent contemporary data set is no longer compiled by the American Association of 
Petroleum Geologists. Forbes and Zampelli’s (2000; 2002) use of the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA) data set is the best currently available, although this only includes the largest Major US producers.
2 McKie did not reference these conclusions to any direct evidence, thus their general validity should be
questioned.
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3. ‘Independents do not try to operate extensively with limited resources, but
specialize in restricted areas which they can study intensivaly.’(McKie, 1960, 
p.570)4.
Without empirical validation, the above must be treated with caution. They also pertain 
only to the operations of Independents in one country, namely the United States. British
Independents are mainly international in their operation: an equivalent to the old US 
Independents’ geographic ‘areas’ of focus might be the British Independents’ focus on 
particular ‘countries’. Section 6.4 explores this question.
No subsequent research has developed McKie’s findings. The organizational strengths 
and competitive strategies that Independents can seek to leverage remain undisclosed. 
This thesis addresses this deficiency, through an examination of the British Independents.
2.2 The British Population
The Independent population recognised for this research constitutes those British and 
Irish Exploration and Production (E&P) companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) as of the 31st October 20035. A market capitalization of £10m was set as the 
threshold level necessary for inclusion in the population; analysis of company web-sites 
and annual reports determined that the few firms below this threshold did not currently 
hold active licence interests. In total twenty-one publicly quoted6 7companies were found 
to fit our Independent ‘unit of analysis’6. Table 2.2.1 displays the population of twenty- 
one Independents, the focus of this thesis8.
4 Italics are plain text within McKie’s (1960) article.
5 Since only two of the Independents in the population were Irish registered, Aminex and Dragon Oil, the 
Independent population sampled are forthwith referred to as British Independents.
* Private companies such as Reach Exploration & Tuscan were not included in the population. This was 
because Companies House data did not accurately specify ‘nature of business’ (SIC 92). E&P companies 
were sometimes detailed under the following categories ‘Other service activities’, ‘Holding company’, 
‘Other business activities’. Unable to source an accurate listing of private E&P firms from either the DTI, 
or Companies House, private firms are not included in this study.
7 (Collis and Hussey, 2003, p. 121)
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British Publicly Listed
Exploration & Production Companies
Company Market
Capitalization (£m)
Pan Andean Resources 10.41
Northern. Petroleum 10.42
Global Energy Development 12.73
Desire Petroleum 14.37
Aminex 19.90
Emerald Energy 22.36
Regal Petroleum 48.54
Edinburgh Oil & Gas 53.25
JKX Oil & Gas 57.81
Sterling Energy 60.81
Melrose Resources 81.68
Ramco Energy 99.87
Dragon Oil 124.94
Venture Production 132.04
Dana Petroleum 168.32
Soco International 216.60
Sibir Energy 259.44
Paladin Resources 295.44
Premier Oil 295.61
Tullow Oil 319.58
Cairn Energy 583.75
Listed at 31/10/03 on the LSE
Tabic 2.21
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 STIATTEGIC DECISIONMAKING SPEED & fAPPIDITY OF
3.1.1 InStoduatior
Rfceiafe wisdom within the industry (HCSC, 1988a; Investment AnalystA), is that 
Independents are fast moving in ttf speed and action of dfaitior-m.aking. For ttis 
industry, neither attribute has been systematically verified academically (Section 1.1). 
The few sasfts to have irvfsrigatee decision-making speed Cave stedominartiy focused 
upon high-velocity environments, mainly industry sectors where changes in demand, 
technology and competition are so fast, and discontinuous, that tte existing information 
available to a firm is rapidly rendered obsolete (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988; 
Eisenharer, 1989; Eisenhatdt, 1990). Progressing ttf research agenda beyond higt- 
velocity environments has been started (Judge and Miller, 1991; Wally and Baum, 1994), 
and the current study aims to take this movement further.
3.1.2 Contemporary Research
Strategic decision-making relates to ‘decisions that involve the commitment of 
substantial resources at the level of the total enterprise.’ (Wally and Baum, 1994, p.933). 
As typical exploration drilling-costs approximate £5-10m (Masseron, 1990, p. 123), most 
drilling decisions are of strategic magnitude to the Independent firm1. Tte modern 
foundations to investigating strategic decision-making speed may be found in 
EisenCaret’s inductive, aase-sthdy based research upon fight microcomshtfr firms 
(Eisenhater, 1989). Establishing a preliminary hypothesis of the relationship between 
rapid decision-making and firm performance (Bourgeois and Eisfnharet, 1988), the 
expanded research contemplated a broad set of influential variables. Key findings 
suggested that fast decision-makers accelerate tteir decision choice by: cortidfrirg 
multiple alretnatrvfs, using real time information, utilising experienced counsellors, 
resolving conflicting opinions, and prioritising the extent to which decisions may bf 
integrated (Eisenhardt, 1989). Judge and Miller (1991) attempted to test Eisfrhardt’s 
findings within the differing velocity environments of biotechnology (n=10), hospitals
1 The mean Turnover for the 21 Independents in 2002 was only £42.04m: one £10m exploration drilling 
would require 24% of Turnover (Section 5.1).
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(n=12) and textiles (n=10). Decision-making speed was mainly found to be strongly
associated with the consideration of multiple simultaneous alternatives within the high
velocity biotechnology sector (p < 0.05), but not for hospitals or textiles.
Part of Eisenhardt’s (1989) study involves categorizing various techniques reported as 
being employed by fast decision-making firms. In contrast to the present work, her 
article does not report on the structure of firms, in terms of the centralization or 
formalization of decision-making, and their roles as notable determinants of decision­
making speed. Her relative lack of findings could be a consequence of the type of firm 
she studied. Thus microcomputer firms, operating in high velocity environments, seem 
to approximate closely to Mintzberg’s (1979) ‘adhocracy’. Operating in dynamic and 
complex environments, authority within the adhocracy is decentralized in structure. In 
order to innovate, creatively functioning teams are predominant, and centralized authority 
is minimal (Mintzberg, 1981). This suggests that Eisenhardt’s (1989) findings should not 
be extrapolated to lower velocity environments without caution, for structural 
determinants are found to have an important influence on decision-making speed in these 
environments (Wally and Baum, 1994).
A further cause of Eisenhardt’s neglect of structural variables is her conflation of the 
numbers of personnel consulted, with the number of alternatives generated. Eisenhardt 
(1989) criticises the previous work of March and Olsen (1981) and Janis (1982), for 
suggesting that consideration of more alternatives slows down decision-making. 
However, she fails to recognise the additional feature at play in these works, in that they 
emphasise the importance of the number of personnel consulted. Whilst her findings do 
demonstrate the importance of considering multiple, simultaneous alternatives on speed 
of decision making, they in no way probe the number of personnel involved within the 
consultation process. The formulating of multiple alternatives to a problem, is a task that 
can be undertaken by any team, regardless of its size. Considering multiple alternatives 
appears very similar to a scenario planning methodology^. Whilst utilisation of multiple
5 An often noted example of scenario planning was Shell’s preparation for a possible oil price collapse, 
which did occur in 1986. (Howarth, 1997, p.349).
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alternatives may enhance the speed of decision-making, this cannot be extrapolated to 
refute the structural organisational feature that the more personnel consulted, the slower 
the decision. A range of differing personnel can be consulted out of necessity; and 
information may need to be gathered from various personnel for a decision to be well 
informed. Judge and Miller (1991) did not find consideration of multiple simultaneous 
alternatives to be associated with decision-making speed in the low velocity 
environments of textiles or hospitals. It could be argued that alternative causal 
mechanisms should be sought for these lower velocity environments, and one such 
alternative, to be investigated in this thesis, is the effect that the number of personnel 
consulted for a given decision has on decision-making speed.
In contrast to Eisenhardt, emphasising decision-speeding techniques^, Wally and Baum 
(1994) acknowledge the importance of structural determinants on decision-making speed. 
Wally and Baum’s (1994) survey of 151 Pennsylvanian manufacturing companies probes 
a wide set of variables of both personal3 4 and structural origin. These include the 
personal determinants of cognitive ability, intuition, tolerance of risk, propensity to act, 
as well as the structural determinants, such as centralization and formalization. Their 
findings show that the greater the risk propensity, optimism, flexibility, and use of 
intuition by the CEO, the faster is the decision-making speed. Further, the greater the 
centralization, and the lesser the formalization within the organisation, the slower is the 
decision-making speed. Firm size, measured according to turnover and total number of 
employees, was adopted as a measure of firm complexity. Both measures were found to 
be inversely correlated with decision-making speed. Further, the larger the firm, the 
slower the decision-making speed.
Overall, the emphasis of Wally and Baum’s (1994) study is on the individual economic 
agent. This is partly a consequence of their methodology. In their case, only CEOs were 
used as respondents. However, this constraint on interviewee was a luxury that could not
3 Eisenhardt’s (1989) findings tend to focus upon the partiicular tactics and methods that any firm can adopt 
to speed decision-making.
4 Wally and Baum (1994) adopt the terminology of ‘personal’, to refer to the individual agent. In their 
study the agent is the CEO.
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be afforded in the one year study of this thesis, as the industry is noted for its 
inaccessibility (Stevens, 1995, p. 129). Moreover, some of Wally and Baum’s (1994) 
approaches to assess the individual respondent, such as a Bieri grid for cognitive 
complexity^, have the underlying assumption that the individual is wholly representative 
of the organization. Simple Likert scales are used for the CEO to assess the level of 
centralization within the organization. Whilst necessary for their highly diverse firm 
population, in order to achieve common comparison, this thesis, being focused on one set 
of firms within an industry, can probe into more specific and complex information. The 
neglect in the literature of the actual numbers and positions of personnel consulted for a 
given decision needs to be rectified. March and Olsen’s (1981) finding, that the number 
of personnel consulted may extend the decision-making process, requires more empirical 
examination than it has hitherto received.
Wally and Baum (1994) do not unpack the size of firm / complexity variable. Although 
they state that larger firm size is accompanied by greater organizational complexity, they 
do not explain the nature of complexity. In this thesis, it is reasoned that, within 
organizations, information search-costs exist. Such costs may be measured specifically 
in the time taken to gather all the relevant information necessary to deliver an informed 
decision. Since the required information is typically generated by individual personnel - 
through application of their particular skills, knowledge, and experience - for a decision 
to be well informed, a range of individuals will have to be consulted. It may be that the 
greater the number of personnel who hold the necessary information, the longer will be 
the time taken to gather the information from them. As Olsen (1981, p. 135) notes ‘the 
greater the number of...participants activated, the longer the decision will take.’ When 
firms increase in size, there is typically a move towards an increased division of labour
5 This grid developed by Bieri et al. (1966, p. 185) reasoned that any given individual’s cognitive 
complexity (information processing skills) could be measured according to the level of discrimination 
exhibited in assessing an event. For Wally and Baum (1994) CEOs had to evaluate particular people they 
knew on a six-point scale over ten cha^^^uctteri^^i^s. Differences between ratings were summed to indicate 
the test-taker’s range of evaluation. A high score indicated high discrimination in evaluation, and therefore 
high cognitive complexity of the respondent. Such a practice was not adopted in this thesis for two 
reasons. Firstly, Wally and Baum (1994, p.945) did not find cognitive complexity to significantly 
influence decision-making pace. Secondly, access to Independent’s CEOs was not necessarily assured: 
often interviews could only be arranged with Technical Directors.
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(Reid, 1989). Mintzberg (1981) notes the propensity of larger firms to engage in 
horizontal specialization^. Whilst this specialization may create efficiencies for the 
processing of day-to-day routine work, such efficiencies may not necessarily hold for 
non-routine, strategic decisions. They are typically of a much greater magnitude, and 
require the simultaneous assimilation and assessment of all the necessary information. 
Through reducing the scope of tasks constituted by an average job, work specialization 
spreads the necessary information across more individuals. The greater the 
specialization, the larger number of individuals require to be consulted to gather the 
necessary information for making an informed decision. This act of gathering 
information has a temporal cost. On the basis of the above discussion, the following are 
hypothesised:
3 a) Hypothesis - The greater the number of personnel consulted to enact a given 
decision^, the longer will be the time taken to choose a course of action.
3b) Hypothesis - The larger the firm size, the greater will be the number of personnel 
consulted for making a given decision.
3.1.3 Focus
An additional structural feature, neglected in existing studies, that may have an impact 
upon decision-making speed is the degree offocus. If the efforts of the ultimate decision­
maker are spread over many projects, then the time taken for this decision-maker to 
become familiar with the details of each individual project, as and when it arises, is likely 
to be longer than for those decision-makers who preside over fewer projects. Within the 
industry examined in this thesis, this may be applied to the number of licence blocks that 
enter within the decision-making jurisdiction of a key manager. The view that there are 
boundaries to the attention a manager can give to any problem/task is supported by the 
research of Gifford (2001a; 2001b; 2001c). Her recognition that overload, that is, too 
many simultaneous projects, can result in poorer decisions, or decision delay, gives 
support to this thesis’ investigation of focus. This suggests the following:
2 Horizontal specialization occurs when jobs within the organization increasingly encompass only a few 
narrowly defined tasks (Mintzberg, 1981).
7 The number of personnel consulted to inform a decision is also referred to in this thesis as the ‘spectrum 
of consultation’.
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3c) Hypothesis - The greater the degree of focus of a key decision-maker in the 
organisation, the more rapidly will decisions bf made.
3.1.4 Stimulus to Action
Although previous studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhatet, 1990; Judge and Miller, 1991) 
emphasise the importance of thf (high-velocity) environment, tte need for fast decisions 
is not always contingent upon the external environment. Rather, ttere can be an internal 
driver for speed. Lying in the small to medium sized enterprise (SME) category, yet 
operating in a sector characterised by extremely Cigt aosrs (Masseron, 1990), British 
Independents are noted for thfir financial When time is costly, speed is of the
essence. Thus one finds insiders making statements like:
‘Sometimes, of coursf, it is the financial pressures which ttfy face which will tflp the 
ineepfnefrts to move quickly - they need to push ttfir partners to work expeditiously 
because they carror afford to “tie up our capital in ror-ptoductivf ways (Roland Staw, 
Premier Oil)” ’ (HCSC, 1988a, p.21).
To verify the above statement, this thesis investigates the financial pressure crfated by 
tte use of debt. Is it thf cost of capital (working its effect thtohgC thf level of gearing) to 
a firm that stimulates Independents to act quickly? Thf burden of debt servicing and 
accompanying banking interest charges impose an additional cost arising from slow 
action. That is, ttf greater the time taken to repay thf debt, thf greater the amount of 
interest repayments required. Fast action may thus be stimulated in an effort to reduce 
the overall cost of debt. Not wishing to confine the investigation of possible stimuli to 
action to debt finance alone, this thesis, through particular question design, also permits 
alternative stimuli to action to be considered (see Section 5.3.2).
3.1.5 Measuring Action
Tte advantage of tte current, cortexr-spfcific investigation, is that an implemented 
action may be measured directly. Unlike previous studies, that have sought generality 
across industries (Judge and Miller, 1991; Wally and Baum, 1994), this thesis, through 
focusing on one industry, allows a generic action urdertakfr by all firms to be nsed as a 
yardstick of comparison. This new research establishes a question design framework for
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measuring action that, once proven in the field, provides a template for extracting data 
from the historical records held by the UK Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 
Such data would assist in testing more widely the following hypothesis, which our small 
sample investigation, at present, can only partially address. Moving downstream, from 
decision to action, these hypotheses question, generically whether Independents do move 
as ‘swiftly’ as the House of Commons Select Committee Reports have suggested 
(Section 1.1). Following Wally and Baum’s (1994) finding that firm size influences 
decision-making pace, this thesis also tests whether a similar relation will hold between a 
firm’s size and the speed at which a particular action is undertaken. In essence, do 
smaller firms implement their actions quicker than larger firms?2 For this study, 
measurement of action relates to three key stages in the exploration of a particular licence 
holding. The first pertains to the licence award, that is, the point at which the host-nation 
grants permission for exploration to be undertaken. The second relates to the initial 
exploratory drilling action that is undertaken, namely the commencement of the first test 
well. Finally, following a successful exploration drilling, the third stage is the point at 
which the test-well discovery is brought on-line, and production commences2. The 
following hypotheses have therefore been proposed:
3d) Hypothesis - The smaller the Operating firm, the shorter the time between award of 
licence and drilling of the first exploration test-well.
3e) Hypothesis - The smaller the Operating firm, the shorter the time between a 
commercially successful exploration test-well find, and production coming on-line.
Acknowledging Eisenhardt’s work, strategic decisions are of a magnitude of importance 
that speed must be accompanied by quality of decision-making. To control for this, a 
firm’s past test-well drilling success rate has been used as a barometer for decision
accuracy.
* Support is found in Chen and Hambrick’s (1995) research. Their investigation of the US airline industry 
revealed small airlines to more rapidly action competitive challenges than large airlines.
2 Following a successful exploration drilling, the firm must establish the appropriate production facilities 
and sales contracts prior to the commencement of production.
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3.1.6 Rapidity of Action, a Growing Necessity for the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS)?
In the opening speech at the 2003 Offshore Europe Conference, Bruce Dingwall 
President of the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) referenced 
the evolving need for rapid action in the North Sea:
‘It needs people and companies who are willing to take risks, who have the energy and 
are able to act and react with pace to a rapidly evolving basin and its unique and ever- 
challenging requirements.’ (Dingwall, 2003)
The UKCS is increasingly recognised as a mature basin. Many now forecast total 
production to have reached its peak (Fig 3.1.1). Maturity is recognised within the 
industry as the final stage of a basin’s life-cycle. The stage when it becomes increasingly 
difficult to find and produce petroleum. As reported for the North Sea, the “easy oil” has 
now been produced (Dingwall, 2003). With unit operating costs forecast to rise from 
$4.1 per boe to $4.9/boe by 2010, and the UKCS already seen as a high cost region, its 
international competitiveness is being questioned (UKOOA, 2003, p.8). Comparison is 
often made between the low cost Gulf of Mexico and the high cost UKCS.
Three Ages of the North Sea
Source: Skipper (2003) Fig 3.1 1
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An important element of the aott eifffrertial is typically to beCaaiortal faaSort.
DTI DiteaSfr, Simon Toole, notes the lengthy time taken to react agreements, ‘nine 
months in the UK...ninf weeks in the Gulf, and ttf quantity of legal paperwork 
characteristic of UKCS contracts (Toole, 2003). Thf emerging objective of thf DTI to 
encourage new Independent entrants from Nortt America, is rationalised by saying that 
‘we need people successful from doing things in a different way’ (Toole, 2003). As thf 
2003 tounetablf workshop session at thf OffsCorf Europe Corffrfrae cfnclueee, for ttf 
UKCS: ‘Tte pace of decision-making is too slow and much slower than in thf Gulf of 
Mexico. This is largely a ahltural itsne - and down to 30 yfatt of accreted practices!’ 
(OER, 2003, p- 10). Hastening decision-making speed is recognised as an important 
strategy for reducing costs within the UKCS. By establishing a framework to explore 
whether or not British Independents are fast moving and speedy decision-makers, this 
thesis will assess British Independents possible possession of such work practices.
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3.2 UTILISATION OF CONTRACTORS
3.2.1 Introduction
The nature of business practice in the petroleum industry has traditionally been 
characterised by its large fully vertically integrated Major corporations (Sampson, 1975).
In these corporations all five principal industry stages, of exploration, production, 
transportation, refining and marketing are internalised. For Majors, management of the 
entire cycle from initial crude extraction to final consumer sale can be provided in-house 
(Masseron, 1990; BP, 1977). In contrast, Independents are characterised by their lack of 
vertical integration. Their focus on the upstream exploration and production stages is a 
defining aspect of their operations (see Section 1.1). However, such focus does not 
imply that all the required functions for exploration and production are provided in-house 
by Independents, Initial unstructured, exploratory interviews suggested the opposite. 
Professor Kemp, University of Aberdeen, reported the Independents’ “use of contractors 
to be key” to their functioning (Kemp, 2003). Thus, one research objective is to 
determine for which functions Independents rely on external contractors, as compared to 
the in-house functional strengths possessed by Independents.
3.2.2 The N ature of the Firm
Within economics literature, the issue of whether a firm provides a particular function 
internally, or whether it out-sources it to an external contractor, has received substantial 
attention. Ronald Coase (1937) posited that the cause of an action, such as whether a 
firm internally or externally sources a particular function, is essentially the consequence 
of there being a cost of using the price mechanism. This cost is, however, relative to the 
cost of internal provision. Coase’s (1937) theory pivoted on the premise that a firm 
would seek in-house provision, if the cost of achieving this was lower than the cost of 
outsourcing the activity to an external provider (i.e. using the “price mechanism”). 
Whilst this transaction cost framework was useful for understanding the internal / 
external sourcing of functions, Coase did not fully explain what actually influenced the 
costs of internal provision. His efforts can be seen as mainly casting light on the 
extremes; the birth of firms and their final maturity. Thus, the establishment of a firm 
occurs because there is a cost of using the price mechanism; the high costs of negotiating
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a separate contract for each transaction on the open market therefore makes it more 
profitable to develop internal provision. Coase’s framework implies that firms have an 
automatic predisposition towards internalising new functions. They continue to grow and 
internalise more functions until a size is reached at which the costs of organizing an 
additional transaction internally are equivalent to outsourcing the transaction on the open 
market. In essence, Coase’s schema prescribes that firms only move towards considering 
the possibility of outsourcing at the final stages of their growth. The theory does not 
sufficiently explain why the level of contractual sourcing varies from ‘industry to 
industry and firm to firm’ (Coase, 1937, p.73). This is because the factors determining 
the costs of internal provision, in the main, are only superficially explored by Coase. 
Subsequent work has explored what these costs of internal provision might entail1. Thus, 
in this thesis the writings of Oliver Williamson and George Richardson are used to 
provide two differing perspectives for interpreting what determines the in-house/out- 
house provision of functions among the Independents.
3.2.3 Transaction Cost Economics
Williamson’s transactions cost economics primarily explains the sourcing of a company’s 
functions through the concept of Asset Specificity. In relations between a buyer and 
seller asset specificity arises when gains from trade are made by investments in assets 
which are specialized to the exchange (Perry, 1989). For Williamson, it is the intensity 
of this specialization that determines whether internal or external provision is sought. 
The greater the specificity of an asset to a firm, the more likely that function will be 
internalised. Williamson (1986) identifies four types of asset specificity: sz7e specificity 
(e.g. related to geographical proximity and asset immobility); physical-asset specificity 
(e.g. a particular die required to produce a component); human-asset specificity (e.g. 
learning-by-doing, or chronic problems of moving human assets in teams); dedicated 
assets, (e.g. involving the development of extra production capacity, but for the prospect 
of selling to a specific customer). Two additional factors that Williamson also notes as
1 Within Williamson’s work (1975; 1985; 1986; 1989; 2002) the cost of internal provision may be 
interpreted to be a function of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of transaction. Whilst for 
Richardson (1972) the cost of internal provision is influenced by the fit (‘similarity’) of an activity with the 
existing knowledge, experience and skills held by the firm.
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being of influence are Uncertainty and Frequency of Transaction. Uncertainty, relates to 
the disturbances to which a transaction is subject. Frequency of Transaction, relates to 
the rate at which transactions recur. As the power of either of these variables increases, 
the propensity to internalise the particular activity within the firm is augmented.
Williamson’s transaction economics is stated to be based upon the concepts of Bounded 
Rationality and Opportunism. The theory of Bounded Rationality was developed by 
Herbert Simon (1961, p.xxiv), and conceived that economic actors were ‘intended^ 
rational, but only limitedly so’. The formation of organizations was therefore a 'way to 
economise on the limited computational capacity of the individual (Simon, 1957, p. 199). 
Drawing on this work Williamson promotes the need for governance structures; those 
that enable the ‘costs of planning, adapting and monitoring transactions...to be 
considered.’ (Williamson, 1985, p.46). For Willliamson, governance structures are not 
only present within firms, but also should help span them when transactions are 
established2 (see Section 6.2). The additional stimulus to governance structures within 
Williamson’s theory, arises from Opportunism, ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ 
(Williamson, 1985, p.47). Human nature is described as going beyond the proclivities of 
the ‘simple self-interest seeking’ individual to strategic or evasive conduct such as 
misrepresentation of facts, lying, cheating, skirting rules and calculated efforts to 
mislead. The combination of bounded rationality with opportunism leads Williamson’s 
economic individuals, when compared to their neoclassical counterparts, to be ‘...on the 
one hand, less competent optimisers and, on the other, better liars, cheaters and shirkers.’ 
(Masten, 1999, p.39). A Machiavellian interpretation of the economic individual is 
openly stated (Williamson, 1985, p.48).
3.2.4 The Resource-B ased Approach
In contrast to Williamson’s transaction cost framework, a resource-based approach offers 
an interesting alternative perspective for the interpretation of findings (Kay, 1992; 1993; 
2000). Such an approach is epitomised by the works of Edith Penrose (Penrose, 1959;
2 When asset specificity is high, for Williamson (2002) ‘credible contracting’ can only be achieved if the 
appropriate safeguarding governance structures are in place. These include: information disclosure, 
penalties, specialized dispute resolution mechanisms and verification mechanisms.
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1971). Her focus on endogenous growth, and the role of knowledge generated within 
firms, provides a useful perspective. An application of her approach would follow the 
reasoning that a firm’s existing experience and skill may determine the ‘direction of 
[firm] expansion’ (Pitelis and Sugden, 2000, p.3). Influenced by Penrose’s work 
(Richardson, 2002, p.37), Richardson (1972, p.231) also reasoned that resources, namely 
knowledge, experience, and skills were what determined how functions (‘activities’) 
were managed by a firm. His writings reinforce the view of the Austrian School 
economist Hayek, that knowledge is uncertain and unevenly distributed, rather than 
‘perfect’ (Hayek, 1937). It is through a focus upon a firm’s resources that Richardson 
constructs his theory for interpreting when in-house versus out-sourced provision is 
chosen. He divides the activities required by a firm into two groups: Similar activities 
and Complementary activities. The former relate to those activities which require the 
same capabilities for their undertaking, whilst the latter, refer to activities which 
represent different phases of the process of production and require, in some way, to be 
co-ordinated. Following this schema, he determines that for any firm with a given set of 
resources, the incorporation of an activity can fall into one of three categories. Such 
activities may be: both similar and complementary, in that they may be co-ordinated by 
direction within an individual business; complementary but dissimilar, in that co­
operation provides an alternative; and neither complementary nor similar, in that 
responsibility is held by differing firms and the market mechanism prevails (Foss, 1994). 
Offering the middle-ground alternative of ‘co-operation’ between firms, Richardson’s 
formulation of co-ordination, represents an interesting alternative to Williamson’s 
opportunistically based theory. More recent support for the idea that ‘planned co­
ordination..^! be effected through co-operation between firms’ (Richardson, 1972, 
p.240) may be drawn from the re-examination of the classic example of market failure. 
General Motor’s acquisition of Fisher Body (Coase, 2000; Freeland, 2000; Casadesus- 
Masanell and Spulber, 2000). Contrary to the classic interpretation, that the merger 
proceeded because of concerns over transaction-specific investment and holdup, detailed 
historic research shows that a ‘working relationship prior to the 1926 merger exhibited 
trust rather than opportunism.’ (Casadesus-Masanell & Spulber, 2000, p.67). The merger 
reflected time-specific economic considerations, not an immutable market failure.
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3.2.5 Contract Incentivisation
The divide between Williamson and Richardson’s theories, over the issues of 
Opportunism and Co-operation, are most acute when applied to contract incentivisation 
policies. For Williamson (2002), Opportunism renders a contract subject to unrelieved
hazard, unless safeguarding governance structures, such as incentivisation measures, are 
in place. His theory promotes the concept that incentivisation should be prevalent in any 
contract where a degree of asset specificity is present. Richardson, in contrast, takes a 
broader perspective. As Langlois (1998, p. 193) describes, Richardson is ‘interested in 
the co-ordination of production, not merely in the co-ordination of commUmcrnsS For 
Richardson, asset specificity can be overcome through co-operative arrangements of 
production (Langlois, 1998, p. 192); incentive safeguards to mitigate opportunism are not 
essential. In contrast to this, Williamson focuses on the co-ordination of commitments 
(the transaction) and argues that trust is ‘irrelevant to commercial exchange’ 
(Williamson, 1993, p.469).
The different approaches towards incentivisation adopted by Independents can be 
interpreted through the contrasting perspectives of the aforementioned theories. In 
Section 6.2, this method of interpreting results from two differing perspectives is shown 
both to be helpful in testing the validity of each theory, and in providing explanations for 
the results found. This method of analysis is most fruitful when reconciliation of two 
opposing theories is achieved. In Section 6.2.6, this is attempted with respect to the 
process by which Independents, as they grow in size, internalise new functions.
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3.3 NEGOTIATION
3.3,1 Introduction
The need for negotiation permeates the petroleum industry. Interdependence and 
conflict, the characteristic stimulants to negotiation (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985; 
Bazerman and Lewicki, 1983), are acutely present in the corporate / State, stake-holder 
divide. Reconciliation is essential to the efficient functioning of the system; States guard 
access to the petroleum resource holding territory, whilst corporations possess the ability 
to co-ordinate the necessary labour and capital for resource extraction and value creation. 
For the E&P firm, success in negotiations with governmental licensing bodies is 
especially important, if access to resources is to be secured.
Negotiation involves a process of struggle, conflicting interests of opposing parties are 
reconciled in order for a mutually agreed solution to be derived (Johnson, 1993). From 
the corporate perspective there are three aspects to licensing negotiation: the approach, 
the fortuitous behavioural methods adopted that may channel a firm’s efforts 
successfully; the content of the proposal, the technical action that is to be actually 
implemented; and the context the environment in which both the approach, with its 
accompanying content will be applied (Fig 3.3.1).
Licence Negotiation
Content
(Technical)
Mediated by
the
►
..........
Approach
(Behavioural)
> Context 
-(Host Government)
Fig 3,3.1
The content of a proposal, relates to the programme of work that a petroleum company 
proposes to undertake. It contains the substance of the negotiation, what the firm 
proposes to do on receipt of a licence. Drawing fiom the assessment criteria utilised by 
UK Government’s licensing agency, the DTI, a series of significant proposal content 
factors may be recognised (DTI, 2003). The first pertains to geological assessment; part 
of the scorecard scheme implemented by the DTI for assessing licence applications
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targets the thoroughness of the technical analysis made by the firm in its work proposal. 
Technical analysis is marked with respect to categories including: evaluation of 
stratigraphie levels, regional analysis and interpretation, identification of prospectivity, 
and use of relevant seismic database. A further factor is the level of commitment to drill, 
the DTI reports different marks to be given for differing types of drilling commitments in 
a work programme. A ‘Firm well’ equals a resolute commitment to drill a well. A 
‘Contingent well’ is similar to a firm well, except it includes the explicit provision for 
commitment to waived if a specified geotechnical evaluation suggests drilling would not 
be justified - the evaluation being another element of the same Work Programme. ‘Firm 
wells’ are granted the highest score, ‘contingent’ the lowest. A further factor targeted by 
the DTI is financial capability - ‘DTI [must] satisfy itself that it only issues licences to 
companies who can afford to complete the Work Programmes they are offering’ (DTI, 
2003, p.5). Finally, innovative application or development of technology is reported by 
the DTI to be favourably rewarded by their system. Beyond the content aspects flagged 
by the DTI, with a specific feature of this thesis being to examine decision-making speed 
and rapidity of action, the content factor of the rapidity of work programme should also 
be incorporated. Although, the above measures are mainly drawn from the context of the 
UK, they still act as a useful set of generic measures for determining what content factors 
are of greatest influence upon award of licence and how their relative significance may 
vary according to the context in which they are applied.
The approach adopted for negotiation is context bound: certain contexts require certain 
approaches. As a highly international industry, the context to petroleum licensing 
negotiations is strongly variegated. In accordance with the work of Salacuse (1991; 
2003), the following research interprets his barriers of differing: laws and legislature, 
bureaucratic systems, and culture as important contextual factors to which the adopted 
negotiating approach must be sensitive. This research does not attempt to disentangle 
how the given context is derived, influential constituents (Fig 3.3.2) are acknowledged, 
but emphasis is placed upon the resulting context rather than the process causing its 
genesis. Research focuses upon the negotiating approach applied to the context. What
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causal approach factors are most suited to a given context, and are any of the features 
particular to Independents part of that approach?
Influe
Consti
The resulting 
Government Context 
to which the Corporate 
Negotiating Approach
must be attuned
Fig 3.3.2
To-date, there is no research either within, the petroleum industry or the growing SME 
literature, that specifically identifies the strengths and weaknesses exhibited by SMEs in 
negotiation scenarios. Yet, strength in negotiations has been noted as a feature central to 
Independents’ ability to ‘cultivate their connections’ with foreign governments 
(Economist, 1998). The two causal features of the Independent approach expressed are: 
firstly, the seniority of the Independents’ company representatives used during 
negotiations, and secondly, the low turnover of negotiators among Independents, the 
same company representatives are present at each negotiating meeting. Though proposed 
as the negotiating strengths of Independents, these two variables should be compared 
with further causal variables (less associated with firm size) particularly those approaches 
drawn from the constituent elements of context: the bureaucratic system of government 
and culture. Comparison enables the postulated strengths of the Independent approach to 
be examined relative to the overall context driven approach required.
3.3.2 The Independent Approach
The seniority of company representatives is widely acknowledged as an important aspect 
to any negotiating approach. Seniority confers both an element of importance and the 
authority to commit. Importance may assist in facilitating access to senior personnel 
within the host government (Marsh, 2001), whilst decision-making authority can both 
hasten the negotiating process and facilitate the overall likelihood of success (Kapoor et 
al, 1991). For a negotiated solution (success) to be achieved, the principle personnel that
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hold the authority to commit on both sides, will eventually need to give their consent to 
action. For Independents, seniority has been reported as a key success factor of their 
negotiating approach: ‘politicians in developing countries sometimes prefer to deal with 
the boss of an Independent than a mere manager of an oil giant.’ (Economist, 1998).
A second reported Independent strength, is the use of the same company representatives 
at each negotiating meeting. Repeated interaction is widely noted as an essential 
constituent to the incremental establishment of trust (Ring and van de Ven, 1992; Child, 
1998). Drawing from alliance literature, high turnover among the personnel of 
management teams is recognised as one of the most significant barriers to the 
establishment of inter-organizational trust (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). Kelly et al. 
(2000) have noted that high levels of management turnover, common in large firms, 
complicates linkage; there is a constant requirement to bring new managers ‘up-to- 
speed’. This takes time, and as a result slows the overall negotiation process (Salacuse, 
1991). In contrast, continuity of negotiating team members enables the establishment of 
shared knowledge that can help both sides to reach an agreement (Salacuse, 1991).
3.3.3 Licensing Agencies and the Bureaucratic System of Government
Authority to commit also extends to the realm of the State. Salacuse (2003) stresses the 
importance of accessing the appropriate department, and government official. Accessing 
the wrong official can result in false promises that will later unfold as the deal progresses. 
The need to incorporate all the appropriate government departments in a decision is also 
emphasised. Firms must know which State departments/agencies to contact and strive to 
include their representatives in any negotiations. The potential for bureaucratic conflict 
is ‘almost always present’ and firms should seek to prevent such an outcome through a 
process of inclusion (Salacuse, 2003).
Beyond accessing the appropriate official, a further important feature to securing a 
licence from a government bureaucracy, may be persistence. State bureaucratic agencies 
vary in both their efficiency and prioritisation. Constant contact or repeated attempts by 
the firm to secure a licence may stimulate recognition of the firm or speed an application
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through the system. Although persistence is not a feature readily noted in the negotiation 
literature, initial inductive research suggested it to be significant to oil licence 
applications. Hodgshon and Land (2000) recount how government systems for acreage 
allocation vary widely. The most competitive format is that of the Bid Round. Where, 
during a fixed time-frame (round), companies prepare bids for specified acreage blocks, 
these bids are assessed by the government according to set criteria and a winner is 
selected. As the preferred method in countries such as the US, North Sea, Australia and 
Brazil, the system is positively noted as being consistent with principles of competition 
and fairness. A further system holding a competitive element is the Contested 
Application; companies are free to apply for open acreage at any time, but once an 
application is registered the government is required to invite competing applications 
during a fixed period. The final system, of non-competitive licensing arrangements 
where countries rely upon bilateral dealing, are equally common. With open access to 
acreage, operating under a ‘first come, first served’ principle, the system is open to 
manipulation. Firms not first in queue may attempt to influence award decisions, this is 
especially true in scenarios where award allocation is centralised with one particular oil 
minister (Hodgshon and Land, 2000). Although the growing tendency is towards 
competitive bid rounds, all governments, regardless of licensing system, retain a 
discretionary element: ‘...the invitation to bid provides no indication of how bids will be 
evaluated’ (Hodgshon and Land, 2000, p.75). The above licensing systems only provide 
surface distinction, determining their actual operation can only be derived from those 
who have experienced the system. Consequently, categories for licensing allocation 
systems do not provide accurate measures of the licensing context with which firms must 
engage. A more generalised distinction of context is required.
3.3.4 Culture
A further key constituent of the particular context to which a negotiating approach must 
be attuned, is culture. When defining culture, two schools of thought dominate. From 
sociology, emphasis is placed upon behavioural traits of the organization (Salancik, 
1977; Meek, 1988); culture is embedded in history and structural relationships, its 
systems, procedures, policies and processes. In contrast, the Perceptions School (Legge,
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1994; Beer et al, 1990), originating in psychology, focuses upon the individual, culture is 
something an organisation ‘has’. Following an interpretive emphasis, culture is the set of 
psychological predispositions that lead members to act in certain ways. A further hybrid 
approach to understanding the cultural context, that sits between the above nodes of traits 
and perceptions, is the work of Hofstede (1994). Focusing upon the resulting practices, 
that are stimulated by cultural values, Hofstede’s hybrid positioning is replicated in much 
research into cross-cultural negotiation (Lin and Miller, 2003; Martin and Herbig, 1997; 
Herbig and Gulbro, 1997). Though it is beyond this study to delimit the heterogeneity of 
cultural particularities that influence the overall negotiating context, acknowledgement of 
the cultural element has been incorporated. Herbig and Gulbro’s (1997) findings that the 
presence of bicultural brokers, host-country nationals, in a negotiating team is positively 
associated with successful negotiation, confirms Kapoor et al’s (1991) identification of 
the advantage that a national representative may confer. Herbig and Gulbro (1997) do 
not however, question the significance of this cultural variable relative to other, non­
cultural aspects of the negotiating approach. The current research, incorporating 
Salacuse’s (2003) recognition of approach defining bureaucratic features, introduces non­
cultural aspects of ‘persistence’ and ‘accessing the appropriate official’ to the negotiating 
approach.
Beyond features of the behavioural approach, in an equitable system, it is the content of a 
licence application that should rationally determine the outcome. Whilst it may be 
assumed that technical content will always be the primary determinant, rather than the 
behavioural approach utilised, governments will differ according to the relative 
weightings that are inadvertently placed upon each. The behavioural approach is likely 
to be more influential in some countries than others. Likewise, technical factors may be 
more closely scrutinised in some countries than others. Herbig and Gulbro (1997) found 
that firms using country or cultural experts were more likely to succeed than those 
concentrating upon business or technical experts as their sources for briefings. However, 
their research only considered one context, ‘foreign negotiations’, this constituted 
business negotiations undertaken with parties outside of the US.
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Further contextual separation is relevant along a Western / Non-Western divide. Such 
terminology usefully probes an aspect of the bipolar divisions in the current global 
system (Watts, 2000). Similar to the macro-terminology of North-South, the Western / 
Non-Western divide receives endorsement from studies of government bureaucracy (Ye, 
2003; Peters, 2001; Beetham, 1987). Within cultural studies a measure of distinction is 
also noted between the two contexts. Marsh (2001) draws distinction between Western 
style culture where the socialization process is orientated towards the individual, whereas 
in other cultures, association is more towards the group. Additional support may be 
sourced in Salacuse (1998), who found Non-Western countries such as Argentina, China, 
Mexico and India to place greater negotiating goal emphasis upon the establishment of a 
relationship than in Western - Spain, France and the US - where negotiating goals were 
focused more towards the contract itself. A similar differential is recognised by Kennel 
(2000) spanning between ‘relationship’ and ‘legalistic’ based countries. Although all 
countries are noted as a combination of both contract and relationship, the relative 
importance does vary between countries. For many ‘the quality of relationship between 
decision-makers is at least as important as the language of the agreement’ (Kennel, 2000, 
p. 182).
With approximately half of the total licence interests held by our Independent population 
being sourced in Non-Western countries, the geographic distinction of the occident 
(Europe and North America) provides a simple divide for analysing how differing 
behavioural approaches and technical content operate in the two contexts: Western to 
Non-Western. This geographic distinction enables the proposed negotiating strengths of 
Independents to be tested for two separate macro contexts - Western and Non-Western 
governments. Whilst the constituent elements of each context may be heterogeneous 
(Fig3.3.2), in aggregation a degree of homogeneity is produced: distinction between the 
‘West’ and ‘Non-West’ contexts becomes apparent.
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3.4 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
3.4.1 Introduction
Research into the internationalisation strategies of resource companies is extremely 
‘scarce’ (Lewis and Minchev, 2001). Existing research emphasis predominates towards 
companies engaged in secondary and tertiary activities (Coviello and McAuley, 1999; 
Papadopoulos and Denis, 1988; Berra et al, 1995; O’Farrell et al, 1998). Penetration of a 
firm’s products and services into new foreign markets is the prevailing focus. In contrast, 
for firms involved in primary activities, such as raw material extraction and production, 
location of international activities are mainly weighted towards accessing the scarce 
resource, rather than accessing a particular market. Without the downstream activities of 
transportation, refining and marketing functions, international strategy of the upstream 
exploration and production company is oriented towards securing supply. Unlike the 
traditional choice for SME internationalisation strategies between exporting or Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI1) (Majoochi and Zucchella,2003), for a foreign supply to be 
secured FDI is the only option available to the Independent.
Two pertinent channels of inquiry that may be drawn from the existing research upon 
FDI strategy are: firstly the causal stimulus, the rationale for seeking foreign operation, 
and secondly, the process followed in increasing international operations. An example of 
the former is the work of Landeau (1977), who uniquely sought to determine the 
rationale of why US Independents chose to expand abroad. Whilst the latter, queries how 
international expansion unfolds (Anderson, 1993; Oviatt and McDougall,1997; O’Farrell 
et al, 1998); which countries are chosen and why. Once more, within internationalisation 
process literature, emphasis is towards market penetration rather than access to supply. 
Nevertheless, the models developed do possess a degree of transferability, and 
application to the current topic is fruitful.
1 Pitelis (2002, p.3) ‘FDI is the control of production which takes place in one country by a firm based in 
another country’.
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3.4.2 Why Internationalise?
Reviewing the sporadic postulations within oil industry literature concerning why US 
Independents expanded abroad and combining these with archived Independent annual 
reports, Landeau (1977) distilled a set of ten factors commonly attributed as key 
stimulants to internationalisation. Through a set of 14 interviews, Landeau tested the
relevance of these factors for the initial move abroad of US Independents. 
Methodologically, Landeau’s probing of ten industry-specific causal factors has 
contemporary support. For example, O’Farrell et al (1998) in an exploratory study, 
similarly employs a set of several ‘qualitative factors’ to assess internationalisation of 
business service SMEs. Utilisation of several qualitative factors may augment the 
possibility that the most pertinent variables will be identified (Kuo and Li, 2003). For 
Landeau, four of the most significant factors reported included: Company’s oil reserves 
expansion (30% of US Independents), Increased cost of finding oil domestically (15% of 
US Independents), Greater potential of oil areas abroad (10% of US Independents), and 
the Higher return abroad (5% of US Independents). Each of these factors has thus been 
incorporated into the current research thesis. Following a similar methodology2, this 
study enables the applicability of Landeau’s principle factors to be tested for the British 
Independents.
Landeau’s interviews found Company’s oil reserves expansion as a ‘general and 
permanent concern’ among the companies. Such concern is evident within the British 
Independent population; annual reports typically place strong emphasis upon reserve 
growth. With reserves described as the ‘essential economic strength’ of an exploration 
and production company (Bauquis et al, 2000, p. 152), focus upon this variable may be 
investor orientated. Indeed, AntiII and Arnott (2000) stress the importance of reserves to 
valuation practices. Evaluation of a company’s reserves is a key aspect that informs the 
calculation of net asset values by investment analysts. Estimated net asset values of 
Independents, relative to their market capitalisation, are one of the principle measures 
used in the valuation of exploration and production companies (Rose and Wilders,
2 Landeau used direct interviews to obtain his data.
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2003)3. Reserve growth is traditionally associated with share price rise4 *. Thus, firms 
seeking to boost their share prices, will be likely to be orientated towards expansion of 
oil/gas reserves3.
The declining exploration success rate and diminishing presence of cheap, easily
accessible oil within the US Increased the cost of finding oil domestically. Whether 
increased ‘finding costs’ (Antill and Arnott, 2000) are the stimulus to an international 
move, by British Independents, is also queried by this research. An additional factor 
identified by Landeau, and incorporated into this study, pertains to the Potential of oil 
areas abroad. Many foreign countries were perceived as under-explored and therefore 
highly prospective. For Landeau, focusing on US entries abroad during the 1950s, the 
potential oil areas abroad mainly related to Middle Eastern countries. Within our 
contemporary study, potential areas have moved beyond this heartland to include 
countries often referred to as the ‘non-traditional petroleum countries’6 (O’Connor, 2000, 
p. 139). These are countries which, until the 1980/90s, had been closed to international 
oil companies and the private sector. Such countries are various, but include: Argentina, 
Yemen, Romania, Poland, China, the fonner Soviet Union, and Bangladesh. Release of 
potential among these countries’, is generally posited upon the application of private 
sector ideas, methods and technology (O’Connor, 2000). Finally, drawing from Jacoby’s 
(1974) reasoning, that the move of US firms overseas was due to the attraction of the 
higher profits being reported there, Landeau incorporated the Higher return abroad 
factor. Whether enhanced profitability of foreign ventures is an influential stimulus to 
foreign expansion is also tested for the British Independents.
3 ‘Our main valuation methodology is analysis of Net Asset Value’ (Rose and Wilders, 2003, p.5).
4 Paladin’s continual share price rise over the past 4 years, may be associated with its consistent expansion 
of petroleum reserves through acquisition (Annual Report, 2002, p. 13). A further example of the direct 
influence of a company’s reserves upon share price, is demonstrated by Shell. Following the revelation 
that it had overestimated its oil and gas reserves by 20%, the share price instantly fell 7% (Hoyos, 2004).
3 Many fund management companies are restricted to selecting shares in companies above a certain market 
capitalization. As an E&P company increases its market capitalization, the pool of fund managers willing 
to invest in the oil firm will similarly increase. (Author’s Internship with a fund management corporation, 
2002).
6 In contrast, the ‘traditional petroleum countries’ are those where the international petroleum industry had 
been concentrated prior to the 1980s. These are stated to include the: Gulf of Mexico, North Sea, and a 
small number of countries in the Middle East, West Africa, and Southeast Asia (O’Connor, 2000, p. 139).
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Following an exploratory methodology, in addition to the above four factors identified by 
Landeau, several further factors have been included in the current research. Some of the
additional factors {Less competition abroad, Lower monetary commitment, Greater 
possibility of control, Improved fiscal terms), are refined versions of non-significant 
factors {Decreased harriers to entry and Tax incentives), probed in Landeau’s research. 
Other factors are novel to this research {Portfolio diversification, Proximity to market, 
and Utilisation of Existing Contacts), and have been included to broaden the initial 
framework initiated by Landeau. Each factor will now be explained in relation to the 
reason for its incorporation.
The first set of factors relates to access, they refine Landeau’s Decreased harriers to 
entry, into the following categories: Less Competition Abroad, Lower monetary 
commitment, and Greater possibiUty of control. An initial field interview with an 
investment analyst specialised in the petroleum sector, noted Independents to only gain 
access to “basket case” countries. Unable to compete for more preferable areas. 
Independents were noted to gain access mainly to countries where there was less 
competition for licences. A further access factor may pertain to the monetary 
commitment required, In a capital-intensive industry (Bauquis et al, 2000), there will be 
occasions when the lower collateral of smaller firms restricts the amount a given lender is 
willing to provide (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990). (see Section 6.1.2.4) For large-scale 
projects, the total capital possessed by Independents could be insufficient. Experience of 
such scenarios, may stimulate Independents to seek countries where the average project 
requires a Lower monetary commitment. For certain countries (UK being given as an 
example), initial inductive enquiry suggested Independents often had difficulty achieving 
the position of licence Operator. Thus, when considering the rationale supporting an 
overseas move, the Greater possibildy of control (i.e. being an Operator) is incorporated. 
Similar to the inclusion of taxation by Landeau, the possibility of Improved fiscal terms 
being offered by a foreign government is considered as a further potential rationale for 
overseas expansion.
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Another factor, often referenced by petroleum industry literature (Foss, 2000; Bauquis, 
2000; Barry, 1993) regards the strategy of Portfolio diversification. Grounded in the risk 
minimising principles of Markowitz (1970), exploration and production companies are 
recommended to hold projects with different risk profiles (Bauquis, 2000). Risk is often 
segmented according to various categories. Within the petroleum industry such 
categories usually include: technical risk, the complexity of a drilling and its likelihood 
of success; political risk, the possibility that governments may re-adjust the existing 
terms and conditions set; and security risk, the risk of insurgency (Foss, 2000). In line 
with the principles of portfolio diversification (Markowitz, 1970; Vickers, 1987; Brealey 
and Myers, 1996), companies may seek to acquire licences that differ in their risk 
profiles. For example, Licence A could be in a country where technical risks are typically 
low, but political risk is high: Licence B, in a country where technical risks are high, but 
political risk is low. As will be discussed (Section 6.4.1), simultaneous holding of 
Licences A and B within a portfolio, can reduce overall firm risk to a greater extent than 
if only one licence was held. Portfolio diversification., the attempt to hold projects with 
differing risk profiles so as to reduce overall firm risk, is an additional factor that may 
stimulate the internationalisation of Independents.
Reflecting upon the market vs. resource supply, locational pull discussed earlier. 
Proximity to market was incorporated to test its relative significance. Finally, with many 
Independent CEOs and Directors having worked overseas prior to establishing or joining 
an Independent, Granovetter’s (1973) concept of the strength of weak ties, through the 
Utilisation of existing contacts, was a further internationalising factor to be incorporated.
3.4.3 Choice of Country
One of the most established models concerning the internationalisation of the individual 
firm is the Uppsala model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975). Still in receipt of contemporary support (Petersen and Pedersen, 1997), the model
holds that firms will follow an incremental internationalisation process, whereby the
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selection of foreign markets will proceed in order of ‘psychic distance’6. Those markets 
most proximate - for example in terms of culture, political system or language - to those 
in which the firm already operates, will be entered first. Indeed, the Uppsala measure of 
psychic distance is similar to our understanding of ‘context’ described in Section 3.3. 
The Uppsala model is, however, market focused in orientation, emphasis being placed 
upon market distance (alias context distance). Whilst this is also applicable to the E&P 
firm, a further element of distance can also be conceived, that of geological distance. 
Differing geological basins will require differing specialist knowledge and experience. 
Some of this knowledge and experience may be transferable to other fields within the 
same basin, and occasionally to foreign basins. In accordance with the Uppsala 
framework - for which a firm’s existing knowledge is recognised as the determinant of 
the expansionary path chosen (Andersen, 1993) - it may be hypothesised that 
Independents will choose to enter those foreign countries where the geologieal distance is 
least, in countries where their existing knowledge and experience is most applicable. 
This concept resonates with a resource-based view of the firm.
3.4.4 Mode of Entry
Beyond country choice, the second dimension to the internationalisation process is choice 
of entry mode (Andersen, 1997). Applied to Independents, entry mode may be 
interpreted as the choice between whether to be Operator or Non-Operator of a foreign 
licence. The move to Operate is associated with a greater degree of resource 
commitment, because the Operator is responsible for staffing and managing the joint 
venture^. According to Barry (1993, p.5) it is the ‘Operator’s duty and privilege to 
propose the work programme’. Use of the operator’s co-ordinating resources for running 
the activities is not, however, refunded with a profit mark up. Partners will reimburse the 
salaries and sums paid by the Operator, but there is no extra payment for the use of its co­
ordinating abilities6. Drawing upon the perspective of the Uppsala, model (Johanson and
6 By this they mean the differences between any two countries in terms of business practice, culture, 
language and legislation.
8 Within the upstream petroleum industry, the joint venture is the dominant structure adopted by firms 
when entering into E&P licences.
6 This extra effort is not exempt of beneficial return, Operating confers a degree of authority over both the 
size and timing of work programmes (Barry, 1993).
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Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975), where it is predicted the mode of entry will follow successive 
stages of increased commitment, moving from initial export to later FDI, this thesis 
questions whether a similar strategy of reduced commitment (Non-Operator), followed 
by that of higher commitment (Operator) is characteristic of the moves abroad
undertaken by Independents.
3.4.5 Born International?
The model of incremental internationalisation has received criticism. Oviatt and 
McDougall (1997) detail the UNCTAD (1993) and OECD (1997) reports which found 
that even though most firms still appear to internationalise in an incremental way, a small 
number of firms are international at founding. Although the ‘born global’ research (Bell 
et al, 2004), similar to other works in the internationalisation literature, is focused upon 
secondary and tertiary activities, aspects of its enquiry may be applicable to the upstream 
petroleum industry. However, in probing this aspect, definitional distinction must be 
observed. If a firm is to be ‘born international’, then this implies that from its naissance 
it started with interests in several countries, almost simultaneously. This should be 
contrasted with what can be classified as ‘born foreign’, where a company at naissance 
holds its headquarters in the UK, but its first active interests are in one foreign country. 
The applicability of this differing terminology will be tested for our Independent 
population.
3.4.6 Business Model
Although the above sections question whether the underlying rationale for 
internationalising may be grounded in a universal theory, such as the resource-based 
approach, a more specific, intra-firm driver may be the source of the action. Individual 
firm actions must be observed in relation to the aggregate of all the actions undertaken by 
a firm. Awareness of the full system may enable the placement of the single action to be 
rationalised. Certain individual choices may be explained by obseiving how they fit 
within the overall logic of the firm’s business model. Determining a firm’s business 
model as an external obseiwer is difficult, although when sufficient numbers of key
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variables are pieced together, then patterns will be likely to emerge (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).
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PART 2 EXPLORING THE FIELD AND FINDINGS
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4. FIELDWORK METHODOLOGY
4.1 Orientation
Set within the ‘secretive’ exploration and production industry (Beard and Burk, 2000), 
and having received minimal social science research, British Independents are largely an 
unexplored set of firms (Section 1.1). Fieldwork was thus a necessity if these companies’
organizational strengths and competitive strategies were to be investigated. As discussed 
in Sections 1.2-1.5, each of the four principal channels of inquiry was inductively 
determined; elements of grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 
1998) were followed during the initial stages of research. Channel selection was 
informed and verified through a variety of sources, including interviews with key 
individuals, conference proceedings, documentary and archival data1.
4.2 Insrrumenaation
Having delimited the four channels of research focus, the primary method chosen to 
obtain data pertinent for the study was through face-to-face interviews. This study 
utilised both qualitative and quantitative tools, since this is often recognised as a useful 
method for attaining richer detail ifom fieldwork (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.40). 
Each type of data can be used to supplement and corroborate the other. Therefore, a 
semi-structured interview agenda (SSI) was designed (Appendix 1.1), as this enabled 
both qualitative and quantitative data to be derived. As exemplified in the writings of 
Reid (1993 and 1998), this instrumentation format is suited to small sample research, for 
it enables the particularities of individual firms to be acknowledged, whilst 
simultaneously permitting generalised conclusions about the average firm to be drawn. 
The SSI crafted for this study incorporated a range of differing question devices to 
extract the relevant data. These devices include: Grid Framework (Questions 1.1, 1.4); 
Ranked Alternatives (Questions 1.6, 1.7, 3.1, 3.2); Scenario Response (Question 1.10); *
‘For example, interviews with Professor Kemp (University of Aberdeen); Iain Patrick (ex-Commercial 
Director of Independent Monument Oil); Petroleum Research Analyst (Analyst A); Timothy Milne 
(Director HS Pipe Equipment); attendance at The Offshore Europe Conference, Aberdeen and The Royal 
Bank of Scotland North Sea Conference, London; company annual reports; Energy Institute newspaper 
archives, London,
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Spectrum Design (Question 3.4); and Probe Structured (Questions 1.5, 3.5, 4.1) . 
Following Bryman's reasoning (1989, p.49), both open and closed-ended questions were 
incorporated in the SSI. This mixture proved fortuitous because inteiwicwee disposition 
also varied between the loquacious and occasional pauciloquent type. Although the same 
set of SSI questions was administered to each Independent, similar to Eisenhardt (1989), 
an inductive element also existed; questions were often supplemented with ones that 
seemed fruitful to investigate during the interview. Prior to implementation the SSI was 
reviewed by Professor Kemp of the University of Aberdeen and piloted with Iain Patrick, 
the ex-Commercial Director of the old Independent, Monument Oil.
Initial communication with Independent firms was in the format of a pre-letter (Appendix 
1.3). This detailed the nature of the study and aimed to stimulate recipient interest in the 
interview requested. To accompany the letter an Agenda Outline (Appendix 1.4) and 
Basic Data Sheet (Appendix 1.5) were scripted. The former documented the topics to be 
covered during the interview, whilst the latter requested quantitative information. Letters 
were sent to either the Technical Director or Chief Executive Officer of each 
Independent, and a follow-up call was made one-week later. Choice of interviewee 
(Technical Director/CEO) was made following an analysis of company annual reports; 
the manager recorded as holding the longest period of tenure in the firm was contacted. 
Out of a population of 21 Independents, 14 consented to interview. This arguably 
represents a very high (67%) response rate. Section 5.1 shows that this sample is 
representative of the population. Each interview lasted an average of 1 14-2 hrs. Similar 
to Reid (1993 and 1998), note taking was favoured rather than dictaphone use. The 
primary rationale for this decision was that in an industry known for its secrecy, a 
dictaphone could result in interviewees being more guarded in their response. Instead, to 
maintain comprehensiveness of the notes made, immediately after each interview, an 
hour was spent reviewing them and any additional points that had not been adequately 
noted were detailed.
2 The importance of open-ended, probe structured questions is discussed in Nachmias and Nachmias (1981, 
p. 195) and a demonstration of the effectiveness of this device is presented in Reid's (1993 and 1998) texts.
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4.3 Triangulation
As discussed in Section 1.1, further information sources were utilised to validate 
(triangulate) the findings of the interviews with British Independents. Firstly, a postal 
questionnaire was sent to the 55 North American (US and Canadian) Independents listed
on the New York Stock Exchange and secondly, a series of 7 face-to-face interviews was 
undertaken with Aberdeen based International Drilling Contractors. For the North 
American Independents a series of questions from the original British Independents SSI 
was extracted and inserted into a two-page postal questionnaire (Appendix 1.9). This 
was sent together with a cover-letter (Appendix 1.10) to the Technical Director or CEO 
of each company. Twelve questionnaires were returned, representing a 22% response 
rate. Section 5.2 shows this sample to be representative of the total population as regards 
the cardinal statistic of market capitalization.
To provide an in-depth, and relatively impartial, perspective upon the operations of 
Independents, a sample of International Drilling contractors was also interviewed. For 
geographical purposes3 this was limited to those Drillers listed in the International 
Association of Drilling Contractors (lADC, 2003) Directory noted as holding business 
premises in Aberdeen. Of the 13 Drillers contacted, 7 agreed to be interviewed. Similar 
to the procedure for the Independents a Pre-letter, Agenda Outline and face-to-face SSI 
were scripted (Appendix 1.6-1.8). Interviews on average lasted 1 Vi hrs and written notes 
were taken. Although the questions in the Driller SSI (Appendix 1.6) were different to 
those in Independent SSI (Appendix 1.2), similar question devices were employed.
4.4 Coni?!delTilaiiry
Although it was originally intended that confidentiality would only be applied to certain 
questions, the request for anonymity throughout by some firms, has resulted in the 
identity of all firms having to be concealed. Consequently, throughout this thesis 
Independents are coded alphabetically. These codes are in order of market capitalization. 
For example Independent A has the smallest market capitalization, whilst Independent N
3 In the UK, the majority of International Drilling Contractors premises were located in Aberdeen.
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has the largesti. This coding procedure is repeated for both North American
Independents (NA to NL) and Drilling Contractors (A to G).
4.5 Data Analysis
All quantitative and qualitative data gathered through interviews and the postal 
questionnaire was entered into an SPSS database. The final data file for the British 
Independents comprised 284 separate variables. SPSS was considered an appropriate 
tool for both statistical analysis and data comparison.
4 In Section 5.3.1 a one-off reference in Table 5.3.1 is made to an Independent O, this a North American
Independent operating in the North Sea. Following our meeting at the LOGIC North Sea New Entrants 
Conference, Aberdeen, the Regional Vice President of Independent O accepted to be interviewed.
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5. RESULTS
5.1 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF
INDEPENDENTS
A wide range of data on firm, size variables has been collected, because this enhances the 
possibility of exploring size-related effects1. The six measures of firm size used in this
thesis are Market Capitalization, Net Assets, Annual Total Production, Turnover, 
Operating Profit, and Total Headcount. Table 5.1.1 shows the mean characteristics of the 
Independent population, when measured by these variables.
Measuring the Independent Population: mean, standard deviation and range of each variable
Variable Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Market Capitalization (£m) 137.52 146.01 10.41 583.75
Net Assets (£m) 83.17 94.39 2.36 326.78
Annual Total Production 2002 (boepd) 8527.53 13517.20 0 53600
Turnover (£m) 42.04 68.15 0 263.10
Operating Profit (£m)1 2 12.99 27.76 -8.58 104.10
Total Head Count 138.67 190.28 2 602
Age of Firm (yrs) 12.43 8.21 2 33
Table 5.1.1
The relatively high standard deviation (e.g. as a ratio to the mean) values displayed in 
Table 5.1.1 for the variables Market Capitalization, Net Assets, Turnover, and Head 
Count, suggests that the Independent population is relatively heterogeneous in terms of 
the constituent firms’ sizes. This heterogeneity in size presents the opportunity of size 
comparisons being made within the Independent population. Hypothesis 3 (b), 3 (d) and 
3 (e) (see Section 3.1) are all concerned with the impact that firm size has upon decision­
making speed and rapidity of action. With Independents shown to be of differing sizes, 
the Independent population can therefore act as a suitable group for the testing of these 
hypotheses.
1 This contrasts with the work of Wally and Baum (1994) who only investigated Turnover and Head Count 
as measures of firm size.
2 Following the findings that Davies et al (1999, p. 1507) relates, as to the subjective fluidity with which a 
firm can detail certain outcomes as exceptional, I have therefore not permitted exceptional items to be 
excluded from the calculation of Operating Profit. This comprehensive definition of Operating Profit, 
prevents firm manipulation from skewing the validity of this accounting ratio.
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Whilst Independents are of differing sizes, the magnitude of the difference in Market 
Capitalization between the smallest (Pan Andean Resources) and the largest Independent 
(Cairn Energy) is less than that between the largest Independent and a typical Major 
(BP). Comparing Market Capitalizations, Cairn Energy is only 50 times larger than Pan 
Andean Resources, whereas the Major, British Petroleum is 150 times larger than Cairn 
Energy2 3. From this perspective, even the largest Independent is closer in size to the 
smallest Independent, than it is to a Major corporation such as BP. When compared to 
Majors, British Independents are relatively similar in their size, and in this sense can be 
treated as a coherent populaiinn4.
Table 5.1.2 summarises the geographical scope of the operations undertaken by the 
Independent population. The table shows the average Independent to produce a greater 
percentage (71%) of its annual total production out-with the UKCS. Additionally, each 
company on average holds licence interests in more than three different countries. 
Overall, whilst Table 5.1.2 produces a useful generalised account of the ‘average’ 
Independent’s international orientation. Section 5.6 reveals the more nuanced variety of 
ways in which this international orientation has been undertaken.
Geographical Scope of the Population
Variable Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Annual Total Production 
within UKCS (MMboe)
1.03 0 - 2.11 0 6.79
Annual Total Production 
outside UKCS (MMboe)
2.08 0.56 - 3.53 0 12.81
% of Total Production 
outside UKCS
71.39 100 100 41.4 0 100
No. of Countries in which 
Interests Held
3.76 3 1 2.64 1 10
No. of Countries where 
Operator
2.11 2 1 1.52 0 6
No. of Countries where 
Non-Operator
2.37 2 1 1.89 0 7
Table 5.1.2
2 The respective Market Capitalizations of the companies are as follows: Pan Andean Resources (£10m),
Cairn Energy (£580m), and British Petroleum (£90,400m).
4 Beyond firm size measures, a further aspect that distinguishes Independents from Majors, is the 
Independents lack of vertical integration (Section 1.1).
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Table 5.1.3 displays the average level of Operatorship undertaken by the Independent 
Population. The propensity of holding the role of Operator (mean = 7.88) is shown to be 
less than the propensity of undertaking licences as Non-Operator (mean = 14.47). 
Independents on average hold more Non-Operated licence blocks than Operated (Table 
5.1.3). A paired samples t-test of mean differences provides some support for this result 
(t-statistic = -1.893; Prob. value = 0.07). As discussed in Section 3.4, the role of 
Operator typically requires greater use of a firm’s co-ordinating resources, than does the 
role of Non-Operator. From this perspective, the results suggest the Independents’ 
tendency towards undertaking a Non-Operating role may be because this requires a lower 
degree of resource commitment.
Level of Operatorship among the Population
Variable Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
No. of Operated
Licence Blocks
7.88 6 4 7.44 0 30
No, of Non-Operated 
Licence Blocks
14.47 7 Multiple modes 
exist
16.16 0 55
% Operated of Total 
Licences
48.39 44.44 - 32.62 0 100
% Non-Operated of 
Total Licences
51.61 55.56 - 32.62 0 100
Table 5.1.3
Turning to the financial aspects of the Independents, Table 5.1.14 measures both their 
debt and profitability. Although the level of gearing within the population is low (mean 
= 11.47), there is a high level of variation between firms (cr = 16.21) (Table 5.1.4). 
Moreover with mean interest paid being 17.31% of the mean operating profit, suggests 
debt repayment for certain firms is high. A bivariate correlation between Market 
Capitalization and Gearing gives a 0.695 Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient (Prob. 
value = 0.000). Thus, the larger the Independent, the higher the level of gearing. As is 
further examined in Section 6.1, the above correlation may be interpreted as a product of 
credit rationing amongst lenders (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990). Lenders are less 
willing to lend when project size is large relative to a borrower’s net worth (Calomiris 
and Hubbard, 1990, p.92). In the context of petroleum exploration and production, the 
greater collateral possessed by larger Independents means that lenders are more willing to 
lend to these firms vis-a-vis smaller Independents.
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The cash generative nature of most Independents is shown by Operating Profit being 
approximately 30% of Turnover. This is a much higher ratio than for some Majors. For 
example, the equivalent ratios for Shell and BP are only 8% and 7% respective^. 
However, the high coefficient of variation for this ratio3, shows not all Independents to be 
cash generative, several displaying an Operating Loss. This result suggests that the level 
of profitability is highly variable amongst the Independent population. Annual Total 
Production is positively correlated with the average price received per barrel of oil 
equivalent (Pearson correlation coefficient 0.644, Prob. value = 0.044). This suggests 
that the greater a firm’s production, the higher the average price received per barrel. 
Section 6.1.2.3 explains this finding using the argument that differential bargaining 
power is associated with different sizes of producer (Porter, 1998).
Measures of Debt & Profitability
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Gearing
((longterm liabilities / net assets + 
longterm liabilities)* 100)
11.47 16.21 0 44.69
Interest paid (£m) 2.25 4.80 0 20.6
Interest paid / Turnover * 100 8.53 2.78 0 73.72
Operating Profit / Turnover * 100 29.43 324.39 -716 1216
Average price received per boe ($) 21.56 2.40 17.17 24.30
Table 5.1.4
Of the 21 firms contacted, 14 agreed to be interviewed. This constitutes a 67% response 
rate. Of the 7 firms that were unavailable or unwilling to be interviewed, 4 had their 
headquarters located outside of the UK and Ireland. An independent samples t-test was 
run to determine how representative the sample of 14 firms was relative to the total 
population. Results of the t-test of mean differences in Market Capitalization indicated 
no support for rejecting the assumption that the 14 respondents were representative of the 
population (t-statistic = 0.257; Prob. value = 0.799)7.
2 Calculations based on figures taken from the companies’ 2002 Annual Reports.
2 The coefficient of variation is the Standard Deviation / Mean, in this case (324.39/29.43 = 11.02).
2 It should be noted that Market Capitalization acts as only one measure of a firm. There are more 
dimensions to a firm that extend beyond size (Market Capitalization). For example, Section 5.6 displays 
how the Independent population may be categorised according to the differing international strategies they 
display. Nevertheless, having achieved a high response rate (67% of the population), the results derived 
should still be considered relatively comprehensive.
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5.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NORTH AMERICAN POPULATION 
Table 5.2.1 displays the average firm size of the North American population (£1919m) to 
be substantially larger than the British Independent population (£138m). An independent 
samples t-test of the mean differences in Market Capitalization between North American 
(£1919m) and British (£138m) populations, confirms this result (t-statistic = -5.281; 
Prob, value = 0.000). Sections 6.1 and 6.2, show this size differential to be a possible 
cause of some of the results produced when comparison is drawn between British and 
North American Independents.
Market Capitalization (£m) of British vs. North American Population
Population N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
British 21 137.52 146.01 10.41 583.75
North
American
55 1919.47 2491.20 10.35 10602.00
Table 5.2.1
Of the 55 North American Independents contacted, 12 questionnaires were returned, 
constituting a 22% response rate. An independent samples t-test was run to determine 
how representative this sample was relative to the total population. A t-test of mean 
differences in Market Capitalization cannot reject the hypothesis that the 12 respondents 
come from the parent population (t-statistic = 0.434; Prob, value = 0.666). Further 
support for this finding is presented in Table 5.2.2. Comparing the level of international 
activity within the sample (50%), relative to the population (44%), this table shows the 
sample to be generally representative of the North American Independent population8.
Level of International Activity - North American Independents
Variable N % of Firms with activities in 
North America Only
% of Firms with 
International activity
Population 55 56.4 43.6
Sample 12 50 50
Table 5.2.2
g
Within forthcoming pages it should be assumed that any open reference to ‘Independents’ within text or 
tables refers to British Independents only. Should a comparison be made with North American 
Independents, that distinction will be clearly stated.
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5.3 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING SPEED AND RAPIDITY OF ACTION 
5.3.1 Decision-making Speed
The first piece of qualitative evidence to verify that the speed of decision-making is faster 
in Independents, relative to Majors, is presented in Table 5.3.1. The results displayed 
pertain to answers given by the seven Independent interviewees, who in their last job had 
been employees of a Major. When asked to compare their experiences of decision­
making speed in the previous Major, relative to the current Independent, the response 
given by each interviewee was that “All” decisions were made more quickly in the 
Independent. Further probing of interviewees, revealed four particular operations where 
this differential in decision-making speed, between Major and Independent, was greatest. 
These specific operations included budgetary amendments (1/7), modelling processes 
(1/7), implementation of service operations (1/7) and, in particular, business development 
(4/7). Business development pertains to the activity of securing new exploration and 
production licences. It involves the action of “bidding for new interests” (Independent 
K) and the “time taken to negotiate [new] projects” (Independent G). As noted in Section 
6.4.4, Independents’ fast business development decisions are likely to be a source of 
competitive advantage (Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Pech and Durden, 2003).
In discussion of their experiences, interviewees also gave their interpretation as to why 
such a temporal differential existed for the speed of decision-making (Table 5.3.1). The 
prevailing reason pertained to formalization (Wally and Baum, 1994). The operations in 
Majors are described to be “much more systematised” (Independent N). Accountability 
of staff at lower echelons in Majors is reported to be below that of the equivalent 
personnel in Independents. Further, in Majors, systems were designed to “protect the 
corporation against poor decisions” (Independent O). Additional interviewees mentioned 
that the larger team size of Majors led to a slowing down of the modelling process. In 
contrast, more rapid decision-making among Independents is explained as a consequence 
of several factors: fewer layers of management; the ease of access to key decision­
makers; and the spatial proximity of the team, illustrated by the phrase “everyone on the
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same floor” (Independent D). In conjunction with other findings, these results are 
discussed in Section 6.1.1.
Results from interviews with the international drilling contractors provided additional 
evidence that decision-making speed is faster among Independents relative to Majors. 
All seven of the drilling contractor interviewees, specified Independents to be faster in 
their decision-making speed. Indeed, one of the most important strengths of a drilling 
contractor, undertaking work for an Independent, was reported to be the Independent’s 
decisiveness (see Fig 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.2). Matching this result, the primary weakness 
for a drilling contractor undertaking a contract with a Major, was its insufficient 
decisiveness (sees Fig 5.3.2 and Table 5.3.3).
Fig 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.2 display the ranked strengths for a drilling contractor 
undertaking a contract with an Independent.
Strengths of Contracts with Independents
■ Acceptance of existing 
contractor specifications
■ Decisiveness
□ Ease of negotiation
□ Improved contractor 
bargaining power
□ Quality of management
Most Inportant toast Important
Fig 5 3.1
2
A Friedman test, % =11-54 (Prob, value = 0.021), shows it is unlikely the rankings for 
Fig 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.2 were derived by chance, and that the preferences expressed are 
therefore significant. The results also display a significant degree of concordance in the 
rankings chosen by respondents, as indicated by Kendall’s W = 0.412 (Prob, value =
0.021).
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Strengths of Undertaking a Contract with an Independent
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Acceptance of existing 
contractor specifications
7 1.86 2 Multiple 
modes exist
1.07 1 4
Decisiveness 7 2 2 2 .82 1 3
Ease of negotiation 7 3.43 3 3 .98 2 5
Improved contractor 
bargaining power
7 3.57 4 4 1.27 1 5
Quality of management 7 4.14 5 5 1.57 1 5
Table 5.3.2
Fig 5.3.2 and Table 5.3.3 display the rankings of weaknesses for a drilling contractor 
undertaking a contract with a Major.
Weaknesses of Contracts with Majors
0 1 2 3 4 5
■ Decisiveness
■ Ease of negotiation
■ Prescriptive engineering 
specifications
□ Reduced contractor 
bargaining power
□ High management turnover
Most Important least Important
Fig 5.3.2
2 ....A Friedman test gives a X = 12.114, (Prob. value = 0.017), which shows it is unlikely the 
rankings for Fig 5.3.2 and Table 5.3.3 were derived by chance and that the variables are 
therefore of differing preference. Results also display a significant level of concordance in
the rankings chosen by respondents, as indicated by Kendall’s W = 0.433 (Prob. value = 
0.017).
Weaknesses of Undertaking a Contract with a Major
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Decisiveness (slow decision­
making speed)
7 1.86 1 1 1.21 1 4
Ease of negotiation 7 2.29 3 3 .95 1 3
Prescriptive engineering 
specifications
7 3.14 3 2 1.21 2 5
Reduced contractor 
bargaining power
7 3.14 4 4 1.46 1 5
High management turnover 7 4.57 5 5 .79 3 5
Table 5.3.3
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As with Independent interviewees, drilling contractors were asked to identify those 
operations where they had detected that the decision-making speed between Independent 
and Major was the greatest. Table 5.3.4 categorises the responses given. As Table 5.3.4 
shows, the operation where the differential in speed of decision is most frequently noted 
(6/7), is that of the tendering process^ It was much quicker for a drilling contractor to 
engage in a tendering process run by an Independent, than one run by a Major. 
Contractor C reported Shell bids took “months” to generate. This time-consuming aspect 
was also noted by Contractor F. The paperwork and processes adopted in tenders with 
Majors were costly in terms of the amount of contractor labour time that a bidding 
procedure required (Contractor F). In contrast, Independents were more decisive in their 
approach; tenders could be formulated in “weeks” or even “days” (Contractor C). A 
further example of an operation in which Independents’ decision-making was frequently 
(3/7) reported to be more rapid than that of Majors, was in the finalising of terms and 
conditions.
The explanations given by drilling contractor interviewees as to why decisions were 
executed faster by Independents, rather than by Majors, are illustrated in Table 5.3.5, 
One of the most frequently (4/7) specified causes relates to the Spectrum of Consultation. 
Majors’ decision making processes were likened to decision by “committee” (Contractor 
A and C). The larger number of personnel consulted by Majors was given as a primary 
cause of the decision-making speed differential between an Independent and a Major. A 
further cause of slower decision-making among Majors, was the pursuit of individual 
goals (‘sub-goals’ in a Williamsonian (1975, p. 130) sense) by certain persons 
incorporated within their decision-making process (3/7). For example, specialists in 
certain areas - safety or insurance being detailed - could be overly attentive of their 
particular area of responsibility. This “territorial” approach (Contractor B) was 
recognised as a consequence of “job protection” (Contractor A). For the contractor, this 
approach resulted in excessively onerous terms and conditions. Peters (2001, p. 167),
9 Tendering is when an Operator (Independent or Major) invites drilling contractors to outline their 
proposals for a particular job to be undertaken on behalf of the Operator. The Operator reviews each 
contractor's proposal and chooses the one deemed most suitable.
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notes such actions are often characteristic of large bureaucratic organizations. 
Bureaucratic red tape and inefficiency in such organizations often results from the 
perceived need of lower echelons to protect themselves from superiors. They do this by 
complying with the ‘letter of regulations', and by refusing to take any personal initiative 
beyond those regulations, because that might subject them to later punishment (Peters, 
2001, p. 167). However, in doing so, their actions reduce the effectiveness of the 
organization. Goal displacement is the result: rules become an end in themselves, rather 
than a means to achieve the aims of the company (Peters, 2001, p. 167). Thus, a further 
cause of the slower decision-making speed reported for Majors appears to reside in the 
job protecting actions performed by some of their personnel. Similarly, business 
undertaken with Majors was reported to be paperwork intensive. This was not because 
projects with Majors were any larger than those with Independents. When Majors' 
projects were of a similar size to those undertaken with Independents, they still generated 
more paperwork (Contractor G). Paperwork was considered to be a key aspect of the 
slower decision process exhibited by Majors relative to Independents. As Contractor B 
stated “Shell is renowned for its long-winded procedure”. Clearly the more formalized 
approach demonstrated by Majors, is an additional factor causing decisions to be made 
more slowly. This corroborates Wally and Baum's (1994) finding that a formalized 
process slows the speed of decision-making. A further element reported to slow 
decision-making was that employees of Majors were often unwilling to make decisions 
on their own (Contractor A). Mintzberg (1981) would explain such a finding through the 
concept of vertical specialization; namely, the extent to which a worker lacks control of 
the tasks he/she performs. Characteristic of extremely large corporations (Mintzberg, 
1981), vertical specialization would explain why employees of Majors may not be 
encouraged to act autonomously and to make decisions outside of their limited authority.
Returning to the tendering process, Table 5.3.6 and Fig 5.3.3 show how the formalization 
of the tendering process varies between Independent and. Major. Although both Majors' 
and Independents' tendering selection procedures display a bias towards the formally 
based side of the spectrum, closer examination of the responses shows the selection 
procedure undertaken by Majors to be more formally orientated than for Independents
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(see Table 5.3.6). An independent samples t-test of the mean differences in formalization 
of the tendering process, between Independents and Majors, confirms this result (t 
statistic = 3.057; Prob, value = 0.022). Replicating the Likert scaling adopted for 
question 2.2 in the Drilling Contractor SSI (Appendix 1.6), Fig 5.3.3 schematically 
displays the differing tendering orientations of both Major and Independent. In each 
case, the length of the arrow represents the magnitude of the orientation relative to the 
equidistant point. The long arrow for the Major (Fig 5.3.3) reflects its strong formally 
based approach (Table 5.3.6).
Position on the spectrum between a Formal approach & a Relationship based approach of the 
Operators Contractual Tendering Selection Procedure
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Independents 7 3.57 4 Multiple 
modes exist
1.27 2 5
Majors 7 2.29 2 2 0.95 1 4
Note: On spectrum 1 = Formally based, 7 = Relationship based, 4 = Equidistant point
Table 5.3.6
Mean Position of Independents & Majors 
on the Spectrum
Formally i Relationship
Based Independents M------- Based
0.43 0
Majors [<--------------------------------------------
1.71
Fig 5.3.3
As previously noted, the tendering process was the most frequently specified operation 
where the decision-making speed of Independents was faster than Majors. This thesis 
finds that Independents’ tendering procedures are less formalized relative to Majors, 
which is concurrent with Wally and Baum’s (1994) formalization results and assists in 
explaining the decision-making speed differential for this activity. The low formalization 
of the Independents’ tendering selection procedure explains why decision-making speed 
for this activity is faster. Contractors B, C, D, and G all identified formalization, in the 
form of paperwork, to be a primary cause of the slower decision-making of Majors 
relative to Independents (see Table 5.3.5).
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5.3.1.1 Spectrum of Consultation
Answers to questions 1.8 & 110 which relate to the spectrum of consultation (see 
Appendix 1.2), demonstrate that the number of personnel consulted to enact a given 
decision varies widely according to the particular Independent (see Fig 5.3.4 and Fig 
5.3.5). This variation is notable when one considers that differing firms apply differing 
numbers of people in order to make the same decision. In this thesis, the two key 
decisions analysed are, firstly, the decision to drill a test-well, and secondly, the decision 
to resolve a particular technical scenario. Both decisions are strategic in nature and 
require the ‘commitment of substantial resources at the level of the total enterprise' 
(Wally and Baum, 1994, p.933). Beginning with the test-well decision, the histogram of 
the number of personnel consulted (Fig 5.3.4), shows most firms' consultation process 
involved between 4 and 16 personnel10. Examination of the data on key personnel 
consulted indicates that Finance personnel were the most frequently consulted (13/13) 
(Table 5.3.7). Thereafter, consultation was most frequently made with the Exploration / 
Geology and Geophysical personnel (1 1/13). Next in frequency, was the consultation 
made with 1mplementation personnel (10/13), of the Operations, Drilling, and Production 
departments. Finally, Engineering personnel were also frequently consulted (9/13). For 
all firms (13/13) a Board Director was involved, typically the Chief Executive Officer. 
Overall, these results provide additional support to the central importance that the 
Finance function has within 1ndependent firms (see Section 6.2).
10 It is of note that the outlier observation of 25 personnel consulted was the response of the largest firm in 
the sample, Independent N. Thus larger Independents may display the organizational disability of some 
Majors.
61
Test-well Drilling
No of personnel consulted
Std Dev = 4.99 
Mean = 11 
N = 13.00
Fig 5.3.4
Drill Pipe Scenario
Std. Dev = 3.72 
Mean = 7 
N = 14.00
3 5 7 9 11 13 15
No. of Persons consulted Fig 535
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Turning to the drill-pipe scenario, Question 1.10 of Independent SSI was found to be a 
highly practical question; two Independents acknowledged that they had experienced a 
very similar decision-making situation. Analysis of histogram results reveals, on 
average, fewer personnel to be consulted for resolution of the drill-pipe scenario (mean = 
7 personnel) (Fig 5.3.5), relative to the test-well drilling decision (mean = 11 personnel) 
(Fig 5.3.4). Examination of the key personnel consulted demonstrates that the Finance 
(10/13) and Implementation (10/13) personnel were the most frequently consulted 
(13/13) (Table 5.3.8). A strong representation from the Board of Directors was also 
present (12/13), with the CEO usually being consulted. Once again, these results point to 
the central role that the Finance department has in the functioning of the Independent 
exploration and production company.
Returning to hypothesis 3(a) in Section 3.1.2, repeated below, Table 5.3.9 tests whether 
results for the drill-pipe scenario permit the acceptance of this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3(a) - The greater the number of personnel consulted to enact a given 
decision, the longer will be the time taken to choose a course of action.
The positive correlation between the Number of personnel consulted and the Time taken 
for the Scenario (Prob. value < 0.05) (Table 5.3.9), does suggest support of hypothesis 
3(a) and rejection of the null hypothesis of no relation between number of personnel and 
action time. A corollary of accepting hypothesis 3(a) is that the fewer personnel 
consulted, the shorter the time taken to decide upon a course of action. The process of 
gathering information from many, as against a few individuals, does have a temporal cost 
(Olsen, 1981) (see Section 3.1), which is an impediment to speedy action.
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Comparing Decision-making Speed with
Spectrum of Consultation, Firm Size, and Burden of Debt
Variable Time taken for Variable Time taken for
Box ordering: (Pearson) Scenario Box ordering: Scenario
-Correlation Coefficient -Correlation Coefficient
- Significance - Significance
-N -N
No. of persons consulted .68’ Operating Profit .20
(scenario) .02 .56
11 11
Market Capitalization .44 Total Head Count .44
.18 .18
11 11
Net Assets .34 Gearing -.06
.31 .86
11 11
Annual Total Production .14 Interest Paid / .04
.69 Turnover .91
10 11
Turnover .19
.57
11
Note: ’ p <.05 , " p < .01
Table 5.3.9
A linear regression of Number of personnel consulted (Scenario) against the Time taken 
for the Scenario provides further support for Hypothesis 3(a) (see Table 5.3.10). Fig 
5.3.6 displays a scatter plot of the data and this estimated linear regression. Here y = 
Number of personnel and x = Time taken. The equation for the estimated regression is 
y = 2.79 + 0.64x. The co-efficient of determination is high at R2 = 0.46, and the F- 
statistic = 7.76 (Prob. value = 0.02) is highly statistically significant (see Table 5.3.10). 
The slope coefficient (0.64) is positive and a t-test shows it to be significantly different 
from zero (t-statistic = 2.786, Prob. value = 0.021). This finding further substantiates the 
positive relationship between the Number of personnel consulted (Scenario) and the Time 
taken for the Scenario. The intercept coefficient (2.79) is also positive, but a t-test does 
not show it to be significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 1.539, Prob. value = 
0.158). This suggests a proportional relationship between the Number of personnel 
consulted and the Time taken (intercept coefficient equal to zero). With the intercept 
coefficient not significantly different to zero, the inference made from such a result, is 
that it takes zero time to consult zero personnel.
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ANOVA of Spectrum of Consultation (Scenario) and Speed of Decision
Model Sum of 
Squares
df Mean Square F S/g.
Regression 77.30 1 77.30 7.76 0.021
Residual 89.61 9 9.96
Table 5.3.10
Linear Regression: Spectrum of Consultation 
and Speed of Decision.
Time taken for decision (hrs)
Fig 5.3.6
Table 5.3.9 also tests whether Firm size, per se as reported by Wally and Baum (1994), 
influences decision-making speed. Although the Pearson correlations between most 
Firm size11 variables and the Time taken for the Scenario are of the appropriate positive 
sign, the Prob. values are all above (0.10). However, closer examination (see Table 
5.3.11) suggests that the larger the Firm size, the longer the time taken to decide upon a 
course of action. An independent samples t-test of the mean differences in Head Count 
(Table 5.3.11), between fast (<lDay) and slow (>lDay) decision-making firms, confirms 
this result (t = -2.422; Prob. value = 0.033). The feature which may have prevented this 
being detected by the above correlation is the limited time scale differentiation by which 
firms expressed their Time taken for the Scenario answers. Firms often expressed their *
“ These variables include: Market Capitalization, Net Assets, Turnover, and Total Head Count.
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answer in terms of days, not hours, thereby limiting scale differentiation12. This was 
especially true of those firms that specified decision-making for the scenario would take 
1 day. The Scenario results thus suggest, that the larger the size of the Independent, the
slower the speed of decision-making.
Comparing Decision-making Speed with Firm Size
Variable < Way (< 7hrs) > / Day (> 7hrs)
N 3 11
Mean Head Count 24.67 164.18
Table 5.3.11
The final relationship for which Table 5.3.9 also tests, is whether an Independent’s 
burden of debt, measured according to Gearing or Interest Paid / Turnover, influences 
the speed at which decisions are undertaken. As the results display, no correlation may 
be established between the Burden of Debt measure and the Time taken for the Scenario. 
Thus the findings give no support to the concept that debt related ‘financial pressures’ 
(see Section 3.1.4.) are a stimulus to faster decision-making.
For hypothesis 3 (b) (Section 3.1), Table 5.3.12 tests this hypothesis, with respect to the 
test-well and drill-pipe decisions.
Hypothesis 3(b) - The larger the firm size, the greater will be the number of personnel 
consulted for making a given decision.
For both ‘test-well’ and ‘scenario’ cases results show the firm size measures of Market 
Capitalization, Net Assets, and Head Count to be positively and significantly correlated 
with the Number of Personnel Consulted (Prob. value < 0.05). These correlations 
suggest rejecting the hypothesis of no relation between Firm size and Number of 
personnel consulted, we accept hypothesis 3(b); namely that the larger the firm size, the 
greater the number of personnel consulted in order to enact a given decision.
12 By expressing their answer in a larger unit of measurement, days rather than hours, the likelihood of 
differentiating between companies was reduced.
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Comparing the relationship between the number of personnel consulted and firm size
Variable Test-Well: Scenario:
Box ordering: (Pearson)
-Correlation Coefficient 
-Significance 
-N '
No. of personnel consulted No. of personnel consulted
Market Capitalization .83” .73”
.000 .003
13 14
Net Assets .76” .76**
.002 .002
13 14
Annual Total Production .45 .57*
.12 .04
13 13
Turnover .47 .56*
.10 .04
13 14
Operating Profit .48 .58*
.10 .03
13 14
Total Head Count .595* .55*
.032 .04
13 14
Note: * p < .05 , * p < .01
Table 5.3.12
Running linear regressions of Number of personnel consulted (Test-Well and Scenario) 
on Market Capitalization provides further support for the acceptance of Hypothesis 3(b) 
(Table 5.3.13 and Table 5.3.14). Table 5.3.13 exhibits the results for the first model, the 
linear regression between Market Capitalization and Number of personnel consulted 
(Test-Well). Fig 5.3.7 displays a scatter plot of the data and this estimated linear 
regression, where y = Number of personnel consulted (Test-Well) and x = Market 
Capitalization. The estimated regression line is y = 0.025x + 6.81. The co-efficient of 
determination, is high at R2 = 0.69, and the F-statistic = 24.71 (Prob. value == 0.000), is 
highly statistically significant, suggesting the acceptability of this model. The slope 
coefficient (0.025) is positive and a t-test shows it to be significantly different from zero 
(t-statistic = 4.971, Prob. value = 0.0004). Similarly, the intercept coefficient (6.81) is 
positive and a t-test shows it to be significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 5.936, 
Prob. value = 0.0001).
ANOVA of Spectrum of Consultation (Test-Well) and Market Capitalization
Model Sum of 
Squares
df Mean Square F Sig.
Regression 211.53 1 211.53 24.71 0.000
Residual 94.16 11 8.56
Table 5.3.13
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Linear Regression: Spectrum of Consultation 
(Test-Well) and Market Capitalization.
Market Capitalization ,....... ...r Fig 5.3.7
Table 5.3.14 displays the results for the second model, the linear regression of Number of 
personnel consulted (Scenario) on Market Capitalization. Fig 5.3.8 displays a scatter 
plot of the data and this linear regression, where y = Number of personnel consulted 
(Scenario) and x = Market Capitalization. The estimated regression line is j) = 4.34 + 
0.016x. The co-efficient of determination is R2 = 0.52, and the F-statistic = 13.26 (Prob. 
value = 0.003) is statistically significant, suggesting the acceptability of this model. The 
slope coefficient (0.016) is positive and a t-test shows it to be significantly different from 
zero (t-statistic = 3.641, Prob. value = 0.0034). The intercept coefficient (4.34) is 
positive and a t-test shows it to be significantly different from zero (t-statistic = 4.431, 
Prob. value = 0.0008).
ANOVA of Spectrum of Consultation (Scenario) and Market Capitalization
Model Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig.
Regression 94.68 1 94.68 13.26 0.003
Residual 85.68 12 7.14
Table 5.3.14
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Linear Regression: Spectrum of Consultation 
(Scenario) and Market Capitalization.
Market Capitalization Fig 5.3.8
In accordance with the discussion of Section 3.1.2 (Reid, 1989), the above findings 
suggest that the larger the Independent, the greater the horizontal specialization 
exhibited13 (Mintzberg, 1981). Evidence drawn from Tables 5.3.7 and 5.3.8 confirms 
this suggestion. For example, in both the ‘test-well’ and ‘scenario’ cases, only the largest 
two Independents (Independent M and N), reported inclusion of a specialist HSE (Health, 
Safety and Environment) head of department in the consultation process. Similarly, 
increased specialization of the personnel within the larger, relative to the smaller 
Independents, may also be recognised for exploration departments. Inspection of Table 
5.3.7 reveals the si^^^l^l^ir Independents to only i^^orpr^or^^'te an Exploration Manager 
(Independents B, C, and E), whereas larger Independents incorporate both an Exploration 
Manager and a Geologist or Geophysicist (Independents J, L, and N). This increased 
specialization reduces the scope of tasks constituted by an average job. Thus when 
information necessary for non-routine, strategic decisions14 is required, it must be 
gathered from a greater number of sources. As explained in Section 3.1, information is 
typically generated by individual personnel through application of their particular skills,
13 To reiterate, Mintzberg (1981) defines horizontal specialization as that which occurs when jobs within 
the organization increasingly encompass only a few narrowly defined tasks.
14 Such as the ‘test-well’ or ‘drill-pipe scenario’ decisions.
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knowledge, and experience. In large organizations, where horizontal specialization is
great, the necessary information will be spread across a larger number of individuals. As 
Table 5.3.10 suggests the greater the number of personnel who hold the necessary 
information (viz. the larger the Spectrum of Consultation), the longer the time taken to 
gather the information from these sources.
Turning to the third hypothesis of Section 3.1.3, Table 5.3.15 seeks to determine if there 
is any relationship between the degree of managerial focus and the speed of decision­
making:
Hypothesis 3 (c) - The greater the degree of focus of a key decision-maker in the 
organisation, the more rapidly will decisions be made.
Although the relationship between Time taken for scenario and Number of Blocks within 
Decision-making Jurisdiction of the Key Manager is of the appropriate sign (-0.25), the 
Prob. value of 0.47 provides insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no 
relationship between these key variables. However, the results of Table 5.3.15 do 
suggest that the degree of managerial focus is associated with firm size. The firm size 
measures used were Net Assets, Production, Turnover, and Operating Profit. These are 
all positively correlated with the Number of Blocks within Decision-making Jurisdiction 
of the Key Manager (Prob. value < 0.05). In essence, these results show that the smaller 
the firm size, the greater the degree of managerial focus. Although, our results do not 
show managerial focus to be associated with decision-making speed, the research of 
Gifford (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) would dispute this finding. According to Sharon Gifford, 
managerial focus does reduce decision delay. 1 would therefore reason that the faster 
decision-making speed identified by this thesis for smaller Independents relative to large 
Independents, may also be influenced by the greater degree of managerial focus in these 
smaller firms.
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Comparing the relationship of Focus to Speed of Decision-making & Action, and Firm Size
Variable
Box ordering: (Spearman’s rho)
-Correlation Coefficient 
- Significance 
-N
No. of Blocks within 
Decision-making 
Jurisdiction of Key 
Manager
Variable
Box ordering:
-Correlation Coefficient 
- Significance 
-N
No. of Blocks within 
Decision-making 
Jurisdiction of Key 
Manager
Market Capitalization .52 Operating Profit .72*
.10 .01
11 11
Net Assets .62* Total Head Count .06
.04 .85
11 11
Annual Total Production 2002 .61* Time taken for -.25
.046 scenario .47
11 11
Turnover .64*
.04
11
Note: * p < .05 , ” p < .01
Table 5..3.15
Finally, in seeking to address the serious lack of attention paid by existing decision­
making speed research to decision quality (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1990 Judge and 
Miller, 1991; Wally and Baum, 1994), Table 5.3.16 measures the accuracy of the 
Independents’ test-well decisions. Since only 6 firms had drilled 5 or more exploration 
test wells, their results are displayed in a separate column from those which include the 
success rate of firms with less than 5 wells drilled. Overall, relative to studies of Majors 
(Forbes and Zampelli, 2000; Forbes and Zampelli, 2002)’5, both results display a 
relatively high success rate for British Independents in making commercially successful 
finds. Indeed, the exploration success rates reported for the British Independents are very 
similar to those recorded by Forbes and Zampelli (2000 and 2002) for Majors. Thus, the 
quality of decisions made by hidependents, as measured by exploration success rate, 
appears to be high and close to that of Majors. This finding produces contemporary 
support for McKie’s (1960, p.559) assertion that uncertainty, in the sense of Knight 
(1921), places the exploration success rates of both Independent and Major on an even 
footing (see Section 2.1). Table 5.3.16 also suggests exploration success rates are not 
influenced by the number of wells drilled. An independent t-test of mean difference
15 As discussed in Section 7.1, the results displayed in Table 5.3.16 concord with the success rates 
calculated by Forbes and Zampelli (2000; 2002) of 55% (1995) and 55.4% (1998) for US offshore and 
onshore exploration respectively.
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between the categories 5 or more wells and less than 5 wells, was not significant (t- 
statistic = -0.222, Prob. value = 0.830).
Commercially Successful Finds
No. of test wells drilled (excluding appraisal & development)
Variable 5 or more wells Less than 5 wells Including those with less 
than 5 wells drilled16
N 6 4 10
Mean % success rate 56.7 52.1 54.88
Table 5.3.16
5.3.2 Stimulus to Action
Relative Importance of Differing Stimulants to the Hastening of Action
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Cashflow 13 1.23 1 1 .44 1 2
Production targets 13 3.00 3 3 1.29 1 5
Cost of capital 13 3.85 4 4 1.68 1 6
Oil price expectations 13 4.00 4 Multiple 
modes exist
1.22 2 6
Competitive Advantage 13 4.15 4 Multiple 
modes exist
1.46 2 6
Government incentives 13 5.08 6 6 1.26 2 6
Table 5.3.17
Table 5.3.17 presents the mean ranked order of the stimuli reported to encourage faster 
action. The action to be hastened is the time between award of licence and production 
coming on-line. The stimulus variables were ranked from 1 to 6, with 1 = most 
important, 6 = least important. The most important stimulus was Cashflow. The very 
low standard deviation (.44), recorded for Cashflow, demonstrates the importance placed 
upon this variable by all Independents. Section 6.1 shows this finding can be explained 
in accordance with a Net Present Value (NPV) valuation approach. Production Targets 
(mean = 3.00) rank next in importance, demonstrating the power that planning via target 
setting has to stimulate faster action. Working to a set deadline can hasten action 
(Parkinson, 1958). Differing from previous reported industry commentary (HCSC, 
1988a; see Section 3.1.4), the financial pressure of debt, Cost of Capital, was found not 
to be a primary stimulus to rapid action. In general, action was not stimulated in an effort 
to reduce the overall cost of carrying debt. Interpretation of this result must be made 
within the context of the finding that the level of gearing is directly proportional to
16 Only 10 firms are detailed because two of the interviewed firms had not drilled any exploration wells as 
Operator, whilst another two did not disclose results.
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Independent firm size (see Section 5.1). Section 6.1, adopts a theory of credit rationing 
(Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990) to explain these results. Returning to the rankings 
presented in Table 5.3.17, a Friedman test, 2'2= 31.17, (Prob, value = 0.000), shows that 
it is highly unlikely that these rankings occurred by chance, and that the variables listed 
can be ordered by distinct preference. The results displayed exhibit a high level of 
concordance in the rankings chosen by respondents; Kendall’s W - 0.479 (Prob, value — 
0.000).
Relative Importance of Differing Stimulants to the Hastening of Action - North American Sample
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Cashflow 11 1.82 2 2 .75 1 3
Production targets 11 2.55 2 Multiple 
modes exist
1.51 1 6
Competitive Advantage 11 2.64 3 1 1.63 1 6
Cost of capital 11 4.00 4 4 1.10 2 6
Government incentives 11 5.00 5 5 .63 4 6
Oil price expectations 11 5.00 6 6 1.41 2 6
Table 5.3.18
Moving beyond the British Independents, Table 5.3.18 presents the ranked stimuli to 
action reported by the North American Independents. Like British Independents, North 
American Independents also reported Cashflow to be the most significant factor 
hastening action (Table 5.3.18). Similarly, Production Targets ranked second in 
importance whilst Cost of Capital is also of lesser importance (ranked 4lh). The only 
substantial difference in the rankings between British and North American Independents 
is the Competitive Advantage variable. Ranked 5 in importance by British 
Independents, it is ranked 3rd in importance by North American Independents. As 
discussed in Section 6.1, this differential may be attributed to the organizational culture 
fostered by the North American approach to business. Further supporting the results of 
Table 5.3.18, a Friedman test, /2= 29.03, (Prob, value = 0.000), shows it is highly 
improbable that the rankings were derived by chance, and that the variables noted 
indicate a significant ordering of preference. Results display a high level of concordance 
in the rankings chosen by respondents; Kendall’s W - 0.528 (Prob, value = 0.000).
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Relative Importance of Differing Factors that Slow Action
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Block significance relative 
to partner firms ’ total 
portfolio
12 1.92 1.5 1 1.44 1 6
Partner Approval 12 2.42 2.5 3 1.44 1 6
Differing geological 
interpretations by partner 
firm(s)
12 3.33 3.5 4 .99 2 5
Delayed capital contribution 
by partner firm(s)
12 3.5 3.5 Multiple 
modes exist
1.78 1 6
Delayed drilling by 
contracting firm(s)
12 4.5 4.5 4 1.09 2 6
Establishing a drilling 
contract
12 5.33 5.5 6 .89 3 6
Table 5.3.19
Turning to the variables that slow down action, Table 5.3.19 displays the mean rank 
order of those factors reported to extend the time interval between award of licence and 
drilling of a first test-well. The most important variable for slowing action was reported 
to be Block significance relative to partner firms’ total portfolio. As Section 6.1 
explains, this finding verifies the reported consequences which arise when an Operator 
considers a licence to be Non-Core 17 (Hannon, 2003). Should the Operator of a licence 
determine it to be of lower potential value, relative to other licences within its company’s 
portfolio, then action upon this Tesser’ licence will likely be delayed. The Operator’s 
other licences receive investment priority. The next most important factor reported to 
slow action is achieving Partner Approval. Partner Approval relates to the final process 
of getting all partners to agree upon a course of action to be undertaken. As Section 6.1 
notes, the importance of this factor accords with the work of Eisenhardt (1989), who 
found the efficacy of dispute resolution to influence the speed of decision-making. A 
Friedman test, j2= 27.67, (Prob. value = 0.000), shows it is highly unlikely that the 
rankings in Table 5.3.19 were derived by chance, and that variables indeed express 
significantly differing preferences. Results display a high level of concordance in the 
rankings chosen by respondents; Kendall’s W = 0.461 (Prob. value = 0.000).
17 Non-Core acreage is property (a licence) that is no longer considered to strategically fit a company’s 
asset portfolio, and as a consequence, does not nonnally attract investment from the company (Hannon, 
2004).
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Relative Importance of Differing Factors that Slow Action — North American Independents
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Differing geological 
interpretations by partner 
firm(s)
10 2.4 2 2 1.43 1 5
Block, significance relative 
to partner firms ’ total 
portfolio
10 2.6 2 1 1.96 1 6
Delayed drilling by 
contractingfirm(s)
10 3.4 3.5 5 1.84 1 6
Partner Approval 10 3.6 3.5 3 1.35 1 6
Establishing a drilling 
contract
10 3.9 4 Multiple 
modes exist
1.20 2 6
Delayed capital contribution 
by partner firm(s)
10 4.7 5.5 6 1.57 2 6
Table 5.3.20
For North American Independents, Table 5.3.20 displays the corresponding variables 
which are thought to slow down actions. A Friedman test, = 10.85, (Prob. value = 
0.055), shows differentiation between rankings (Table 6.3.18) to be weaker than for the 
previous British Independents. Results display a lower level of concordance in the 
rankings chosen by respondents; Kendall’s W = 0.217 (Prob. value = 0.055). 
Nevertheless, Block significance relative to partner firms ’ total portfolio continues to be 
one of the key factors stated to slow down actions.
5.3.3 Rapidity of Action
Table 5.3.21 presents the five variables used to measure the speed of action of 
Independents. The variables are divided into two groups. In the first group are those 
measures that relate to exploration drillings where the Independent is in control and holds 
the position of Operator (Variables: Ol, 02, and FD). In the second group, are those 
measures which relate to the Independent having less control over the timing of action 
because it only holds the position of Non-Operator (Variables: N1 and N2). Analysis of 
the results reveals that for both Operated and Non-Operated licences in which 
Independents are engaged, the action to drill (01, Nl), or develop a licence (02, N2), is 
enacted within 2 years. Comparing this interval (< 2 year), to the 4 years permitted by
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the UK DTI for each activity 18, data suggests Independents to be relatively rapid in their
action.
Speed of Action Measures
Variable19 N Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Operator; (Ol)
Time differential between award of 
licence & 1st successful test-well (yrs)
9 2 1.12 1 4
Operator: (02)
Time differential between successful 
test-well & production on-line (yrs)
4 1.75 2.22 0 5
Non-Operator: (Nl)
Time differential between award of 
licence & 1s® successful test-well (yrs)
11 1.73 1.79 0 5
Non-Operator: (N2)
Time differential between successful 
test-well & production on-line (yrs)
6 1.5 1.05 0 3
Operator: (FD)
Time taken for field development 
decision, (yrs)
8 1.03 0.66 0.25 2
Table 5,3.21
It is interesting to note that for the question 1.1 (see Appendix 1.2), only one Independent 
(Independent N) reported an unsuccessful well being drilled prior to a successful 
exploration test well. This result may suggest that in situations where a first test well 
proved dry, it was unlikely that the Independent, as Operator, would persist with that 
licence. As discussed in Section 6.1.2.4, this result could be interpreted as the 
Independent seeking to avert the possibility of ‘Gambler’s ruin’20 (McCray, 1975; 
Newendorp, 1996). Indeed, as is later shown, the possibility of Gambler's ruin is 
considered more likely for the capital constrained Independent than the deep pocketed 
Major (Newendorp, 1996).
Table 5.3.21 also displays the average time taken for the field development decision. The 
field development decision is the term used to describe the organisational process that is
18 The DTI’s Traditional Production licence consists of an initial term of four years for exploration (Ol and 
Nl), followed by four more years for development to be enacted (Ol and N2) (DTI, 2004).
19 N is often below 14 because firms varied in whether they had undertaken exploration drilling as 
Operator, Non-Operator, or both. Likewise some firms had yet to undertake field development as Operator.
20 Gambler’s ruin is the possibility of a long series of chance consecutive losses such that the gambler 
losses all his money and must drop out of the game. In the context of a failed exploration drilling, one of 
the approaches to hedge against gambler’s ruin is for the company to leave the licence altogether 
(Newendorp, 1996, p.538).
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initiated following a successful exploration drilling. The process is necessary if a field is 
to be developed and production brought on-line (Kemp, 2003). It involves four principal 
processes (Kemp, 2003). (1) Raising financial capital, as development of a field is more 
capital intensive than the initial exploration phase (Masseron, 1990). (2) Reservoir
Studies, as further examination of seismic and test-well information is needed to 
determine reservoir dynamics. (3) Contractor negotiations, as the running of tendering 
processes is needed in order to select the various required contractors. (4) Sales 
arrangements, to establish to whom, and at what price, the petroleum produced will be 
sold. During initial inductive research interviews (Kemp, 2003), it was hypothesised that 
the substantial capital21 requirements which the field development decision entailed, 
would be likely to prolong the process for Independents. Examination of the result 
displayed in Table 5.3,21 does not suggest this, because, on average, British 
Independents completed the field development decision in just one year. However, when 
comparison is made with the North American Independents, the British field 
development decision is relatively slow. Table 5.3.22 displays the North American 
Independents to take, on average, half the time (6 months) to formulate the field 
development decision as is taken by British Independents (12 months). An independent 
samples t-test of mean differences supports this result (t-statistic = 2.169; Prob. value = 
0.047). Section 6.1.2.3 investigates possible reasons for this differential.
Speed of Action (yrs) for Field Development Decision: British vs. North American
Variable N Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
North American Independents
Operator: (FDNA)
Time taken for field development 
decision, (yrs)
9 0.45 0.43 0.08 1.5
British Independents
Operator: (FD)
Time taken for field development 
decision, (yrs)
8 1.03 0.66 0.25 2
Table 5,3.22
For a breakdown of the activities upon which the British Independents spent field 
development decision-time see Table 5.3.23. This table displays the greatest percentage
21 Both monetary and human capital.
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of British Independents’ time to be spent upon Sales arrangements (30%). This is
22followed by Contracting negotiations (21%) and Reservoir studies (19%)) .
Field Development Decision - % of Time spent on particular Activities
Variable15 Contracting
negotiations
Raising
financial
capital
Reservoir
studies
Sales
arrangements
Other
N 7 7 7 7 7
Mean 21.19 13.01 19.01 29.76 17.01
Standard
Deviation
16.29 13.46 7.71 13.76 15.66
Min 0 0 10 10 0
Max 50 40 30 50 43
Table 5.3.23
In contrast, North American Independents spent their greatest percentage of time on 
Reservoir Studies (41%) (Table 5.3.24)22 23 4. This is approximately double the proportion of 
time spent by British Independents on the same activity. Similar to British Independents, 
among North American Independents Contracting Negotiations received the second 
largest apportionment of time (23%). Whilst Raising financial capital was apportioned 
the least time (1%). This is substantially lower than the proportion of time spent by 
British Independents (13%) on the same activity. In Section 6.1, it is discussed that this 
feature is most likely a further consequence of credit rationing (Calomiris and Hubbard, 
1990). The larger sized North American Independents have a greater collateral against 
which a loan may be secured. The greater willingness of lenders to lend to firms with 
more collateral, may explain the more rapid time taken to raise financial capital for the 
large North American Independents, than for the small British Independents.
22 Activities detailed in Other category were few, they included: partner approval (10% for Independent I), 
government regulations (-30% Independents G & F), environmental regulations (20% Independent C).
23 Five of the Independents interviewed had never undertaken field development as Operator & two 
interviewees could not give an accurate break-down of the time spent. Hence N = 7.
24 Activities detailed in Other category were few, they included: facility/engineering design, government 
regulations, feed study, development options.
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Field Development Decision - % of Time spent on jparticular Activities - North American Independents
Variable Contracting
negotiations
Raising
financial
capital
Reservoir
studies
Sales
arrangements
Other
N 11 11 11 11 11
Mean 23.02 1.18 41.35 13.77 18.41
Standard
Deviation
19.21 3.06 26.93 19.93 21.22
Min 0 0 10 10 0
Max 67 10 90 57 60
Table 5.3.24
On the topic of financial capability, comparison of certain variables for Independent 
Operated, relative to Independent Non-Operated exploration drilling, reveals the two 
categories to be quite different (Table 5.3.25). Independents appear to drill fewer 
appraisal wells when Operator (mean = 0.5), than when acting as a Non-Operating 
partner in a joint venture (mean = 1.67). An independent samples t-test of mean 
differences partially supports this result (t-statistic = -1.118; Prob. value = 0.290) 
Similarly, the mean total water depth in which Independents have undertaken exploratory 
drilling as Operator (mean = 446.75m), is shallower than the Non-Operated exploration 
drillings in which they are involved (mean = 612m). Although an independent samples t- 
test of mean differences does not show this finding to be significant (t-statistic = -0.311 ; 
Prob. value = 0.751), the claim that Independents utilise the option of being Non­
Operator to access exploration drillings that may exceed their ‘Operator’ resource 
capabilities should not be rejected.
Independent Operated vs. Non-Operated Exploration Drilling
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
No. of appraisal wells 6 .5 0 0 .837 0 2
No. of appraisal wells 9 1.67 0 0 2.96 0 9
Water depth (m) 4 446.75 70.5 - 769.10 46 1600
Water depth (m) 8 612 100 - 905.55 5 2590
No. of shareholding 
partners
8 1.25 .5 0 158 0 4
No. of shareholding 
partners
9 3.11 3 2 1.27 2 5
% shareholding by 
Independent.
9 72.22 86 100 34 7 100
% shareholding by 
Independent
11 16.5 12 10 11.83 2 37.5
Table 5.3.25
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For example, it is interesting to note that for exploration drillings where Independents are 
Operators, there tend to be fewer additional partners (mean = 1.25), than in drillings 
where Independents are Non-Operator (mean = 3.11)21 An independent samples t-test of 
mean differences supports this result (t-statistic = -2.691; Prob. value = 0.017). Since 
Independents appear to undertake less resource-intensive activities as Operators than 
when Non-Operators (Table 5.3.25), this may explain why fewer additional partners are 
required. The resources necessary for less complex exploration drillings may be more 
easily borne by one firm.
Further supporting evidence for the claim that Independents are restricted in their capital 
resources, may be drawn from the Drilling Contractor Interviews. SWOT analysis 
revealed Payment default to be the greatest threat to a Drilling Contractor of undertaking 
contracts with Independents (see Fig 5.3.9 and Table 5.3.26).
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Most Important least Important
Fig 5.3.9
A Friedman test, X2 = 5.057 (Prob. value = 0.168), cannot rule out the possibility that 
chance may have influenced selection (Fig 5.3.9 and Table 5.3.26). Kendall’s W = 0.241 
(Prob. value = 0.168), suggests a moderate degree of concordance in the rankings chosen by 
respondents.
25 Jim Hannon of HannonWestwood UKCS market intelligence consultancy reports 3 partners are typically 
involved in a licence. (Hannon, 2004).
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Threats of Undertakin g a Contract with an Independent
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Payment default 7 1.57 1 1 1.13 1 4
Technical error 7 2.7 1 3 Multiple 
modes exist
.76 2 4
Oil price feedback 7 2.7 1 3 Multiple 
modes exist
1.11 1 4
HSE risk 7 3 3 4 1.15 1 4
Table 5.3.26
In contrast to Independents, the greatest strength reported by Drilling Contractor 
interviewees for undertaking contracts with Majors was the financial security conferred. 
Payments would certainly be made (see Fig 5.3.10 and Table 5.3.27).
Strengths of Contracts with Majors
■ Financial security 
(payment)
□ Length of contract (long)
□ USE approach
□ Materiality of project 
(high)
□ Quality of management
0 12 3 4
Most Important Ix;ast Important
Fig 5.3.10
2 ...A Friedman test, % = 7.314, (Prob. value = 0.120), does not rule out the possibility that 
chance may have influenced selection (Fig 5.3.10 and Table 5.3.27). Kendall’s W = 0.261 
(Prob. value = 0.120), suggests a moderate degree of concordance in the rankings chosen by 
respondents.
Strengths of Undertaking a Contract with a Major
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Financial security (payment) 7 2.14 2 1 1.46 1 5
Length of contract (long) 7 2.43 2 1 1.62 1 5
HSE approach 7 2.71 3 Multiple 
modes exist
1.11 1 4
Materiality of project (high) 7 3.86 4 4 1.07 2 5
Quality of management 7 3.86 4 5 1.21 2 5
Table 5.3 .27
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Reviewing the results gathered for Questions 1.1 and 1.4 of the Independent SSI 
(Appendix 1.2), Table 5.3.28 shows how the above questions have been successful in 
extracting a relatively even cross-section of the exploration drillings undertaken by 
Independents. As Table 5.3.28 displays, results in the main, are evenly weighted 
between offshore/onshore and Western/Non-Western exploration drillings.
Last Successful Exploration Drilling - Sample Distribution (Operator/Non-Operator)
Variable Offshore Onshore Western Countries Non-Western Countries
N (Operated) 
Question 1.1
4 5 5 4
N (Non-Operated) 
Question 1.4
7 4 6 5
Table 5.3.28
For Operated exploration licences, no Independent firm-size measures were found to 
correlate with either the total depth of the successful well or the water depth in which 
drilling was undertaken. Small Independents were equally likely to drill wells of a similar 
depth to those of larger Independents. Indeed, the deepest well recorded within the 
sample (5334m), was undertaken by one of the smallest Independents, Independent D. 
Since both well depth and water depth may be recognised as measures of drilling 
complexity (Campbell and Laherrere, 1998), the previous results suggest no difference in 
the complexity of exploration drillings undertaken by British Independents of differing 
firm size. Although larger Independents undertake more licences (Table 5.3.29), the 
average complexity of an exploration well, measured according to total well depth and
water depth, appears to be similar to those of smaller Independents.
Spearman ’s rho Correlations - Comparing Firm Size with Total No. of Licences Held
Variable
Box ordering;
- Correlation Coefficient
- Significance 
-N
Market
Capitalization
(£m)
Annual Total
Production
(boepd)
Net Assets (£m) Turnover Operating
Profit
Total No. of .55’ .48 .54’ .58’ .61"
Licences .02 .06 .03 .02 ..009
17 16 17 17 17
Note: p < .05 , p<.01
Table 5.3.29
Before testing hypothesis 3(d) and 3(e) set in Section 3.1, it is important to test whether 
any other variables may be found to influence the speed of action measures Ol, 02 and 
Nl, N2. Tables 5.3.30 and 5.3.31 test the variables of Water depth, Total well depth,
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Number of shareholding partners and the Number of appraisal wells drilled and show
none of these factors to strongly influence the speed of action measures.
Spearman’s rho Correlations - Independent Operated Exploration Drilling
Variable
Box ordering:
- Correlation Coefficient
- Significance 
-N
Operator:
(Ol)
Operator:
(02)
No. of 
appraisal 
wells
Water
depth
Total well 
depth
No. of 
shareholding 
partners
Operator: (02) .50
.50
4
No. of appraisal wells -.10
.84
6
.00
1.00
4
Water depth .78
.23
4 1
-1.0
1.0
2
Total well depth -.19
.66
8
-.50
.67
3
-.35
.56
5
.50
.67
3
No. of shareholding 
partners
.32
.44
8
.83
.17
4
.00
1.00
5
1.00**
4
.02
.97
7
% shareholding by firm -.40
.28
9
-.83
.17
4
-.51
.30
6
-.80
.20
4
.20
.63
8
-.95**
.00
8
Note:*p<.05 , ”p<.01
Table 5.3.30
Spearman’s rho Correlations — Independent Non-Operated Exploration Drilling
Variable
Box ordering:
- Correlation Coefficient
- Significance 
-N
Non-
Operator:
(Nl)
Non-
Operator:
(N2)
No. of 
appraisal 
wells
Water
depth
Total well 
depth
No. of 
shareholding 
partners
Non-Operator: (N2) -.08
.89
6
No. of appraisal wells .06
.88
9
-.07
.90
6.
Water depth .27
.52
8
.80
.20
4
.45
.31
7
Total well depth .43
.19
11
-.35
.49
6
.41
.27
9
-.26
.54
8
No. of shareholding 
partners
-.48
.19
9
.65
.24
5
.43
.29
8
-.03
.95
7
-.44
.24
9
% shareholding by firm .05
.89
11
-.97**
.00
6
-.36
.35
9
-.24
.57
8
.27
.42
11
-.728’
.03
9
Note: ’ p < .05 , ” p < .01
Table 5.3.31
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Likewise, a series of independent samples t-tests do not demonstrate any significant 
difference in the mean time taken for an action onshore relative to the equivalent mean
time taken for the same action offshore (Table 5.3.32).
Testing the Difference in the Mean Time taken Onshore vs. Offshore
Action Variable N Mean Standard
Deviation
t-statistic Prob.
Value
Operator (Ol): Time taken between award of 
licence & 1st successful test-well
Onshore 5 2.20 0.84 0.57 0.58
Offshore 4 1.75 1.50
Operator (O^): Time taken between
successful test-well & production on-line
Onshore 3 2.00 2.65 0.33 0.78
Offshore 1 1.00 1.00
Non-Operator (Nl): Time taken between 
award of licence & 1st successful test-well
Onshore 4 2.00 1.83 0.36 0.72
Offshore 7 1.57 1.90
Non-Operator (N2): Time taken between 
successful test-well & production on-line
Onshore 3 1.33 0.58 -0.35 0.74
Offshore 3 1.67 1.53
Table 5.3.32
From these results the only relationship which seems worthy of further examination is 
that between the % shareholding of the joint venture held by the Independent and N2 (see 
Table 5.3.31). The result suggests that the larger the Independent’s % shareholding when 
Non-Operator, the shorter the time between a successful exploration drilling and 
production coming on-line (Prob. value = 0.00).
We have found none of the other variables examined (for example. Water depth. Total 
well depth, Offshore/Onshore) influenced the speed of action measures . The 
hypotheses 3 (d) and 3 (e), as shown below, may now be tested.
Hypothesis 3 (d): The smaller the Operating firm, the shorter the time between award of 
licence and drilling of the first exploration test-well.
Hypothesis 3 (e): The smaller the Operating firm, the shorter the time between a 
commercially successful exploration test-well find, and production coming on-line.
Table 5.3.33 displays the test results for Hypothesis 3 (d) and 3 (e). The results show that 
a strong relationship cannot be found between the firm size {Market Capitalization, Net 
Assets, Total Production, Turnover1, Operating Profit, Head Count) and speed of action 
measures {Ol, 02, FD, Nl, N2). Thus the results do not suggest the rejection of the null 
hypothesis for either hypothesis 3 (d) or 3 (e). However, closer examination of the
Although this suggests that these factors are of no influence, it must be acknowledged that there could be 
some forms ofjoint influence at work.
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results reveals that for those speed of action measures where the Independent is in control 
through being the Operator (01 and 02), a partial relationship may be identified. The 
majority of the coefficients between firm size variables and the rapidity of action 
measures Ol and 02, display a positive sign (Table 5.3.33). Overall, these results 
suggest that as the size of the Independent firm increases, speed of action slows. Such a 
finding does correspond with similar conclusions drawn by Chen and Hambrick (1995)
for the US airline industry.
Spearman’s rho Correlations - Comparing Firm Size with Speed of Action
Variable
Box ordering;
-Correlation Coefficient 
- Significance 
-N
Operator: (Ol) Operator: (02) Operator: (FD) Non-Operator:
(Nl)
Non- Operator:
(N2)
Market .16 .95 -.19 .09 -.24
Capitalization (£m) .69 .05 .66 .79 .65
9 4 8 11 6
Net Assets (£m) .4 .95 .04 -.10 -.24
.29 .05 .93 .76 .65
9 4 8 11 6
Annual Total .24 .32 -.15 .13 -.53
Production 2002 .56 .68 .73 .72 .28
(boepd) 8 4 8 10 6
Turnover (£m) .22 .95 -.31 .13 -.03
.57 .05 .48 .71 .96
9 4 8 11 6
Operating Profit .31 .63 -21 -.01 -.41
(£m) .42 .37 .52 .98 .42
9 4 8 11 6
Total Head Count -.18 .32 -.17 -.29 -.59
.64 .68 .68 .40 .22
9 4 8 11 6
Note; ' p < .05 , ’ p<01
Table 5.3.33
Turning to the Field development decision, similar to the above discussion, a strong 
relationship cannot be found between firm size and the time taken to formulate the field 
development decision (FD) (Table 5.3.33). Nevertheless, closer inspection does reveal 
the majority of coefficients do display a negative sign. In aggregate this suggests that the 
larger the firm size, the shorter the time taken to formulate the field development 
decision. This partial finding supports one of the hypotheses generated during initial 
inductive research (Kemp, 2003), that the resource intensive field development decision 
might bear more heavily upon small, relative to larger sized Independents. The proposed 
consequence (Kemp, 2003), that the below findings partially support, is that the time
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taken to execute the field development decision would be longer for the smaller 
'Independents.
Returning to the issue of whether a company’s burden of debt may stimulate faster 
action, Table 5.3.34 gauges the relationship between the companies’ debt measures and 
speed of action measures. Since no strong relationships may be detected between the 
burden of debt and the actual speed of action undertaken by individual Independents, 
these findings reinforce previous results that would assign a low importance to the 
financial pressure of debt as a stimulus to action (see Table 5.3.17).
Spearman's rho Correlations — Comparing Stimulants with Speed of Action
Variable
Box ordering:
-Correlation Coefficient 
- Significance 
-N
Gearing Interest paid Turnover *1CC
Operator: (Ol) .22 -.04
.46 .91
9 9
Operator: (02) .78 -.32
.16 .68
4 4
Operator: (FD) -.29 -.56
.35 .15
8 8
Non-Operator: (Nl) .13 .20
.61 .55
11 11
Non-Operator: (N2) -.32 -.73
.41 .10
6 6
Table 5.3.34
Although in this latter section (Section 5.3.3), significance levels are often low the 
research has highlighted that the question design framework for measuring action (see
questions 1.1 and 1.4 of the Independents SSI) is of a format and content that would 
provide a useful template for extracting data from historical government records. This 
would enable the relationships detailed above to be more comprehensively tested.
Nevertheless, our own sample still produces findings that assist the overall exploratory
nature of this research.
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A final feature that may assist in explaining Independents’ propensity towards rapidity of 
actions pertains to company growth targets. Although firms frequently set internal 
production targets, few indicated these publicly, only 28.6% of the sample so doing. For 
those disclosing, growth rate targets were high; future production targets implied year on 
year production growth rates of 57.2%, 145%, and 216% respectively. Unfortunately, 
few firms would disclose internal production targets. Thus, the above three act as 
glimpses of the actual growth rates Independents seek to achieve.
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5.4 UTILISATION OF CONTRACTORS
5.4.1 Sourcing of Functions
5.4.1.1 Functions Provided In-House
For each Independent, Table 5.4.1 displays how twenty-five separate operational
functions are sourced. Provision of these functions falls into one of three categories: (1) 
Fully provided in-house, (2) Mixed provision provided both internally and externally out­
sourced, and (3) Fully out-sourced. Employing these category numbers as codes (for 
example 1 = in-house to 3 = out-house) Figure 5.4.1 displays how the average 
Independent sources each particular function. In this chart, the lower the coding, the 
greater the tendency for a function to be internally sourced. Analysis of Table 5.4.1 and 
Figure 5.4.1 reveals that the four predominant strengths of Independents lie within the 
functional categories of Financial, Commercial, Human Resource Management, and 
Procurement. Explanations as to why it is these functions that are sourced internally, can 
be drawn from the contrasting transaction-cost and resource-based frameworks. As noted 
in Section 6.2, following Williamson’s transaction-cost interpretation, human asset 
specificity and frequency of transaction, would be the likely causes of internalisation in 
this circumstance. Alternatively, in accordance with Richardson’s resource-based theory, 
the four activities can be grouped together as, similar, value orientated functions of the 
business. Unlike other functions, these activities are less technically specialised and 
more general in their scope, their emphasis being upon value-generation, through deal 
making and skilled managerial co-ordination. Moving to the more technically specialised 
functions, such as Petroleum Engineering, Reservoir Engineering, and Seismic Analysis, 
it is interesting to find these functions to be of both in-house and mixed provision. 
Following Williamson’s framework, human asset specificity appears the most applicable. 
A level of sustained internal capability is required if the firm is to maintain a store of 
knowledge about its long-term assets. Moreover, when external providers are sought, a 
level of internal expertise will enhance a firm’s ability to assess contractors and reduce 
the likelihood of adverse selection. From a resource-based perspective, these functions 
could be recognised as requiring similar capabilities; all require technical knowledge of 
petroleum/reservoir dynamics (See Section 6.2). Examining the functions of 
predominantly mixed provision, namely Project and Facilities Management, their partial
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internalisation could be interpreted as a consequence of uncertainty. When contracted 
out, both of these functions are found to be critical to an Independent’s performance (see 
Table 5.4,2). Holding such a position of importance, the need for closer monitoring of 
the contractor, with the aim of reducing uncertainty, may stimulate the Independent to 
hold some internal expertise. From a Richardsonian perspective, the two functions can 
also be recognised as requiring similar capabilities. Each of the functions relates to the 
monitoring and control of action, the overseeing of the drilling or production work being 
undertaken. Overall, as discussed in Section 6.2, both interpretative frameworks appear 
applicable.
5.4.1.2 Outsourced Functions
The remaining functions, of mainly out-sourced provision, may be grouped accordingly. 
They fall into the categories of Drilling (Equipment, and Personnel), Engineering 
(Development, Mechanical, and Process), Support Services (Maintenance, and 
Information Technology), Subsea Operations (Design, Fabrication, and Diving), and 
Infrastructure (Pipeline Engineering, Handling and Laying) (Table 5.4.1 & Fig 5.4.1). 
According to Williamson’s transaction-cost interpretation, the out-sourcing of these 
functions arises because asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of transaction are 
themselves insufficient for internalisation to be enacted. In contrast, a resource-based 
interpretation, would posit these activities to be complementary to those in-house 
activities referenced in Section 5.4.1.1. Although not similar to in-house activities, yet 
acting as complementary to the process of production, it is within these functions, 
according to Richardson, that co-operative possibilities lie.
Analysis of Table 5.4.2, which displays the out-sourced functions upon which each 
Independent firm’s performance is most dependent, reveals the categories of Drilling, 
Engineering, and Subsea to be of importance. However, the contracted function upon 
which the performance of Independents is most clearly dependent is Drilling. Results 
show that regardless of firm size, Drilling is the most important function upon which 
firms are dependent. Holding such primacy to Independents’ performance. Section 5.4.2
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investigates the topic of i.nceiitivisatio.n and the manner in which contracts with Drilling
firms are managed.
Functions provided by the Contracting Firms upon which Independents’ Performance is most Dependent
7S< - 5lh in Order of Decreasing Dependence
Independent ist 2nd 3” 4th 5*
A Infrastructure Drilling Facilities
management
B Data
management
Petroleum / 
reservoir 
engineering
u.:,> ■
Public & 
investor relations
Lawyers
C Project
management
Drilling Logging / 
wireline services
Logistics Logging / 
wireline services
D Drilling h’Di
l; t. tpK i’dPD- ! O.'. til
Logging / 
wireline services
Lawyers
E Drilling Drilling Cementing / 
stimulation
Logging / 
wireline services
F Drilling Petroleum / 
reservoir 
engineering
G Subsca
construction
Drilling Drilling services Facilities design 
construction
Facilities design 
construction
H Drilling services Subsca
construction
Facilities design 
construction
Pipelaying
I Drilling Subsea
construction
Subsea
construction
Subsca
construction
Facilities
management
J Facilities
management
Drilling Seismic survey 
& processing
Seismic
processing
iii;>.'.t>
IT
K Facilities
management
Petroleum / 
reservoir 
engineering
Drilling Drilling Logging / 
wireline services
L Drilling Drilling Logging / 
wireline services
Logging/ 
wireline services
Seismic
(irocessing
M Facilities
management
Seismic
processing
N Facilities
management
Drilling Drilling Drilling Drilling
Table 5,4.2
Beyond Drilling, closer examination reveals, the next most influential function upon 
Independent performance is Facilities Management of production operations. This 
function is particularly important among the larger Independents (J, K, M, and N). It 
involves the task of managing a production platform from which production is brought 
on-line. An interesting finding regarding this function was that the greater the percentage 
of an Independent’s total production within the UKCS, the greater the extent to which 
Facilities Management was contracted out (Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient = 
0.599; Prob. value = 0.038). Drawing from Williamson’s writings (1985, p.96). Section 
6.2.7 d^r^c^r^^t^^t^^ the level of asset speccfeity experienced by a fi^m is also dt^lt^i'm ir^<^d 
in relation to market provision. The more extensive the market provision, the lower the
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asset specificity, and the higher the tendency to out-source. Alternatively, Facilities 
Management also produces findings that are supportive of a resource-based interpretative 
framework. Findings show that the greater the percentage of its total licences held as 
Operator, the greater the propensity for Facilities Management to be undertaken in-house 
(Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient = -0.608; Prob, value = 0.028). This result 
indicates that firms with managerial resources which are adequate for undertaking the co­
ordinating task of Operator, are equally involved in the activity of Facilities Management 
where similar co-ordinating resources are required.
5.4.1.3 North American Independents
As displayed in Table 5.4.3, the general pattern of functional sourcing among the North 
American Independents is similar to that of the British (Table 5.4.1). For example, the 
British Independent functional strengths of Finance, Commercial, Human Resource 
Management, and Procurement are all predominantly internalised by the North American 
firms. Nevertheless, differences occur in the functions of: Seismic Analysis, Data 
Management, Project Management, Facilities Management, Petroleum Engineering and 
Reservoir Engineering. Whilst the British Independents in this context utilised mixed 
provision, the North American Independents mainly internalised these functions. 
Likewise, the functions of Drilling Personnel, Development Engineering, Mechanical 
Engineering, Maintenance Services, and System Engineering, which are predominantly 
out-sourced by British Independents, are mainly of mixed provision with the North 
American firms. Having established in Section 5.2, that the North American Independent 
firm size is on average significantly larger than the equivalent British Independent, their 
greater size may also result in more functions being internalised. The impact of firm size 
upon the sourcing of functions may also be recognised within our British sample. 
Inspection of Table 5.4.1 reveals a distinct split between the smaller (A to H) and larger 
(I to N) British Independents in their provision of both Development Engineering and 
System Engineering. For each function, the smaller Independents mainly out-source, 
whilst the larger Independents have mixed provision.
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Reviewing the results gathered from North American Independents concerning the out­
sourced function upon which their performance is most dependent (Table 5.4.4), it is 
clear, that similar to British Independents, Drilling is of greatest importance.
Function provided by the Contracting firm upon which North 
American Independents’ Performance is most Dependent
Independent Function Provided
NA Drilling
NB Drilling
NC Seismic survey & processing
ND Desisgn & development engineering
NE Drilling
NF Drilling
NG Drilling
NH Facilities management
NI Not specified
NJ Facilities management
NK Design & development engineering
NL Drilling
Table 5.4.4
5.4.2 Utilisation of Safeguards
5.4.2.1 Governance St^i^c^tt^I'i^^ Sought
Table 5.4.5 lists the four governance structures required by Williamson (2002) if credible 
contracting is to be achieved under conditions of asset specificity. Independent responses 
were made in reference to the drilling contractor with whom each firm had the strongest 
ties. Results for the analysis of governance structures were coded on a scale from 1 =
very important to 5 = not important.
Governance Structures sought with Primary Drilling Contractor
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard.
Deviation
Min Max
Information disclosure 13 1.00 1 1 .00 1 1
Penalties for premature 
termination
11 2.73 2 2 l.OI 2 5
Specialized dispute 
settlement mechanisms
12 3.00 3 2 1.28 1 5
Verification mechanisms 13 1.69 1 1 .95 1 4
Table 5.4.5
Information disclosure, with its attribute of reducing information asymmetries, is the 
most important governance structure that Independents seek with drilling contractors. 
All firms stated they aimed to be kept up-dated at all times with the most current drilling 
developments. Penalties for premature termination, alias incentivrsatron mechanisms, 
were of less significance, achieving a quite important classification. Extra-legal,
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specialized dispute settlement mechanisms, as might be found in the standard form of 
contract, were not found to be of significance. Indeed, the indifferent category of 
response prevailed. Verification mechanisms, being approaches to determine the actual 
effort made by contractors, were classified as quite to very important by most 
interviewees. Thus results show only a few of Willliamson’s governance structures to be 
applicable to the contracts established between Independents and Drillers.
Entrance into alliances with drilling and/or production operations (facilities management) 
contractors was found to be minimal (Table 5.4.6).
Alliances with Drilling and/or Production Operations Contractors
Variable N Yes No
Alliance with Drilling
Operations Contractor
14 3 11
Alliance with Production 
Operations Contractor
14 2 12
Table 5.4.6
For those that did, the rationale supporting alliance formation was diverse. For one firm, 
Independent E, which had invested in a post-Soviet state, the alliance was not intended. 
Rather it was a requirement of the deal negotiated that the original State drilling company 
both maintain a 25% equity in the operations undertaken and be the principal driller for 
those operations. Independent A had also attempted equity provision with a drilling 
contractor operating in South America. However, the respondent noted that “any time 
they had tried to persuade” a drilling contractor to take risk, it “hadn’t worked out.” In 
this case, risk sharing contracts were stated to be risky in certain developing countries, 
because court systems could not be relied upon should the contractor default. For 
another firm, Independent N, lack of expertise was given as the reason for alliance 
formation. The service contractor held regional offshore knowledge that the 
Independent, at the time of the deal, did not possess. A 25% equity stake and cash were 
taken by the contractor to manage the development of the field and act as production 
operator. Following a recent acquisition of another exploration firm in the region, 
Independent N stated this previously contracted out function was now internalised, and 
the acquisition had conferred on N the necessary skill and experience required. Another 
Independent (K), stated that the use of production operators arose because the company’s
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focus was upon “cussisg and developing the business: not implementing operational 
work programmes”. This firm aimed to keep its “core staff low and outsource as much 
as possible.” The reason for outsourcing the production-operator role was because they 
did not have the necessary “skill set”. Moreover, the Independent did not have the 
“economies of scale” from which the production operator benefited. As for Independent 
K’s choice of production-operator, this was a consequence of “long established 
relationships with key individuals in the [contracted] organization.” In summary, these 
findings show alliances to be rarely utilised. However, when they are chosen as the 
method of preference, it is often because the Independent does not possess the necessary 
resources, and information transfer from the partner-firm is required.
5.4.2.2 IIlsceSivitation
Utilisation of iscestivitatios systems for governing relationships with drilling contractors 
had differing incidence. Thus, while 38.5 % of Independents reported no iscestivisatios, 
only a day-rate system being employed % 61.5% did indeed use some form of 
iscestivisatios system (see Fig 5.4.2).
Incentivitation Systems Utilised with Drilling 
Contractors
Fig 5.4.2
The bonus system was the most common form of iscestivisatios, 50% of all 
Independents detailed its use (Fig 5.4.3). Equity systems and turnkey solutions* 2 were
' A day-rate system means that the drilling contractor is paid a fixed sum for each day of work completed. 
There are no incentivisation schemes in place. Kemp and Stephen (1997; 1999) have theorised that such a 
system could be subject to abuse. For it is the field investor, in this case the Independent, which bears the 
burdens of cost over-runs and delays in work completion.
2 A turnkey solution results in a fixed price being arranged to cover the entire drilling programme before 
work commences. It essentially acts as a hedge for the Independent and locks it into a known total cost. 
The cost of over-runs and delays are now borne by the drilling contractor.
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less common, utilised by 29% and 17% of firms respectively (Fig 5.4.4-5). No firms 
were found to utilise either a penalty system or to give a percentage share of field sales.
Bonus system
■ Yes
■ No
Fig 5.4.3
Equity system (farm-in) Turnkey (fixed price at outset)
■ Yes ■ Yes
■ No _______ 17% ■ No
ifjigil
71% 83%
Fig 5.4.4 Fig 5.4.5
Of the firms detailing the use of bonuses, all stated the use of budget and time targets 
(Fig 5.4.6). Output and health and safety targets were of lesser significance, whilst no 
quality targets were set.
Performance Targets Incorporated by Firms 
utilising a Bonus System
Budget Time targets Output I lealth & Quality
targets targets safety targets
targets
Fig 5.4.6
Incentivisation among North American Independents was resolute, 100% of respondents 
detailed the incorporation of at least one performance incentive device. As discussed in
Section 7.2, this propensity to engage in incentivisation among the North American
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companies does concord with Williamson’s opportunism based theory and the 
incentivisation safeguard required for credible contracting.
Bonus system - North American 
Independents
Fig 5.4.7
Equity system (farm-in) - North 
American Independents
8%
92%
Turnkey (fixed price at outset) - 
North American Independents
Fig 5.4.8 Fig 5 .4.9
Similar to British Independents, a bonus system was the most common form of 
incentivisation among North American firms, 67% of the sample specifying use (Fig 
5.4.7). Equity systems were of lesser significance among the North American firms than 
for British (Fig 5.4.8). In contrast, turnkey approaches were more frequently used, 42% 
detailing use (Fig 5.4.9). No North American firms were found to utilise either a penalty 
system or to give a percentage share of field sales.
Comparing the use of incentivisation systems between Majors and Independents, 
interviews with the International Drilling Contractors revealed that Independents 
allocated a greater proportion of total project risk to the drilling contractor (see Table 
5.4.7).
Operators with whom a Greater Proportion of the Total 
Project Risk is Typically Allocated to the Drilling Contractor
Weighting Project risk
Independent 57.1%
Equal 28.6%
Major 14.3%
Table 5.4.7
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The most prominent incentive, which induced this cisk-tcassfec, was the turnkey solution. 
Several respondents noted the turnkey system to be a relatively “common” preference 
among Independents. Indeed, whilst only 14% of the projects undertaken by drillers, for 
Majors, had utilised a turnkey system (Fig 5.4.10), the cocresposdisg figure was 29% for 
Independents (Fig 5.4.11).
Turnkey - fixed price at outset Turnkey - fixed price at outset
(Majors) (Independents)
14% 29%
□ Yes
B a No , . . ---- V
□ Yes
■ No
71%
86%
Fig 5.4.10 Fig 5.4.11
The explanation given by drillers, as to why the turnkey system was so popular among 
Independents, was because it “caps their financial exposure”, and thereby helps them to 
gain external finance more easily. Iscestivisatios schemes transfer risk to the contractor. 
As a consequence, Kemp and Stephen (1997, p.5) note, small oil companies, with few 
projects, will experience a significantly greater reduction in risk through implementing 
such schemes, than will large, diversified companies. This risk reduction may explain 
the strong popularity of turnkey systems among Independents, as shown by our results.
With the expectation of increased future Independent entrance to the UKCS, Contractor F 
stated its new policy was to develop a turnkey package. Contractor B already had such a 
turnkey package in place; its business model was specifically focused upon providing 
drilling to Independents. Another contractor (C) noted the propensity of the turnkey 
approach among Independents within the Gulf of Mexico. This latter observation may 
contribute to Contractor B’s preference for such a system, as its primary site of operation 
was the Gulf of Mexico. Such a finding corroborates our previous results that show 
turnkey approaches to be more frequently utilised by North American, as against British, 
Independents.
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Although some drilling firms had engaged in penalty systems, all drilling interviewees 
noted that these systems were rare. As Contractor E stated, a penalty system would only 
be present in the tender process - to ensure a rig would turn-up on time - but would not be 
included in the final contract document. Two drillers (A & C) reported their contracts 
were usually without incentivisation, a simple day-rate being the firms’ principal policy. 
Contractor C acknowledged that his company prided itself in striving to improve drilling 
performance regardless of incentivisation. Detailed time-depth performance curves were 
made available to operating clients in order to demonstrate the firm’s commitment to 
continual performance improvement. An example of such a chart is displayed in Fig 
5.4.12. In this chart, each coloured line is representative of a different vintage of well 
(pink, being the oldest well; blue, the most recent well). The chart shows a continual 
shift of these time-depth curves to the left. Over time, this contractor has improved its 
performance; greater drilling depths are achieved in fewer days.
Drilling Contractor Performance - Simple Day-Rate Employed
Note: For confidentiality, aspects of the original chart have been altered.
Fig 5.4.12
Contractor C’s incentive-free approach juxtaposes Williamson’s credible contracting 
framework. Although open to abuse (Kemp and Stephen, 1997; 1999), i.e. there is no 
cost to the driller of work being delayed, Fig 5.4.12 shows that, even without 
incentivisation, drillers can still be trusted to deliver on-time. Thus, adherence to a day- 
rate system carries with it the connotations of trust and co-operation. It suggests that for
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such contracts Richardson’s co-operative middle-ground approach provides a more 
realistic interpretative framework than does Williamson’s opportunism based theory.
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5.5 NEGOTIATION
5.5.1 Approach Factors
For the Non-Western context, the ranked importance of the five tested approach factors 
are displayed in Fig 5.5.1 and Table 5.5.1. In this context, Accessing the appropriate 
government official is the most important reported factor influencing award of licence. 
This result confirms Salacuse’s (2003) assertion (Section 3.3.3) that it is important to 
target the appropriate department and official within the government system. Seniority of 
company representatives (Kapoor et al, 2001; Marsh, 2001), an anticipated behavioural 
strength of Independents (Section 3.3.2), was also of relative importance. Use of the 
same company representatives, a further proposed behavioural strength of Independents 
(Section 3.3.2), was found to be the least important approach factor influencing award of 
licence in Non-Western countries (see Fig 5.5.1).
Mean Rank of Approach (Behavioural) Factors in 
Non-Western Countries
Fig 5.5. I
• i 2A Friedman test, =17.05, (Prob. value = 0.002), shows it is unlikely the rankings for
Fig 5.5.1 and Table 5.5.1 were derived by chance and that variables are therefore of 
differing preference. Results also display a high level of concordance in the rankings 
chosen by respondents, as indicated by Kendall’s W= 0.328 (Prob. value = 0.002).
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Approach Factors Influencing a Licence being Awarded in Non-Western Countries
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Accessing the appropriate government 
official
13 1.85 2 1 1.14 1 5
Persistence 13 2.38 2 Multiple 
modes exist
1.26 1 5
Seniority of company representatives 13 3.00 3 3 1.08 1 5
Presence of a host-country national 
among company representatives
13 3.85 4 Multiple 
modes exist
1.41 1 5
Use of the same company 
representatives
13 3.92 4 5 1.12 2 5
Table 5.5 .1
For Western countries (Fig 5.5.2 and Table 5.5.2), Persistence is the most important
factor influencing award of licence. In contrast to Non-Western countries (Fig 5.5.1),
Accessing the appropriate government official is of negligible importance for the
Western context. Such a result highlights the need for different approaches in each
context. Whilst repeated licence applications are necessary for eventual success within
Western countries, in Non-Western countries, access to the appropriate government
official holds greater prominence. With different approaches required, it is likely that 
the two contexts deviate in their functioning. This finding accords with existing writings 
on government bureaucracy, where the West/Non-West distinction is recognised (Ye,
2003; Peters, 2001; Beetham, 1987).
Mean Rank of Approach (Behavioural) Factors in 
Western Countries
Fig 5.5.2
A Friedman test, /2 = 8.145, (Prob. value = 0.086), shows differentiation between 
rankings in Table 5.5.2 to be weaker than for Non-Western countries. Results display a 
lower level of concordance in the rankings chosen by respondents; Kendall's W = 0.185 
(Prob. value = 0.086).
108
Approach Factors Influencing a Licence being Awarded in Western Countries
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Persistence 11 2.18 2 Multiple 
modes exist
1.08 1 4
Seniority of company representatives 11 2.45 2 2 1.21 1 5
Use of the same company 
representatives
11 2.92 3 Multiple 
modes exist
1.40 1 5
Accessing the appropriate government 
official
11 3.45 4 5 1.70 1 5
Presence of a host-country national 
among company representatives
11 3.82 4 Multiple 
modes exist
1.33 1 5
Table 5.5.2
Combination of the British with the North American Independent results (Fig 5.5.3), 
confirms the original pattern in Fig 5.5.1; namely. Accessing the appropriate government 
official is the most important approach factor in Nos-Wetters countries.
Mean Rank of Approach Factors in Non-Western 
Countries (British & North American 
Independents)
■ Accessing the appropriate 
government official
□ Persistence
□ Seniority of company 
representatives
□ Presence of a host-country 
national
□ Use of the same company 
representatives
Fig 5.5.3
• j 2A Friedman test, % = 28.33, (Prob. value = 0.000), shows it is unlikely the rankings 
for Fig 5.5.3. and Table 5.5.3 were derived by chance and that variables are therefore of 
differing preference. Results display a high level of concordance in the rankings chosen 
by respondents, Kendall’s W= 0.417 (Prob. value = 0.000).
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Approach Factors Influencing a Licence being Awarded in Non-Western Countries 
(British & North American Independents)
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Accessing the appropriate government 
official
17 1.82 2 2 1.02 1 5
Persistence 17 2.12 2 1 1.21 1 5
Seniority of company representatives 17 3.06 3 3 .97 1 5
Presence of a host-country national 
among company representatives
17 4.00 4 Multiple 
modes exist
1.28 1 5
Use of the same company 
representatives
17 4.00 4 5 1.06 2 5
Table 5.5.3
Combination of the British with the North American Independent results (Fig 5.5.4), 
strengthens the findings of Fig 5.5.2. That is, Persistence is the most significant factor, 
whilst Accessing the appropriate government official and Presence of a host-country 
national are the least important approach factors in Western countries.
Mean Rank of Approach Factors in Western 
Countries (British & North American
Independents)
0 12 3 4
Most Important Least Important
■ Accessing the appropriate 
government official
□ Persistence
□ Seniority of company 
representatives
□ Presence of a host-country 
national
□ Use of the same company 
representatives
Fig 5.5.4
A Friedman test, /2 = 17.85, (Prob. value = 0.001), shows it is unlikely the rankings 
for Table 5.5.4 and Fig 5.5.4 were derived by chance and that variables are therefore of 
differing preference. Results display a high level of concordance in the rankings chosen 
by respondents, Kendall’s W= 0.279 (Prob. value = 0.001).
110
Approach Factors Influencing a Licence being Awarded in Western Countries 
(British & North American Independents)
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Persistence 16 1.88 1.50 1 1.03 1 4
Seniority of company representatives 16 2.69 2.5 2 1.30 1 5
Use of the same company 
representatives
16 2.71 2 2 1.21 1 5
Accessing the appropriate government 
official
16 3.63 4 4 1.46 1 5
Presence of a host-country national 
among company representatives
16 4.00 4 5 1.21 1 5
Table 5.5.4
5.5.2 Content Factors
Level of commitment to drill is the most important technical factor influencing award of 
licence in Non-Western countries (Fig 5.5.5). Thus, it is seen that governments seek 
assurance that drilling activity will occur. According to these results, Non-Western 
countries will make awards to those companies where the licence will be treated as 
supporting a ‘core’ committment, in the sense that a work programme will be undertaken, 
and investment made (Hannon, 2004). This is followed in importance by Financial 
capability. Non-Western Governments seek confirmation that firms have the Finance to 
undertake the planned activity.
0 12 3 4 5
Most Important Least Important
Fig 5.5.5
A Friedman test, %= 19.73, (Prob. value = 0.001), shows it is unlikely the rankings 
for Fig 5.5.5 and Table 5.5.5 were derived by chance and that variables are of differing 
preference. Results display a high level of concordance in the rankings chosen by 
respondents, as indicated by Kendall’s W= 0.411 (Prob. value = 0.001).
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Content Factors Influencing a Licence being Awarded in Non-Western Countries
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Level of commitment to drill (e.g.
‘Firm ’ or ‘Contingent ’ well)
12 1.67 1 1 .89 1 3
Financial capability 12 2.69 3 Multiple 
modes exist
1.18 1 5
Geological assessment (e.g new play 
idea, lead)
12 2.83 3.5 4 1.40 1 4
Rapidity of work programme 12 3.17 3 2 1.19 2 5
Innovative application or development 
of technology
12 4.50 5 5 1.00 2 5
Table 5.5.5
Similar to Nos-Westers countries, in Western countries Level of commitment to drill is 
the most important content factor influencing the award of licence (Fig 5.5.6). This is 
followed in importance by Geological assessment. Comparing ranks. Geological 
assessment is of greater influence in the Western (Fig 5.5.6) than the Non-Westem (Fig 
5.5.5) context. This suggests that more thorough technical analysis is required in 
Western countries.
for Table 5.5.6 and Fig 5.5.6 were derived by chance and that the variables are therefore 
of differing preference. Results display a high level of concordance in the rankings 
chosen by respondents, Kendall’s W= 0.243 (Prob. value = 0.013).
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Content Factors Influencing a Licence being Awarded in Western Countries
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Level of commitment to drill (e.g.
‘Firm ’ or ‘Contingent ’ well)
13 1.92 1 1 1.12 1 4
Geological assessment (e.g. new play 
idea, lead)
13 2.62 3 3 1.33 1 5
Rapidity of work programme 13 3.15 3 Multiple 
modes exist
1.07 2 5
Financial capability 13 3.31 3 5 1.60 1 5
Innovative application or development 
of technology
13 4.00 4 5 1.23 2 5
Table 5,5.6
5.5.3 Context Comparison
5.5.3.1 Importance of Approach & Content IFK^tco^rs jn WesSem vs. Non-Western Contexts 
Table 5.5.7 displays results for the intra-firm, cross-country comparisons asked in 
Question 3.3 of the Independent SSI (Appendix 1.2). For this question, interviewees 
were asked to compare the two countries (Western and Non-Western) in which they had 
applied for an exploration/production licence. As Table 5.5.7 demonstrates, for this 
comparison, approach / behavioural factors were found to have a greater influence upon 
the awarding of licences in Non-Western (8/10 = 80%), relative to Western countries 
(2/10 = 20%). In contrast, content technical factors tend to be of greater influence upon 
the awarding of licences in Western (7/10 = 70%), relative to Non-Western countries 
(3/10 = 30%). The strength of this relationship is suggested by the fact that no 
companies (0/10 = 0%) have simultaneously detailed content factors to be of greatest 
influence in Non-Western countries, and approach factors to be of greatest influence in 
Western countries.
Relative Factor Influence in
Non-Western vs. Western Countries
Content fTechnical) Factors
Variable
Box ordering:
- Count
- % of Total
Of greatest 
influence in 
Non­
Western
Of greatest 
influence in 
Western
Aooroach
IBehavioural)
Factors
Of greatest 
influence in 
Non­
Western
3
30%
5
50%
Of greatest 
influence in 
Western
0
0%
2
20%
Table 5.5.7
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As discussed in Section 6.3.3, the above finding indicates that the Western context is one 
which more closely approximates to the functioning of Weber’s (1947, p.301) ‘ideal’ 
bureaucracy than does the Non-Western context.
Further evidence, suggesting difference between the Western and Non-Western contexts, 
regards the formalization of the licensing agency’s selection procedure as important 
(Question 3.4, Appendix 1.2). As shown in Table 5.5.8 and Fig 5.5.7, Western countries 
are primarily orientated towards a formally based system of selection, whilst among Non­
Western countries relationship based approaches are more important. Similar to charts in 
Section 5.3.1, the length of the arrow in Fig 5.5.7 represents the magnitude of the
orientation on the original Likert scale relative to the equidistant point.
Position on the spectrum between a Formal approach & a Relationship based approach of the 
Licensing Authority’s Selection Procedure
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Western
countries
14 3.29 3 2 1.94 1 6
Non­
Western
countries
13 4.77 6 6 2.13 1 7
Note: On spectrum 1 = Formally based, 7 = Relationship based, 4 = Equidistant point
Table 5.5.8
Mean Position of Western & Non-Western countries
on the Spectrum
Formally Relationship
Based Based
Western M— ---------- 0------------- M Non-Western
Countries ' • Countries
0.71 0.77
Fig 5.5.7
An independent samples t-test of the mean differences in formalization of the licensing 
authorities’ selection procedures, between Western and Non-Western countries, 
supports the results shown in Table 5.5.8 and Fig 5.5.8 (t statistic = 1.896; Prob. value =
0.070).
Combining the North American responses with the British reinforces the above findings 
(See Table 5.5.9 and Fig 5.5.8). Western countries’ selection procedures are of greater 
formal orientation, whilst Non-Western countries’ selection procedures are more 
relationship based.
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Position on the spectrum between a Formal approach & a Relationship based approach of the 
Licensing Authority’s Selection Procedure - (North American & British Independents)
Variable N Mean Median Mode Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Western
countries
24 2.67 2 1 1.81 1 6
Non­
Western
countries
19 4.79 6 6 2.02 1 7
Note: On spectrum 1 = Formally based, 7 = Relationship based, 4 = Equidistant point
Table 5.5.9
Mean Position of Western & Non-Western countries 
on the Spectrum - (North American & British)
Formally
Based
Relationship
Based
Western ------ 0------------- W Non-Western
Countries ,33 ' Countries0.79
Fig 5.5.8
An independent samples t-test of the mean differences in formalization of the licensing 
authorities’ selection procedures, between Western and Non-Western countries, 
confirms this result (t statistic = 3.632; Prob. value = 0.001).
5.5.3.2 Sttr^^ngt^^ / Weaknsrser of SmaH Finn Siie
The following Tables 5.5.10-14 categorise the answers given by interviewees to open 
ended Question 3.5 (Appendix 1.2). Table 5.5.10 summarises the reported strengths that 
smaller firm siee confers when applying for exploration licences in Western countries. 
For this context, most respondents (8/14 = 57%) stated smaller firm siee conferred no 
advantage. The only significant reported strength, was speed of decision-making and 
action (6/14 = 43%). Next in importance was focus, the degree of commitment to a 
particular asset (3/14 = 21%).
Following a similar structure to the previous table, Table 5.5.11 displays the main 
weaknesses that smaller firm siee confers when applying for exploration licences in 
Western countries. The principle weakness recorded by the majority of Independents 
(12/14 = 86%) was financial capability. Western governments were reported to be 
particularly focused upon whether firms of Independent siee could sufficiently finance 
exploratory, and especially the follow-on, development activity. As previously noted for
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the context of the UK DTI, checks must be made to ensure a firm can afford to complete 
the work programme it is offering (DTI, 2003) (Section 3.3.1). Of lesser significance 
than finance, was in-house capability (4/14 = 29%) and experience (4/14 = 29%). 
Independents were reported not to have the breadth of in-house capability or long-term 
“proof of ability” that larger firms usually possessed.
For the Non-Western context, Table 5.5.12 presents the strengths that smaller firm size 
may confer when applying for exploration licences. Dissimilar to the Western results, all 
Independents recognised smaller size to confer some advantages in the Non-Western 
context. The two most common strengths were the approach factors, seniority of 
representatives (5/14 = 36%) and communication (5/14 = 36%). Apart from the 
emphasis upon the decision-making authority and the ability to commit, enabled by 
senior representatives, reference was also made to the Independents’ “personal 
approach”, the “personal interaction between senior staff and [the] licensing authority” 
(Independent I) and their ability to deal with “softer issues” (Independent K). This 
evidence is further enhanced by the answers given for communication, where an 
emphasis upon “creating...relationships” is detailed by all the respondents (Independents 
C, E, H, I, M). As reviewed in Section 6.3.4 establishing relationships can be a powerful 
tool in achieving negotiating gain (Halpern, 1994; Greenhalgh and Chapman, 1998). A 
further strength supplied by respondents was that Independents are a lesser threat to the 
host authorities; they are “more flexible” (Independent J), “looking to do business rather 
than set direction” (Independent N) and succeed in states where working by the 
“rulebook...wouldn’t work” (Independent G). Several Independents acknowledged 
themselves to be flexible in structuring deals with Non-Western authorities. For 
example, Independents E & G, recognised that when applying for a licence in Post-Soviet 
State X, it was their willingness to guarantee utilisation of the State’s contracting firms, 
that enabled a licence to be secured. In contrast, certain Majors were reported to have 
avoided the 'same Post-Soviet State, because of their unwillingness to accept such terms. 
A publicised example might be the withdrawal of Shell and ChevronTexaco from 
Bangladesh. The government of Bangladesh is unwilling to permit gas exports until 
‘sizeable’ reserves have been discovered. This ‘intransigence’ is noted by investment
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analysts to ‘have taken its toll on both Shell and ChevronTexaco’; leading to their exit
from the country (Rose and Wilders, 2003, p.9). In contrast, despite such circumstances, 
both Tullow and Cairn resolutely continue to hold interests in Bangladesh.
Beyond the above referenced negotiating approach and deal content strengths, some
Independents’ (3/14 = 21%) willingness to operate in countries with political risk was 
noted as increasing the chances of licence award, since few other companies held 
equivalent ‘interest’. This result is further examined in Section 5.6.6 and discussed in 
Section 6.4.7, where it is shown that several Independents have an affinity towards such
politically ambivalent states.
Similar to the Western context, the greatest disadvantage that smaller firm, size confers 
when applying for exploration licences in Non-Western countries was financial 
capability (7/14 = 50%) (Table 5.5.13). In addition, for Non-Western countries, several 
interviewees reported (7/14 = 50%) that the authorities’ doubts were focused upon the 
overall ability to deliver; i.e. on whether an Independent of such a small size had the 
capability to do the job. A further Independent weakness was resource transfer (3/14 = 
21%). Whilst Major companies would train and hire local staff, this training capability 
was not so widely practiced by Independents. Independents would usually hire local staff 
with existing experience.
Nevertheless, in spite of these content weaknesses, as Section 6.3.4 discusses, it is the 
Independents’ strength in approach factors that may explain their propensity to engage in 
Non-Western countries (Section 5.6.3).
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5.6 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
5.6.1 Why Internationalise?
Independents were classified as international if they held licences in two or more
countries. Since most of the British Independents were born foreign (Section 5.6.5), 
Independents were asked (Question 4.2, Appendix 1.2) what the rationale was for their 
move into a second country. Table 5.6.1 categorises the primary rationales given by 
Independents for this first international move.
Primary Rationale to First Expansion Overseas1
Rationale No. of Firms
Greater potential of oil/gas areas abroad 4
Diversify portfolio 1
Knowledge of forthcoming asset sale 1
Proximity to market 1
Company’s oil reserves expansion 1
Greater possibility of control (Operator) 1
Government bureaucracy less arduous 1
Table 5.6.1
Assessment of why Independents first chose to expand abroad reveals that the most 
important variable is the potential of under-explored foreign oil and gas areas (Table 
6.6.1). Closer inspection made in Section 6.4.1 reveals this finding to concord with 
O’Connor’s (2000) emphasis on the growing importance of ‘non-traditional petroleum 
countries’. Beyond the primary rationale given by respondents (Table 5.6.1), the most 
frequently referenced supporting rationale (60% of Independents) was geographical 
diversification (Fig 5.6.1). As discussed in Section 6.4.1, the prominence of portfolio 
diversification, as a rationale to overseas expansion, can be explained by Markowitz 
(1970).
1 The results do not include Independents J or L because interviewees were not present at the company’s 
first internationalising move.
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Rationale to First Overseas Expansion 
(% of Independents including the following variables)
Fig 5.6 .1
With the exception of Independents D & F, all the Independents interviewed currently 
seek to increase their international operations. The most important rationale supporting 
this intention was the desire to expand the company’s oil/gas reserves (Table 5.6.2). 
Independents thus appear attuned to investor’s focus upon reserves growth (Bauquis, 
2000; Antill and Arnott, 2000; Rose and Wilders, 2003). As Figure 5.6.2 demonstrates, 
reserves expansion was also the most frequently referenced supporting rationale (80% of 
Independents) for an Independent seeking to increase its international operations.
Primary Rationale for Further Seeking to Increase 
International Operation
Rationale No. of Firms
Company’s oil/gas reserves expansion 5
Greater potential of oil/gas areas abroad 4
Diversify portfolio 1
Utilise existing contacts 1
Higher return abroad 1
Table 5.6.2
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Rationale for Seeking to Increase International Operations 
(% of Independents including the following variables)
□ Company's reserves expansion
■ Diversify portfolio
■ Greater potential of areas abroad
■ Less competition abroad
□ Utilise existing contacts 
D Higher return abroad
■ Lower monetary commitment
■ Increased domestic finding costs
□ Greater possibility of control
■ Proximity to market
□ Opportunistic
□ Improved fiscal terms
Fig 5.6.2
For the 58% (7/12) of North American Independents that seek to increase their 
international operations, the most frequently expressed rationale (7/7) is the company’s 
oil reserves expansion (Fig 5.6.3). This is followed by the unexplored potential of oil/gas 
areas abroad (6/7) and the need to diversify the portfolio (5/7). These results are similar 
to those of the British cases and thus add further evidence to support the view that the 
above three rationales act as principal stimuli for the Independents’ further 
internationalisation.
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Rationale for Seeking to Increase International Operations 
(% of North American Independents including the following variables)
Fig 5.6.3
5.6.2 Mode of Entry
In contrast to the predictions of the Uppsala model (Section 3.4.4), the majority of firms 
were found to have undertaken their first expansion overseas by playing the resource 
intensive role of Operator (Fig 5.6.4).
First Overseas Licence Block Holding
Fig 5.6.4
The predominant reason for this mode of entry was that the Independents wished a 
greater degree of control over their operations (Table 5.6.3); firms preferred to be in­
charge. As it was expressed by Firm B, it is: “...hard to add value as Non-Operator, 
invested in someone else’s ability.” Sometimes this decision was partially bom out of
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necessity rather than choice; Firm A acknowledged that the reason for being an Operator 
was because they were one of the first firms to enter the region. Another, Firm E, 
recognised that a particular country’s low cost of entry was a factor in permitting the 
position of Operator to be undertaken. In accordance with the Uppsala model, the role of 
Non-Operator was chosen by some Independents (H and K) because they wished to limit 
their initial commitment, but these firms were in the minority.
Reason for Choice (Operator vs. Non-Operator) 2
Independent Country Operator/
Non-Operator
Reason
A Non-Western Operator First Mover
B Non-Western Operator Control
E Western Operator Low Cost of Entry
H Western Non-Operator Large Size of Project
I Western Operator Control
K Western Non-Operator Risk Management
M Non-Westem Operator Control
Table 5.6.3
5.6.3 Choice of Country
As the Uppsala model (Section 3.4.3) would hold, the most frequently referenced 
primary rationale (24% of countries) for choosing a particular country, was found to be 
existing firm knowledge / experience (See Fig 5.6.5). Inclusion within this category 
meant the firm’s response fitted one, or all, of the following three aspects. Firstly, that the 
firm’s managers had knowledge/experience of working in the country before. Secondly, 
that the geology was similar or was a spatially proximate extension of the geological 
basin with which the firm was familiar. And thirdly, that the specialist techniques 
required for the licence were similar to that implemented by the firm elsewhere. For 
example, if the firm was a specialist in mature fields, then experience/knowledge of 
work-over procedures would be transferable. For a quarter of the countries in which the 
Independent sample held licences, knowledge/experience was the primary rationale for 
choice of country.
2 A low response rate is due to interviewees of Independents C, D, G, J, L & N not having been present at 
company’s birth.
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Primary Rationale for Choice of Country 
(% of Countries chosen for the following Reason)
□ Knowledge / Experience
■ Under-explored 
B Opportunistic
□ Proven area
□ Low competition
□ Historic
□ Potential higher returns
□ Proximity to market 
a Contacts
■ Political stability
□ Follow the leader
□ Low barriers to entry
□ First mover
□ Rapid schedule possible
□ Technical advantage
3
Fig 5.6.5
The next primary reason for country choice was that areas within certain countries had 
been under-explored (15% of countries) (Fig 5.6.5). Respondents identified particular 
areas as not having received sufficient attention to date, and as being highly prospective. 
Finally, the next most important reason for country choice was opportunism (14% of 
countries). There had been no set intention of entering the particular country, rather a 
suitable ‘deal’ had presented itself and the firm had seized it (in corporate strategy terms, 
a target or window of opportunity).
Cross tabulation of the current countries within which the Independent population holds 
licences, reveals a propensity for Independents to be Operators in Non-Western 
countries, and Non-Operators in Western countries (Table 5.6.4). A Pearson /2 value of 
3.914 (Prob. value = 0.048) confirms the cross-tabulated distribution not to be a product 
of chance. Although the cause of this orientation is not clear, it may be that it is 
Independents’ strength in negotiating approach factors which enhances their ability to 
gain Operator status in Non-Western countries (Section 6.3.4).
' ‘Historic’ includes those countries that were remnants of other firms’ interests. Thus current ownership 
by the Independent was not intended, but rather originated with the take-over.
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Distribution of the Independent Population’s Current Interests 
 (Count = No. of Countries)4 
Operator Non-Operator
Western Actual Count 9 20
Expected Count 12.9 16.1
Actual % of Total 14.3% 31.7%
Non-Western Actual Count 19 15
Expected Count 15.1 18.9
Actual % of Total 30.2% 23.8%
Table 5.6.4
5.6.4 Bom Foreign?
Compilation of the available information sources reveals the majority of Independents to 
have commenced their first licence holding outside the UKCS. These initial interests 
were not simultaneously accompanied by other foreign interests. Instead, firms were 
found to start with just one country of activity (Table 5.6.5). The evidence suggests most 
firms were born foreign, not international. Firms that first commenced with operations in 
the UKCS, are recognised to be in the minority. Nevertheless, most firms do have their 
headquarters located within the UK; the exceptions being Dragon Oil, Global Energy, 
Sibir, and Soco International.
Location of Birth
Independent Country of first 
licence holding
Pan Andean Bolivia
Northern Italy
Desire Falklands
Emerald Colombia
Regal Ukraine
Edinburgh UK
JKX Ukraine
Ramco Azerbaijan
Venture Trinidad
Dana Russia
Sibir UK
Premier UK
Tullow Senegal
Source: Historic Annual Reports, 
Newspaper Archives & Company 
Interviews.
Table 5.6.5
4 The table excludes those countries in which a firm was both Operator and Non-Operator.
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As Table 5.6.6 shows, British Independents, of both small and large size, hold a similar 
disposition towards international activity. An independent samples t-test of the mean 
differences between the number of countries in which small and large Independents are
active was insignificant (t-statistic = -1.795; Prob. value = 0.102).
Number of Countries in which Small and Large Independents are Active
Size of Firm N Mean Standard deviation
Small
(Market Capitalization < £100m)
12 2.83 1.47
Large
(Market Capitalization > £100m)
9 5.00 3.39
Table 5.6.6
In contrast, size of firm strongly affects the international orientation of North American 
Independents. As Table 5.6.7 shows, North American Independents, with a firm size 
beneath £1000m market capitalization, tend only to have activities in North America. It 
is only those very large North American Independents, with a market capitalization 
exceeding £1000m, where international activity predominates. A Pearson %2 value 
14.734 (Prob. value = 0.000), confirms the cross-tabulated distribution in Table 5.6.7 not 
to be a product of chance. British Independents have a greater propensity to engage in 
international activities than North American Independents of equivalent size (i.e. market 
capitalizations beneath £ 1000m).
International Activity of North American Independents Relative to Firm Size
Firm Size
(Market Capitalization)
< £1000m > £1000m
North America 
Only (US + 
Canada)
Actual Count 25 6
Expected Count 18 13
Actual % of Total 45.5% 10.9%
International Actual Count 7 17
Expected Count 14 10
Actual % of Total 12.7% 30.9%
Table 5.6.7
5.6.5 Business Model
For the Independent population, five differing business models may be distinguished. 
These include the: Country Focused, Mature Asset Specialists, Regionally Focused 
Internationally Diversified, and Portfolio Approach. Models are differentiated both by 
their level of geographic diversification, and their tendency to Operate.
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Country focused Independents tend to have activities in only one country (see Table 
5.6.8). Firm types range in size from the small Desire Petroleum to the large Sibir. 
Within this category, firms appear to utilise country specialisation as their source of
©Country Focused©
Independent Market
cap’
(£m)
Country of 
Focus
No. of 
Countries 
where 
interests 
held
No. of 
Countries 
where 
Operator
% of Total
Licences 
that are 
Non­
Operated
Undertaken
Field
Development 
as Operator
Licence
Operator
Offshore
Licence
Operator
Onshore
Desire 14.37 Falklands 1 1 20 - Yes No
Emerald 22.36 Colombia 1 1 0 Yes No Yes
Regal 48.54 Ukraine 2 2 0 No No Yes
Edinburgh 53.25 UKCS 1 I 69 Yes No Yes
Dragon 124.94 Turkmenistan 1 1 - - Yes No
Sibir 259.44 Russia 1 1 - - No Yes
Table 5.6.8
advantage. For example, Independent F, a constituent of this category, expressed their 
reason for not internationalising as being because they “wished to retain focus” and 
“exploit the goodwill” and “track record” they had developed in Country Y. Retaining a 
focus on Country Y, meant they could “play to strengths”. As discussed in Section 6.4.2 
such firms seem to accord with Hymer’s (1976) ‘liability of foreignness’ thesis.
Similar to Country Focused models. Mature Asset Specialists also exhibit a very low
degree of international licence dispersion (Table 5.6.9). They Operate a large number of
Mature Asset Specialists
Independent Market 
cap ' (£m)
No. of 
Countries 
where 
interests 
held
No. of 
Countries 
where 
Operator
% of Total 
Licences 
that are 
Non­
Operated
Undertaken
Field
Development 
as Operator
Licence
Operator
Offshore
LicenceOperator
Onshore
Venture 132.0 2 2 37 Yes Yes Yes
Table 5.6.9
licences (12 for Venture Production, ‘Venture’ hereafter) and hold relatively few as Non­
Operator. Emphasis is upon acquiring and re-invigorating existing wells to boost 
production through techniques such as: workover, infill drilling, or injection technology. 
Involvement in exploration drilling is less common, although still present. Geographical 
focus is predominantly upon the UKCS. Firms like Venture are dependent upon mature 
asset transfers, therefore proximity to the seller is likely to be important if deals are to be 
detected. Moreover, through specialising on the UKCS basin. Venture has developed a
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thorough knowledge of this area that may assist in valuing deals. Another Independent 
openly acknowledged that one reason for seeking the role of Operator overseas, was 
because it was unable to compete with the knowledge/experience of the UKCS held by 
firms like Venture. For the mature asset firm, geographical dispersion is likely to be 
minimised in favour of the benefits conferred through focusing upon the area where 
mature asset transfers are most likely. Thus, it would not be paradoxical to say, as an 
interviewee from Venture did, that “concentration of assets brings synergies”.
Regionally Focused firms are those that exhibit a moderate level of international licence 
dispersion (Table 5.6.10). Licences are held for a few countries within a regional basin 
of similar geology.
^Regionally Focused©
Independent Market
cap'
(£m)
Countries 
of Focus
No. of 
Countries 
where 
interests 
held
No. of 
Countries 
where 
Operator
%of 
Total 
Licences 
that are 
Non­
Operated
Undertaken
Field
Development 
as Operator
Licence
Operator
Offshore
Licence
Operator
Onshore
Cairn 583.75 India & 
Bangladesh
3 I 63 Yes Yes Yes
Global 12.73 Panama, 
Colombia 
& Peru
3
Table 5.6.10
Although undertaking the role of Operator is integral to this group, a portfolio of Non­
Operated assets is also held for the region. For Cairn Energy the position of regional 
geographic focus was different from the way the company functioned five years ago. 
Analysis of old annual reports reveals the firm to have adopted a similar international 
orientation to that of Diversified Premier Oil and Tullow (Cairn Energy, 1998). Cairn’s 
original move to Bangladesh and later India, was reported to be a consequence of an 
initial deal opportunity that, following successful exploration, stimulated a complete firm 
re-orientation towards the region (Cairn Energy, 2002). With Cairn’s current moves 
suggesting licence interests in Nepal (Cairn Energy, 2003), accordance with the 
Regionally Focused international strategy continues to influence firm direction.
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Internationally Diversified Independents are those whose licences are highly 
geographically dispersed (Table 5.6.11-13). For these Independents, the larger the firm
©Diversified Firms of Small Size©
Independent Market 
cap ’ (£m)
No. of 
Countries 
where 
interests 
held
No. of 
Countries 
where 
Operator
% of Total
Licences 
that are 
Non­
Operated
Undertaken
Field
Development 
as Operator
Licence
Operator
Offshore
Licence
Operator
Onshore
Pan Andean 10.41 2 0" 100 No No No
Northern 10.42 4 4 17 No Yes Yes
Table 5.6,11
©Diversified Firms of Medium S ize®
Independent Market 
cap ' (£m)
No. of 
Countries 
where 
interests 
held
No. of 
Countries 
where 
Operator
% of Total 
Licences 
that are 
Non­
Operated
Undertaken
Field
Development 
as Operator
Licence
Operator
Offshore
Licence
Operator
Onshore
Aminex 19.90 3 2 - Yes Yes Yes
JKX 57.81 4 1 56 Yes No Yes
Melrose 81.68 3 2 30 - Yes Yes
Ramco 99.87 5 2 47 Yes Yes Yes
Soco 216.60 6 3 29 - Yes Yes
Table 5.6.12
•Diversified Firms of Large Size*
Independent Market 
cap ’ (£m)
No. of 
Countries 
where 
interests 
held
No. of 
Countries 
where 
Operator
% of Total
Licences 
that are 
Non­
Operated
Undertaken
Field
Development 
as Operator
Licence
Operator
Offshore
Licence
Operator
Onshore
Premier 295.61 8 5 68 Yes Yes Yes
Tullow 319.58 9 6 65 Yes Yes Yes
Table 5.6.13
size, indicated by the darker shades of blue in Fig 5.6.6, the more geographically 
diversified the firm. Among the companies in this model, Operated licences are sought 
in geographically diverse locations. For example, Premier Oil Operates licences in 
Guinea Bissau, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan, whilst Soco International Operates 
licences in Vietnam, Mongolia and Thailand. An international Non-Operated portfolio is 
present among these firms, although its relative significance is much lower than for the 
following Portfolio Approach model.
5 Pan Andean’s business model was to Operate licences, but at the time of the 2002 Annual Report it had 
just sold its Operated holdings.
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Fig 5.6.6 displays a series of spheres each of which represents attributes of an 
Independent. The spheres are coloured according to the particular business model. 
Along the x-axis is the number of countries in which an Independent holds licences as 
Operator, whilst the y-axis displays the proportion of total licences held as Non-Operator.
HO
90
70
50
30
10
Characteristics of the Differing Business Models
O
Sphere size is 
proportional to 
firm market 
capitalization
Key: Business 
Models
• Country Focused 
Mature Asset 
Specialists
• Regionally 
Focused
• Intern’ Diversified 
(Small Firm Size)
• Intern’ Diversified 
(Med’ Firm Size)
• Intern’ Diversified 
(Large Firm Size)
• Portfolio 
Approach
Q
-iO-
Number of Countries where Operator 6
Fig 5.6.6
Portfolio Approach firms exhibit a very low degree of Operator dispersion; they are 
found to Operate in very few countries (Fig 5.6.6 and Table 5.6.14). However, their level 
of Non-Operated geographical licence dispersion is particularly high; thus more than 
90% of each of the firms’ total licences are Non-Operated (Fig 5.6.6). As discussed in 
Section 6.4.6, the substantial portfolio of licences held by the above firms would appear 
to follow diversification recommendations (Markowitz, 1970; Vickers, 1987; Brealey 
and Myers, 1996).
6 The graph does not include Dragon Oil, Sibir, Aminex, or the GlobalEnergy Development Corporation
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©Portfolio Approach©
Independent Market 
cap ' (£m)
No. of 
Countries 
where
interests held
No. of 
Countries 
where 
Operator
% of Total 
Licences that 
are Non­
Operated
Undertaken
Field
Development 
as Operator
Licence
Operator
Offshore
Licence
Operator
Onshore
Sterling 60.18 5 1 96 - Yes No
Dana 168.3 10 3 91 No Yes No
Paladin 295.4 6 2 91 No Yes No
Table 5.6.14
5.6.6 “Basket-case Countries”
Each country for which British Independents hold licences, Table 5.6.15 displays both 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2003 score and the 
International Monetary Fund’s Political Stability 2001 Index score. For the CPI index, 
countries are rated between 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). Similarly, for the 
Annett (2001) International Monetary Fund Political Stability index, countries are rated 
between -3 (highly unstable) to +3 (highly stable). The column entitled ‘Average 
Corruption’ provides the average corruption score for all the countries in which a 
company holds interests. Likewise, the column entitled ‘Average Stability’ gives the 
average political stability score for all the countries in which a company holds interests. 
Companies are listed in combined rank order: those with the highest corruption and 
political instability scores are placed at the top of the list. Analysis of Table 5.6.15 
reveals that the majority of British Independents (18/21) hold a licence in a corrupt 
and/or politically unstable country. It is interesting to note that of those countries (9/64) 
chosen by Independents due to Low Competition for licences, all were found to have low 
corruption and political stability scores (Table 5.6.16). As Section 6.4.7 discusses, poor 
governance in a country may discourage investment and result in lower competition for 
licences.
Countries where Low Competition was Reported to have Influenced Selection
Country Corruption Score Political Stability Score
Bangladesh 1.3 -0.57
Bolivia 2.3 -0.61
Bulgaria 3.9 0.37
Ghana 3.3 -0.11
Indonesia 1.9 -1.56
Montenegro 2.3 -
Poland 3.6 0.69
Romania 2.8 -0.08
Russia 2.7 -0.41
Table 5.6.16
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Beyond the general tendency of British Independents to have some involvement in a 
politically unstable or corrupt country, closer examination of Table 5.6.15 reveals certain 
Independents (Sibir, Regal, Premier, Emerald, Global Energy, Tullow and Soco) to 
exhibit an affinity towards such countries (see Section 6.4.7). Nevertheless, the strongest 
example of this orientation towards politically unstable countries is demonstrated by 
Independent a (see Exhibit 5.6.1). Although technically situated outside the Independent 
population (Section 2.1)7, its willingness to engage in politically unstable countries was 
strikingly similar to the above referenced Independents. However, unlike other 
interviewees, the Chief Executive of Independent a disclosed more intimate detail as to 
how his firm managed risk. The case-study which follows provides privileged insight 
into how smaller firms can leverage advantage in such environments.
Exhibit 5.6.1 - Case-Study Independent a
Independent a was a start-up exploration and production company seeking to invest in Iraq. Although 
outside the Independent population designated by this study, an interview with the Chief Executive of this 
firm revealed it to exhibit a strong preference for countries with high political/security risks.
Having previously sought interests in Sudan, Yemen', Syria and Uganda, the interviewee acknowledged 
“[we] go places others won’t go”. He reported there was less competition in these countries; they were 
neglected by larger Majors because of the publicity risk they would face. Majors do not want to engage in 
countries that would result in negative publicity of the sort that might make the “front page of the FT”7.
Explaining why Independent a was able to undertake work in such risky environments, he stated “risk is 
about perception”. Political / security risks can be managed if the appropriate method is adopted. On the 
“surface” we take on “higher risks”, but in reality it is because we “control risks better”. When detailing 
how the firm could operate without hindrance in Iraq, he stated their policy was to “stay at smaller hotels, 
seek protection, keep low profile”. In contrast, he noted that Majors were “more targeted for kidnapping 
and attack, as [they] stay in the main hotels”.
' The British Independent Soco International is also engaged in Yemen.2 In contrast Premier Oil would take such risks, for example, its willingness to undertake licences in non-democratic 
Myanmar (FT 15/5/98) and Cuba (API 11/3/98).
7 This was because at the time of sampling Independent a was not in possession of any licences (Operated 
or Non-Operated) upon which activity was being undertaken.
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Exhibit 5.6.1 - cont’d.
A further method employed to reduce threat was local engagement. “Basic way is to provide 
jobs, talk to local tribes, work with local tribes and hire their people”. Beyond the importance of 
Accessing the Appropriate Government Official, the firm also channelled its efforts towards 
Accessing the Appropriate Local Chief. Independent a would aim to “go through the local 
chief,” who held tribal authority over the licensing area. Inclusion of local tribes into the projects 
was noted as a key strength in their method of mitigating political / security risk3.
Beyond methods to reduce political / security risk, Independent a was found to embody the 
relationship approach factor, identified in this study as a key strength of Independents 
negotiating in Non-Western countries (Section 6.5.4). During his company’s negotiations with 
the Iraqi Petroleum Directorate, the interviewee reported a “willingness to socialise” with 
officials was a necessity. In Iraq, there is “less of a division between family and business”. “If 
invited to home or restaurant, [you] must accept and show you enjoy...basic courtesy”. Strong 
relations with officials in the Petroleum Directorate were essential, you “can’t do business unless 
you get on well with senior people”. To facilitate these relationships, Independent a was 
sensitive to the Petroleum Directorate’s needs. For example, when the Directorate’s printer was 
running low on toner. Independent a brought replacement cartridges from Britain - such 
cartridges were not easily available in post-war Iraq. Further assistance included the bringing of 
old “Economist or Newsweek” magazines and old “medical journals”, the latter being gratefully 
received by local Iraqi hospitals. Although these gestures pertain to a form of gift aid, they are 
situated within an overall relationship approach that is reported as a negotiating strength 
particular to Independents (Section 6.5.4).
3 Independent L reported a similar policy of hiring a “lot of local staff” for it assisted in “lowering security 
risk”, they are “more happy to co-operate with us”.
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PART 3 INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSIONS
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6. INTERPRETATION OF EVIDENCE
6.1 STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING SPEED & RAPIDITY OF ACTION
6.1.1 Decision-Making Speed
6.1.1.1 Speed of Decision-Making: Independents vs. Majors
The qualitative results analysed in Section 5.3.1, indicate Independents to be faster in 
their decision-making than Majors. All Independent interviewees, who had previously 
worked for Majors, stated decision-making speed, for every operation, to be faster within 
the current Independent (Table 5.3.1). Drilling Contractors confirmed this. Each 
interviewee specified decision-making speed, for most operations, were faster among 
Independents (Table 5.3.4). Drilling Contractors reported one of the greatest strengths 
for undertaking contracts with Independents was their decisiveness (Fig 5.3.1). In 
contrast, the greatest weakness of undertaking contracts with Majors was stated to be 
their slow decision-making speed (Fig 5.3.2).
Seeking the cause of this temporal differential the range of structural factors reported by 
Independent and Driller interviewees warrants attention (Table 5.3.1 & Table 5.3.5). 
One of the most prominent factors referenced was the Spectrum of Consultation. The 
larger “team size” of Majors (Independent D) resulting in decision by “committee” 
(Contractor A and C). In accordance with the concept of centralization (Wally and 
Baum, 1994), the concentration of decision-making authority was also reported to be of 
influence. The “fewer layers of management” (Independent K) present within 
Independents, were recognised as a source of rapid decision. In contrast to the clarity of 
decision-making authority in Independents, individual personnel in Majors were 
recognised to be unwilling to make decisions on their own (Contractor A). Vertical 
specialization (Mintzberg,I981), the extent to which a worker lacks control of the tasks 
he/she performs, thus appears to be high for the Majors. This finding corresponds with 
Mintzberg’s predictions of divisionalized bureaucracy, a structural configuration 
characteristic of extremely large corporations. Another causal element, acknowledged by 
interviewees, was formalization. In support of Wally and Baum’s (1994) results, 
formalization of work practices was commonly referred to (Table 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.5) 
as a further feature causing the slower speed of decision-making among Majors. Our
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examination of the formalization of the tendering processes confirmed this result. 
Majors’ tendering selection procedures were found to be more formally based than 
Independents’ procedures (Table 5.3.6 and Fig 5.3.3) (t-statistic = 3.057; Prob.value = 
0.022). The objective of this augmented formalization was rationalised by interviewees 
as a system to ensure consistency and to protect Majors against poor decisions. Analysis 
of comments made by interviewees revealed that vertical specialization in Majors was 
also accompanied by horizontal specialization (Table 5.3.5). Thus many of the jobs 
within the organization encompassed only a few narrowly defined tasks (Mintzberg, 
1981). This propensity for horizontal specialization carried an additional implication. 
Driller interviewees reported aspects such as safety, insurance, and legal terms and 
conditions, on occasion, to receive excessive emphasis by Majors. The cause of this 
emphasis was related to individuals in these departments being somewhat “territorial” 
with respect to their field of expertise (Contractor B). Another interviewee observed a 
“lot of job protection going on” through the excessive “pointing out of mistakes” 
(Contractor A). The impact of this unwarranted attention was reported by drilling 
interviewees to be an unnecessary prolonging of the overall decision process. Peters 
(2001) notes this as common in bureaucratic administrative structures, where refusal to 
take personal initiative outside of regulated authority is a consequence of lower echelons 
protecting themselves from their superiors (Section 5.3.1). Further sources of causation 
which were referred to include spatial proximity and focus. Some interviewees noted 
that the spatial proximity of decision-makers (e.g. as in, all being in the same office), 
tended to facilitate communication and to hasten decision speed. This accords with 
communication studies noted by Monge and Contractor (1998), which find proximity 
enhances the likelihood of communication, by increasing the probability that individuals 
will meet and interact (Festinger et al, 1950; Zahn, 1991; Van den Bulte and Moenaert, 
1997). Focus was most frequently mentioned regarding Independents’ smaller portfolio 
of assets. Making specific reference to business development and the bidding for new 
ventures, interviewees noted that the capital allocation process became more rapid. 
Considering fewer prospective assets at any given time enabled the Independent to 
consider each prospective investment opportunity on its own basis. Such focus was 
noted to be a further cause of the speed differential.
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The above findings suggest that a range of structural causal variables have influence on
the decision-making speed differential. These include: Spectrum of Consultation, 
Centralization (concentrated decision-making authority), Vertical Specialization, 
Formalization, Horizontal Specialization, Spatial Proximity, and Focus. Although the 
current research design has specifically targeted the structural aspects of Spectrum of 
Consultation and Focus, future research in the area may seek to determine the weighting 
of these factors relative to the other causal variables identified by the Independent and 
Driller interviewees.
6.1.1.2 Speed of Decision-Making: Small vs. Large Independent
This section seeks to ascertain whether differences in decision-making speed may also be 
detected within the Independent population. According to Wally and Baum (1994) firm 
size (as measured by Head Count), is significantly correlated with decision-making speed 
(p < 0.01). That is, the larger the firm, the slower the decision-making speed. 
Qualitative results, reported in Section 6.1.1, suggest this feature of firm size holds 
between the small Independent and the large Major. Inspection of the Independent 
sample produces a similar finding. Results shown in Table 5.3.11, suggest that the larger 
the firm size (as measured by Head Count), the longer the time taken to decide upon a 
course of action. An independent sample t-test of mean differences in Head Count 
between fast (<lDay) and slow (>lDay) decision-making firms, confirmed this result (t 
= -2.422; Prob. value = 0.033). This result thus suggests that the larger the firm size of 
the Independent, the slower the speed of decision-making.
6.1.1.3 Spectrum of Consultation
Section 5.3.LI results suggest support of Hypothesis 3(a) that the greater the number of 
personnel consulted to enact a given decision, the longer will be the time taken to choose 
a course of action, and rejection of the null hypothesis of no relation between number of 
personnel and action time (Prob. value < 0.05) (Table 5.3.9). Accordingly, Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) generalised criticism of March and Olsen (I98I) and Janis (1982) (See Section 
3.1) appears misplaced. By contrast, our results imply the length of the decision process
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is influenced by the number of personnel consulted. Further support for this is readily 
identified at the extremes, when comparison is drawn between Independents and Majors. 
For example, decision by “committee” was a common causal force referenced by Drilling 
interviewees, recounting experiences of slower decision-making among Majors.
Section 3.1, argued that the number of personnel consulted, for a given decision to be 
made, was influenced by the size of the firm. Hypothesis 3(b) held that: The larger the 
firm size, the greater will be the number of personnel consulted for making a given 
decision. The reasoning behind this was that as a firm increases in size, there is typically 
a move towards an increased division of labour (Reid, 1989). What Mintzberg (1981) 
notes as the propensity of larger firms to engage in horizontal specialization. A by­
product of this specialization is the dispersal of information. For a decision to be fully 
informed, the required information1 must be gathered from all the relevant parties. Work 
specialization, through reducing the scope of task constituted by an average job, thereby 
spreads the necessary information across a larger number of individuals. In consequence, 
when a decision of strategic proportions is required, a larger number of individuals needs 
to be consulted. The results analysed in Section 5.3.1.1 support the above interpretation. 
For both ‘test-well’ and ‘scenario’ cases Firm Size measures are positively and 
significantly correlated with the Number of Personnel Consulted. These correlations 
(Table 6.3.12), together with the associated linear regressions (Table 5.3.A-B and Fig 
5.3.A-B), suggest rejecting the hypothesis of no relation between firm size and number of 
personnel consulted; thereby accepting Hypothesis 3(b). Evidence of increased 
horizontal specialization amongst the larger Independents may be extracted from Tables 
5.3.7-8. For example, in both the ‘test-well’ and ‘scenario’ cases, only the two largest 
Independents report inclusion of a specialist Health, Safety and Environment head of 
department in the consultation process. Similarly, among the larger Independents, the 
increased specialisation of personnel in their Exploration and Finance departments is also 
suggested (see Tables 5.3.7-8). Thus, whilst task specialization may stimulate efficiency 
gains for routine, standardised decisions, for decisions of strategic magnitude, the
' Here ‘Required information', is considered as that generated by individual personnel through application 
of their particular skills, knowledge, and experiences.
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existing task specialised framework results in more personnel being, consulted and a 
slowed decision-speed. Collection of information is not a free operation; the process of 
gathering it imposes a temporal information-search cost.
7.1.1.4 Focus
If all agents are limited more broadly, in their cognitive capacity, and more narrowly, in 
their computational capacity (Simon, 1955) (i.e. there is ‘bounded rationality’), then as 
Gifford (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) reports, there are boundaries to the attention a manager 
can give to any problem/task. A manager’s attention is a scarce resource. Whilst Simon 
(1955) is concerned with problems where an optimal solution is infeasible, because of the 
complexity of the problem, Gifford (2001a) addresses problems for which an optimal 
solution is possible, but costly. The cost measured, is that of limited managerial 
attention. The problem she sets concerns the allocation of limited attention among a 
number of projects. An analogy of juggling plates is suggested, the choice being to set 
up further spinning plates, or to re-spin existing ones before they hit the ground. With a 
manager’s evaluation attention being limited, congestion and overload may occur. 
Projects can be retained, or discarded unevaluated, whilst attention is focused upon an 
existing or new project. Implicit within this concept is the notion of time and quality of 
decision. Overload, too many simultaneous projects, can result in poorer decisions (a 
project is discarded unevaluated), or delay (a project is retained unevaluated). 
Managerial focus on fewer projects is therefore associated with improved decision 
quality and speed of decision. For the British Independents our results show Focus to be 
positively correlated with Firm size variables (Prob. value < 0.05) (Table 5.3.13). Hence, 
the smaller the Independent firm, the greater the degree of focus. Turning to Hypothesis 
3(c) we find that the greater the degree of focus of a key decision-maker in the 
organisation, the more rapidly will decisions be made. Although the relationship 
between Decision-speed and Focus was of the appropriate sign (-0.25), a Prob. value of 
0.47 provided insufficient evidence to reject the Null Hypothesis of no relationship 
between these variables. However, the research of Gifford (2001a; 2001b; 2001c) refutes 
this finding and shows managerial focus to reduce decision delay. With scenario response 
times showing faster decisions to be made among the smaller Independents (Table
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5.3.11) (Prob. value = 0.033), in accordance with Gifford, I reason that this result may 
also be influenced by the greater degree of managerial focus in these smaller firms.
6.1.1.5 Speed versus Quality?
Although rapid decision-making is typically associated by researchers with enhanced
performance (Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge and Miller, 1991; Stalk, 1988), the quality of the 
resulting decision has received limited attention. Wally and Baum (1994) accept that fast 
decisions may diminish decision accuracy. However, they side-step its implications by 
referencing Smith et al (1991), who notes accuracy may not be of value, if it is mistimed. 
Indeed, timing is likely to be critical for certain strategic decisions made by 
Independents. This may be particularly true of the business development activity of 
bidding for new licences, where the ‘window of opportunity’ (Wickham, 2001), may be 
of limited duration. This activity, considered by interviewees to be a site where 
Independents’ decision-making is particularly fast relative to Majors, is more closely 
analysed in Section 6.4. In accepting the ‘timing’ reasoning of Wally and Baum (1994), 
the mutual importance of both speed and decision quality for actions such as test-well 
drilling, should not be underestimated. A measure of decision-quality for this thesis, is 
the exploration success rate of Independents. With results of the success rate for the 
Independents’ last five exploration test wells measuring 55% (Table 5.3.14), decision- 
quality does not appear to be a concern, as this figure corresponds with the success rates 
calculated by Forbes and Zampelli (2000; 2002) of 55% (1995) and 55.4% (1998) for 
Majors US offshore and onshore exploration respectively. Thus, the quality of decision 
made by Independents is close to that of Majors. A possible interpretation is that 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921), as proposed by McKie (1960), may serve to equalise their 
exploration success rates. Firms may apportion risk probabilities to calculate expected 
monetary values of differing exploratory drillings, but even these probabilities are subject 
to Knight’s non-actuarial uncertainty. Beyond the concept of uncertainty, the feature that 
further complicates determination of the variables influencing decision accuracy is the 
capability of the individual human agents. Certain decision-makers may be highly 
sophisticated in their analysis, as one interviewee commented a “star” analyst might be 
found in any organization, regardless of size. Indeed, Wally and Baum (1994) attempted
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to measure cognitive complexity with respect to decision-making speed, but found no 
relationship. Measuring the individual innate ability of members in any team remains 
beyond the bounds of research. A small team of star analysts in an Independent could 
theoretically outperform a larger team made up of lower individual talents. What counts 
is the efficacy of the final decision, not the means to the end.
6.1.2 Action
6.1.2.1 Stiimt^ul^u> to Actton
The factor found to most stimulate British Independents to reduce the time between 
award of licence and producing on-line was Cashflow (Table 5.3.15). The predominance 
of Cashflow as the principal stimulus to action can be explained from a Net Present 
Value (NPV) valuation approach. NPV calculates the present value of a project 
according to the timeliness of the Cashflows that will be produced. Future Cashflows are 
discounted according to the particular year in which they will occur. The further in the 
future that a Cashflow occurs, ceteris paribus, the lower its present value. For the NPV 
approach, the variable used to calculate present project values, is the Discount Rate. 
Traditionally it is estimated according to three factors: Risk, Interest Forgone, and 
Inflation (Atrill and McLaney, 2001, p. 278). These factors serve to reduce the 
prospective value of future Cashflows. To demonstrate how the Discount Rate may be 
applied, a hypothetical successful exploration programme is displayed in Table 6.1.1.
Calculating NPV
Time Cashflow (£m) Discount Factor Present Value
Immediately (1) 1/(l+15y,-1 (1)
1 year's time (10) 1/(1+15)t = 0.870 (8.7)
2 year's time 2 l/(l+15)2 = 0.756 1.512
3 year's time 16 1/(1+15)3 = 0.658 10.528
4 year's time 20 1/(1+15)4 = 0.572 11.44
5 year's time 20 ....1/(1 + 15'" = 0.497 9.94
NPV = 23.72
Discount rate (r) = 15% n = year Discount Factor = l/(’+Hr)n
Table 6.1.1
Table 6.1.1 shows that the later in Time that a Cashflow occurs, the higher the Discount 
Factor. For example, the £16m received in year three, has a greater Present Value 
(£10.53m), than the £20m received in year five (£9.94m). Thus, the faster a company 
brings production on-line, the greater the Present Value of the associated Cashflow. The
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presence of a Discount Factor, l/(l+r)n, in the NPV calculation demonstrates that there 
is a cost to slow action.
The second most important stimulus to action was Production Targets (Table 5.3.17).
An unsurprising result when one considers Parkinson’s Law (1957) which argues that 
work expands to fill the time available for completion. According to Parkinson, a task 
without defined time limits has the tendency to stretch to the maximum amount of time 
given. From this perspective the issuance of Targets tends to initiate faster action. 
Privately, Production Targets were frequently used by Independents (Section 5.3.3), and 
Independents acknowledged, they did hasten action (Table 5.3.17).
Contrary to expectations, Cost of Capital was not as significant a stimulus to action as 
either Cashflow, or Production Targets (Table 5.3.17). Thus the view that the greater the 
financial pressure of debt borne by Independents, the greater the stimulus to fast action, is 
thereby challenged. Further support for this challenge is given by the finding that the 
mean gearing for the Independent population was very low, at only 11.47% (Table 
5.1.14). Thus, the results suggest that financial pressure, in the form of debt, is not the 
key stimulus to fast action by Independents.
The overall level of gearing was, however, positively correlated with firm size (Prob. 
value = 0.000). Closer examination of the results reveals that whilst virtually all British 
Independents below a market capitalization of £60m had no gearing (8/9): the majority of 
Independents (10/12) above a market capitalization of £60m did. Support for such a 
finding is demonstrated in the work of Michaelas et al (1999). Analysing a broad set of 
SME’s (N=3500), from a variety of different UK business sectors, they found a positive 
relationship between the size of a firm and the gearing ratio it is able to achieve and 
maintain (Prob. value = 0.011). Their conclusion is that, smaller firms face higher 
financial barriers. Further explanation as to the nature of these barriers may be drawn by 
using the concept of Credit Rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Calomiris and Hubbard, 
1990). Credit Rationing theory starts with the phenomenon of there being asymmetric 
information between borrowers and lenders. This asymmetry increases the potential for
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adverse selection, and thus encourages limits to be placed upon the number of loans a 
lender will issue (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Under these circumstances, lenders prefer 
borrowers with significant financial resources and reputations (Calomiris and Hubbard, 
1990). For such financially secure borrowers, project sizes tend to be small relative to 
the borrower’s net worth. Assured by the greater levels of collateral with which a larger 
firm can secure a loan, lenders are thus more willing to lend. With the cost of a £10m 
exploration drilling being high relative to the average Independent's Net Assets 
(£83.17m), the limited net worth of the several Independents beneath a Market 
Capitalization of £60m may explain the absence of gearing. Lenders may be less willing 
to lend to firms of that size. Combined with lenders’ aversion to risky economic sectors 
(Lopez-Gracia and Ayabar-Arias, 2000), the smaller British Independent is likely to 
experience Credit Rationing more intensely than the larger British Independent.
Results showed (Table 5.3.17 & Table 5.3.18) North American Independents to rank 
Competitive Advantage as a more important stimulus to fast action than do British 
Independents. This greater emphasis upon Competitive Advantage may reflect a different 
behavioural attitude among North American compared to British Independents. The 
greater competitive drive of North American firms may be a consequence of the 
organizational culture that is commonly propagated in North American approaches to 
business (e.g. through leading business schools). Particular societies do give rise to 
particular organizational cultures2. Although, it is beyond the limits of this research to 
determine the precise nature of the difference between British and North American 
Independents’ organizational culture, as regards the particular traits and/or perceptions 
that are propagated, our evidence is suggestive of a promising channel of future enquiry.
6.1.2.2 FFatorr Slowinn Action
The most important factor holding up the time between award of licence and first test 
well drilling was found to be Block significance relative to partner firms ’ total portfolio. 
This result is in accord with the initial inductive research (Patrick, 2003; HCSC, 1988a)
2 Kay (1993), for example, notes the difference in business practices between North America and Japanese 
firms (See Section 6.2).
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which suggested that, action upon licences can be delayed, when the Operator of a 
licence asserts it to be of lower potential value relative to other licences, within its 
portfolio. Proponents of this view typically made reference to those joint ventures where 
a Major holds the position of Operator and an Independent the role of Non-Operator. To 
reiterate the view of Barry (1993, p.5) ‘it is quite difficult for the Non-Operating partners 
to get the Operator to initiate something against its will.’ In contrast, the position held by 
the Operator gives them authority over both the ‘size’ and ‘timing’ of work programmes 
(Barry, 1993, p.5). Holding large global portfolios of assets, including licences viewed 
as assets . Majors can be selective with respect to the channelling of intra-firm 
investment. Thus only certain licences within their portfolios will receive investment. 
Independents, with their much smaller asset portfolios do not have such a luxury. 
Compared to a Major each single licence held by an Independent is representative of a 
greater proportion of the Independent’s total assets (including licences). As a 
consequence, each licence has a greater probability of investment deepening.
Taking the UK as an example, research by consultants HannonWestwood has found 
Majors to consider, on average, 60% of their licence holdings within the UKCS to be 
Non-Core (Hannon, 2003) (see Fig 6.1.1). Non-Core in this context means that the 
company no longer considers the property (licence) to fit strategically the company’s 
asset portfolio; and as a consequence, they are unwilling to invest in it. Moving right on 
the chart to the smaller companies, a similar situation is not found for the Independents, 
Indeed, HannonWestwood record, on average, no more than 30% of Independents’ 
licence holdings within the UKCS to be Non-Core. This means 70% of Independents’ 
assets within the UKCS are considered as Core holdings by their Independent owners and 
therefore will receive investment.
3 Licences reserve a right to drill (and/or to exploit). Even if unexploited, the licence has prospective value 
(as an entitlement to invest, in a real options sense) and therefore have positive value as financial paper, 
and can be sold on. In this sense, they are financial assets.
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Major w Independent: Core / Non-Core Acreage in the UKCS
Fig 6.1.1
With a greater number of licences, Majors can be selective as to which of their licences 
receive investment (Core acreage). A consequence of this greater choice is that Majors 
can set higher thresholds of return. Newendorp ( 1996) notes an Independent Operator 
will more frequently drill a test-well that a Major did not wish to drill, even though the 
same expected monetary value (EMV)4 was determined by both firms. Thus, a licence 
could be considered Core by an Independent, yet Non-Core to a Major. This is because 
the EMV falls below the Major’s investment threshold. Using industry terminology, this 
characteristic is referred to as Materiality (Zanoyan, 2004); meaning smaller companies 
have lower EMV thresholds relative to large firms. As Roy Franklin CEO of Paladin 
reported, the small size of the assets sought by Paladin are “just not material for BP” 
(Franklin, 2003). The second most important factor for slowing action was reported to be 
partner approval, the final process of getting all partners to agree on a course of action to 
be undertaken. The importance of this factor accords with the work of Eisenhardt (1989), 
who found the efficacy of dispute resolution to influence the speed of decision-making.
4 Expected monetary value of an outcome is the product of the probability that the outcome will occur 
(exploration success), and the conditional value (worth) that is received if the outcome occurs (Newendorp, 
1996).
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6.1.2.3 Acctoi! Meeaurrd
Results show Independents to be rapid in their action (Section 5.3.3). For both 
Independent Operated and Non-Operated licences, the time differential between award of 
licence and first successful test-well (Ol, NI), and the time differential between a 
successful test-well and production on-line (02, N2), are each found to be less than 2 
years. Being well within the 4 years permitted by the UK DTI for each of these 
activities. Independents may be considered to be relatively rapid in their actions.
The time taken for the Field Development Decision (FD) was also short: on average, it 
took only 1 year to complete. However, British Independents are slow in comparison to 
the North American Independents. The latter Independents only took 6 months for the 
same Field Development Decision. An explanation for this differential can be sought in 
the time spent by fiims on Raising Financial Capital and Sales Arrangements. On 
average North American Independents spent only 4 days Raising Financial Capital, 
whereas British Independents spent 48 days for the same task. The cause of this 
discrepancy may be related to firm size. Following the concept of credit rationing 
discussed earlier (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990), being larger in size. North American 
Independents have more collateral against which a loan can be secured. This 
circumstance is likely to augment the willingness of lenders to advance funds in debt 
finance form to North American Independents. Consequently, North American 
Independents spend less time Raising Financial Capital than their British equivalents. 
Beyond firm size, a further aspect that may contribute to the difference between British 
and North American Independents is the strong evidence for credit rationing within the 
UK. HannonWestwood report North American banks to be even less inclined to lend 
into the UK than UK based banks, and this leaves local UK lenders with a “pretty closed 
system to exploit.” (Hannon, 2003). Such a system may also prolong the time spent by 
British Independents in Raising Financial Capital.
Turning to Sales Arrangements, on average. North American Independents spent only 25 
days making Sales Arrangements, whereas British Independents spend 109 days on the 
same task. This difference may also be a consequence of firm size. Among British
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Independents, it has been found that the greater a firm’s production, the higher the 
average price received per barrel (Prob. value = 0.044). From Porter’s (1985; 1998) 
work on bargaining power, if a buyer knows that it is the sole buyer available to a 
particular supplier, then this knowledge can be used to bargain down the price paid. 
With small sized Independents having low petroleum production, a buying refinery will 
be aware “small volumes” can only be sold to one refinery (Independent D). Moreover, 
with such small volumes being relatively “insignificant” to the buying refinery 
(Independent D), the buyer holds the advantage. Here, the contract is more crucial to the 
small Independent than to the refinery. The outcome of this bargaining differential is that 
smaller producers receive a lower average price per barrel than larger producers. Larger 
producers produce in sufficient quantity that their supply becomes significant to 
refineries. Moreover, the quantity is such that it may now be apportioned between one or 
more refineries. Thus large producers, being less reliant upon a sole refinery, have a 
stronger bargaining position, and may extract a higher price. Similarly, the smaller 
production of British Independents vis-a-vis North American Independents is likely to 
place British Independents in a weaker bargaining position with refiners. This weaker 
position may explain the greater time that is dedicated by British Independents to Sales 
Arrangements.
6.1.2.4 Capitt.1 Connttrtinn
Overall, examination of the activities undertaken by Independents leads to the suggestion 
that these firms are resource constrained. Independents are found to hold more of the less 
resource intensive Non-Operated licences, than of the resource intensive Operated 
licences (t-statistic = -1.893; Prob. value = 0.07). Taking a sample of these licences, 
results suggest Independents may utilise the less resource intensive role of the Non­
Operator to enter into more complex exploration drillings. For example, Non-Operated 
licences involve more partners in the joint venture and tend to be undertaken in deeper 
water than Independent Operated licences. Further supporting evidence for the resource 
constraint exhibited by Independents, resides in the finding that only one Independent, 
following an unsuccessful exploration test well as Operator, reported that it had 
continued to explore under the same licence. McCray (1975) and Newendorp (1996)
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♦interpret such an approach to be characteristic of firms with limited capital, essentially 
those which need to be careful to avoid the possibility of ‘Gambler’s ruin’. To re-iterate, 
‘Gambler’s ruin’ is the possibility of a long series of chance consecutive losses such that 
the gambler loses all his money and must drop out of the game. One preventative 
measure to avoid such a circumstance is for the company to leave the licence, if its first 
test-wells prove dry (Newendorp, 1996, p.539). The alternative is to seek and attain a 
larger supply of finance capital, so that should a period of sequential losses transpire, the 
firm can sustain itself until eventual success. With Independents experiencing capital to 
be in limited supply, obtaining extra finance is often not an option. Unlike the capital 
rich Majors, Independents cannot always sustain sequential losses. To illustrate, consider 
the following example adapted from Newendorp (1996). Suppose there are two firms: 
Independent X and Major Y. Independent X has £20m available to explore for oil in a 
new area, whilst Major Y £50m. The prospective area has the following parameters:
1. Exploratory dry hole costs = £10m each
2. Number of prospects (anomalies): N = 20
Fraction of prospects expected to contain enough oil to be classified as a 
significant commercial (£I00m) discovery: p = 0.25.
From this data the maximum number of consecutive failures that Independent X can 
sustain is 20/10 = 2 and for Major Y it is 50/10 = 10. The estimated number of possible 
discoveries is N x p = 20 x 0.25 = 5. The corresponding number of likely dry prospects 
is N x (1 - p) — 20 x (1 - 0.25) = 15. Table 7.1.2 expresses the conditional probability 
terms for the scenario of 5 wells being drilled in the given area.
Conditional Probability Terms
Probability Term Meaning of the Probability Term Numerical Value
P(Fi) Probability 1st well is dry 15/20
Pto) Probability 2nd well is dry, given 1st one was dry 14/19
P(Fs) Probability 3rd well is dry, given first two were dry 13/18
P(F4) Probability 4th well is dry, given first three were dry 12/17
P(Fs) Probability 5“' well is dry, given first four were dry 11/16
Table 6.1.2
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Probability of n = 2 consecutive failures (Independent X):
= P(F,) x P(F2) = — xH = 0.553
20 19
Probability of n = 5 consecutive failures (Major Y):
= P(Fi) X P(F2T X P(Fs) X P(F4) X P(F5) = — x — x — x — x- =0.194 
20 19 18 17 16
By participating in 3 additional wells Major Y has a much lower chance of Gambler’s 
ruin (19%) than Independent X (55%). The above example reveals how an 
Independent’s limited financial resources may result in an early exit from an area where 
initial exploration drilling proved unsuccessful.
Further evidence pointing to the limited financial resources of Independents pertains to 
the number of appraisal wells drilled. Results suggest fewer appraisal wells are drilled 
by Operating Independents, than for licences they have entered as Non-Operator (Table 
5.3.25). Appraisal wells, undertaken after a successful exploration drilling, assist the 
Operator to determine the size of the field. This knowledge enables the Operator to 
develop the right scale of infrastructure necessary for the field. However, as Iain Patrick 
related, appraisal wells reduce risk, but are costly to implement. Indeed, he 
acknowledged that some Independents may not have “enough cash” to undertake such 
work. The fewer appraisal wells drilled by Independents, when acting as Operator, as 
against when they are Non-Operator, could be a consequence of the Independents’ capital 
constraint.
The final evidence confirming the suggestion that Independents are noticeably restricted
in their capital resources was presented by drilling interviewees. Whilst Financial 
Security was the greatest strength for a driller undertaking a contract with a Major (Fig
5.3.7), Payment Default was the greatest weakness for a driller undertaking a contract 
with an Independent (Fig 5.3.6).
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6.1.2.5 Firm Size and Speed of Action
In testing Hypotheses 3 (d) and 3 (e) a statistically significant relationships could not be 
found between measures of firm size and speed of action. The evidence was not
technically sufficient to reject the null hypotheses of no relationship. Nevertheless, the 
positive sign displayed by the majority of coefficients between firm size variables and 
rapidity of action measures Ol and 02 do suggest that as the size of the Independent firm 
increases, speed of action slows (Table 5.3.33). Reviewing the results for decision­
making speed and rapidity of action it appears smaller firm size is associated with both 
faster decisions and faster action. A key competitive strength of the Independent is thus 
its ability to make and enact swift decisions.
The only deviation from this observation might be for the resource intensive Field 
Development Decision. In this situation, the capital constraint faced by smaller 
Independents does appear to have a temporal effect. Results suggest that for this action, 
larger firm size may be associated with speedier implementation (Table 5.3.33). Indeed, 
not all interviewed Independents had undertaken field development; it remained a 
resource intensive task that some firms specifically avoided (for example, Independent J). 
This finding is useful in terms of the clarification it presents, for it suggests that whilst 
small firm size is associated with speedy actions, these actions can be delayed should the 
firm engage in activities that exceed its current resource capabilities. Independents do 
enact swift decisions, but in circumstances where the action requires a step-change in the 
firm's capital resources, delays may be a possibility.
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6.2 UTILISATION OF CONTRACTORS
6.2.1 The Trio of Capabil ity
With Section 5.4.1 having identified the functional strengths of Independents, namely 
those functions that are provided in-house, this section seeks to determine why it is these 
functions have been internalised. Explanation is formulated along two avenues: (1) 
Richardson’s resource-based schema, and (2) Williamson’s transaction cost framework.
Using Richardson’s resource-based framework (I960, p.231), three primary layers of 
generic capability can be recognised for Independents. (I) The first layer, pertains to the 
four functions that are predominantly provided in-house, namely: Financial, Commercial, 
Human Resource Management (HRM) and Procurement. In aggregate, a degree of 
similarity may be detected in the four functions as they act as the key value-orientated 
functions of the business. They are: accessing money (Finance), allocating value 
(Commercial), selecting the value co-ordinators (HRM), and managing contracted deals 
(Procurement). (2) The second layer, more frequently of mixed provision, although with 
a few firms holding complete in-house capability, includes the functions of: Reservoir 
engineering, Petroleum engineering, and Seismic analysis. This capability layer is highly 
technically orientated, as firm capability lies in geological knowledge of 
petroleum/reservoir dynamics, (3) The final layer of capability, most frequently of mixed 
provision, includes the functions of: Project Management, Facilities Management, and 
Health Safety/Environment. The main capability of this layer pertains to the monitoring 
and control of action, the ability to oversee the drilling or production work being 
undertaken.
These three layers of capability, are the Independents’ sites of specialization, within each 
layer activities are similar and complementary. Similar, in that they require the same 
capability for their undertaking, and complementary, because they represent different 
phases of the same process of production. According to Richardson’s theory (1972), it is 
the similarity of the activities within each layer that has lead to their internalisation. 
Dissimilar activities would result in increased information costs and diseconomies of
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scope. In contrast, similar activities, drawing upon the same existing firm capabilities, 
can be efficiently internalised (Foss, 1994, p.37).
6.2.2 Complementary Functions
Examination of the remaining functions, those primarily concerned with out-sourced
provision (see Section 5.4.1.2), reveals their relationship with the above three capabilities 
is one of complementarity, rather than similarity. Each of the out-sourced activities fall 
into categories that require very specialised capabilities. For example, Drilling requires 
the running of highly sophisticated physical assets, namely drilling rigs which includes 
provision of the rig and the team of personnel required to work it. Likewise, the other 
categories of Engineering, Subsea Operations, and Infrastructure provision, also require 
highly specialised skills and equipment that go beyond the capabilities of the 
Independent1. The capabilities of the average Independent are more general in nature, 
they include: (1) value generation through deal making and managerial co-ordination (2) 
assessing petroleum/reservoir dynamics in order to locate and extract the petroleum (3) 
monitoring and controlling the execution of drilling/production work programme s2. It 
would seem the internal capability of Independents is strongly focused upon the core 
elements of the exploration and production business; those activities that rely on human 
capital, and the co-ordinating role of the entrepreneur. These are activities that set the 
direction of the firm. Indeed, Independents bear close resemblance in their structure to 
Mintzberg’s (1989, p. 112) Entrepreneurial Organization, emphasis is upon the co­
ordinating Strategic Apex (Capability I) and essential work, that undertaken by the 
Operating Core (Capabilities 2 & 3). Ancillary activities are kept to a minimum.
According to Richardson, it is with dissimilar yet complementary activities, where the 
possibilities for co-operative arrangement lie e.g. between Independent and contractor. 
As the next Section (6.2.3) demonstrates, Richardson’s assertion is vindicated by certain 1 2
1 Holding the appropriate capabilities, the ‘skills, experience, and market connections’ (Richardson, 1998, 
p.44), and benefiting from economies of scale, external contractors specialised in one of these activities 
will be more efficient in its provision than an Independent.2 The capabilities of Independents are principally grounded in Human, rather than Physical Capital.
160
Independent’s relationships with Drillers and Facilities Management contractors. With
each of these complementary activities, co-operative arrangements are detected.
Richardson’s concept of co-operation is not conceived to be a fixed state. Rather, he 
identifies differing business associations lie along a spectrum of co-operative 
arrangements. He proposes that a ‘continuum’ exists that passes from transactions - as 
found in the commodity markets, where co-operation is minimal - to ‘intermediate areas’ 
where ‘linkages of traditional connexion and goodwill’ are present, and finally to 
clusters, groups, and alliances where co-operation is most fully developed (Richardson, 
1972, p.229).
For the Independents, such an intermediate area of co-operation is recognised to reside 
among activities associated with capability categories (2) and (3). Of mixed, in-house 
and out-house provision, these activities often resulted in the internal and out-sourced 
teams working together. This was found to be particularly true of contractors 
(consultants) supporting the Independent’s existing geological capability - specialized 
expert advice was occasionally contracted in. As Richardson (1972, p.236) documents, 
‘a subcontractor commonly compliments his own capabilities with assistance and advice 
from the firm he supplies.’ Bringing in external geologic capability has an inherent 
element of co-operation. The contracted firm is advisory in its role; the business 
transaction is one of exchange, rather than commodity transfer. Although a fee is paid to 
the consultant, the information he/she divulges is not charged per unit, rather it is their 
presence, knowledge, and open advice that the firm requires - the transaction has a co­
operative element. As Foss (1994) quotes, co-operation requires some knowledge of the 
other firms ‘neighbouring’ capabilities (Richardson, 1972, p.228) so that ‘...their limited 
individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that...the relevant information is 
communicated’ (Hayek, 1945, p.86).
6.2.3 Alliances
Alliances, recognised by Richardson to be those arrangements where co-operation is 
most fully developed (Richardson, 1972, p.229), were infrequently used by Independents
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in their relationships with contractors. Only a minority of Independents had engaged in 
alliances with drilling (3/14) and facilities management (2/14) contractors (Table 5.4.6). 
The most common reason given for the formation of an alliance was either because the 
firm lacked the necessary experience at the time, or, as in the case of Independent K, that 
the company’s business model was intentionally not geared towards monitoring and 
implementing work programmes (see Section 5.4.2.1). Independent K’s strengths resided 
mainly in capability layers (1) and (2), with layer (3) provided through alliances. For 
example, Independent K had established an office in Aberdeen where, its own staff 
together with the personnel of the facilities management contractor and a reservoir 
engineering / well design contractor were based, for the duration of the project. This 
level of co-operation was reported to be a product of the Independent’s CEO having a 
long established working relationship with key individuals in the two contracting firms. 
Although overall few alliances were arranged by Independents, the example of 
Independent K, demonstrates that a strongly co-operative arrangement can be 
established3. Trust and ‘goodwill’ can mitigate the need for more ‘formal arrangements’ 
(Richardson, 1972, p.226).
6.2.4 Williamsonian Interpretation
Results for the functional sourcing questions (Table 5.4.1, Fig 5.4.1), may alternatively 
be interpreted utilising Oliver Williamson’s variant of transaction cost economics, with 
his specific variables of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of transaction. For 
three of the four primary functions (Commercial, Financial, and Procurement), human 
asset specificity and frequency of transaction appear the most likely rationale for 
internalisation. If used to represent the core of the business, these functions are highly 
dependent upon individual personnel. Deal making and skilled managerial co-ordination 
are talents likely to be tailored specifically to a particular Independent. The personnel 
enacting these functions, the senior management, cannot easily be replaced; their skills.
3 Independent K was also one of the firms to report only utilising a simple day-rate with drilling 
contractors; the rationale, "contractors will factor in down-time.”
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knowledge and experience are firm specific1. Moreover, the frequency with which such
personnel are likely to be utilised, strengthens the rationale for their internalisation. The 
internalisation of these functions matches what Williamson (1985, p. 105) terms 
‘mundane integration’; the integration of core functions essential to the running of a
business.
The predominant internalisation of the human resource management function might be a 
product of uncertainty. The increased responsibility that is reported to be conferred upon 
individuals working for Independents (Table 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.5) may invigorate the 
need for newly hired personnel to be compatible with existing staff. Determination of fit 
is most readily achieved when current staff are integral to the interview and selection 
process, for this should reduce uncertainty and attenuate adverse selection. Reservoir and 
Petroleum engineering, being mainly sourced in-house or of mixed provision, can be 
interpreted as a consequence of human asset specificity. Continuity of the employment 
of personnel in these functions is necessary if knowledge about a particular licence area 
is to be maintained over its life-time. Learning-by-doing (Arrow, 1962) results in 
pertinent knowledge and experience being stored with individuals in the company. It is 
their familiarity with licences which enables comparisons to be drawn so that the 
appropriate licences may be selected or disposed. Moreover, in-house geological 
capability is essential if a store of knowledge about long-term licences is to be 
maintained. An outsourced solution could run an availability risk, access to a particular 
consultant on a regular basis may not be guaranteed. Thus the frequency with which 
these functions are utilised provides a further practical reason for internalisation.
The high internal/mixed provision of HSE could be interpreted as a consequence of the 
frequency of transaction. Any operated exploration or production licences upon which 
the firm takes action, will require health, safety and environmental checks and procedures 
to be undertaken. The required level of provision will, however, depend partly on the
4 For example, review of Independents’ annual reports reveals that should a Director wish to terminate his 
employment with a firm, then one year’s notice is typically required. This accords with Williamson’s 
(1985, p.243) reasoning that ‘governance structures must be crafted more carefully as the degree of human 
asset specificity increases.’
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State jurisdiction to which the operated licences pertain. For example, some states are 
likely to be more rigorous in their health and safety requirements than others. In this
context one notes that the only two British Independents (E & G) fully outsourcing the
HSE function, were also both engaged in the same Post-Soviet country.
Both data management and seismic analysis are also of mainly in-house or mixed 
provision. It could be argued that the primary reason for this was uncertainty. 
Contracted firms that deal with the same competitors in a particular region may be placed 
in a privileged position where confidentiality could become an issue (Cameron et al, 
2000, p.241)2. To reduce this uncertainty, a level of in-house provision is typically 
present. For seismic analysis, a degree of human asset specificity is also likely to be 
important; many Independents may be reliant upon the internal expertise of their seismic 
interpretation personnel.
Finally, turning to the last two functions of predominantly mixed provision, viz. project 
and facilities management, the partial nature of their internalisation could be interpreted 
as arising from uncertainty and human asset specificity. Internalisation confers upon 
Independents a greater knowledge of these functions. Thus, when, external contractors 
are utilised, the Independent is potentially better equipped to monitor and assess them, 
thereby reducing uncertainty. Beyond the monitoring role, experienced personnel also 
enhance the internal capability of the firm; they act as the first resources necessary to 
develop full in-house capability.
For the remaining functions (see Section 5.4.1.2), mainly outsourced in their provision, 
not one of the factors of asset specificity, uncertainty, or frequency of transaction is 
sufficient for internalisation to be undertaken. Nevertheless, though of insufficient 
magnitude, these factors are still present. For example, on reviewing the outsourced 
functions of drilling equipment and personnel, it is clear that both dedicated asset 
specificity and uncertainty are present. An Independent will arrange for a drilling rig to
2 Privy to the licence interests of their competing customers, such contractors would hold highly sensitive 
information, for example, new geological play ideas.
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be kitted-out with the appropriate modules and machinery specific to their requirements. 
Thus the rig holds a degree of dedicated asset specificity^. Turning to the drilling 
personnel, there may be uncertainty concerning the ‘effort’ (Kemp and Stephen, 1999) 
and competence of the contractor in executing the task. Drilling, although not 
internalised, is a function of great importance to the performance of Independents (see 
Section 5.4.2). As a consequence, following Williamson’s reasoning, safeguarding 
governance structures must be present between Independents and drillers if credible 
contracting is to be realised. Section 6.2.8 reviews this concept in light of Richardson’s 
co-operative alternative.
6.2.5 Size of Firm and Internalisation of Functions
As Independents grow in size, and the quantity of exploration and production licences 
increases, Williamson (1985, p.94) would propose that the diseconomies associated with 
in-house production will be ‘everywhere reduced’. Thus he says that, ‘The firm is simply 
better able to realize economies of scale as its own requirements become larger in 
relation to the size of the market’ (Williamson, 1985, p.94). Williamson’s chart of 
comparative production and governance costs assists his explanation (Fig 6.2.1). On the 
horizontal axis is the level of asset specificity; on the vertical axis is the cost per unit.
3 Sunk costs are also present for the Independent will have spent valuable labour time in selecting this firm 
through their tendering process.
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AC is given as the steady state production cost difference between producing internally
the given function and the steady state cost of procuring the same function in the market. 
AC is expressed as a function of asset specificity (k). It is assumed that AC will be 
positive throughout, but will be a decreasing function of k. For standardised transactions, 
where market aggregation economies are great, the production cost penalty for using 
internal organization is large; where AC is large, k is low. As functions become close to 
unique, high values of k, aggregation economies of outside contracting are no longer 
realized. The previous contractor’s economies of scale and scope are no longer 
applicable for the Independent can internalise without penalty.
AG is the comparative governance cost between market and internal organization. At 
low asset specificity levels, markets can aggregate demands, economies of scale and 
scope are realized and advantage is conferred. However, when asset specificity is great, 
high bilateral dependency upon a particular contractor enhances the benefit of 
internalisation, where greater control over the specific function is established. The point 
on AG where the choice between firm and market becomes ‘one of indifference’, is 
denoted by k"
With the aim being to minimize the sum of production and governance cost differences, 
the vertical sum of AG + AC is also displayed. The value of k for which this sum 
becomes negative is denoted by kA. Williamson proposes, that where optimal asset 
specificity is slight (k*«k\ out-sourcing holds advantages in both governance and scale 
economy respects. However, when optimal asset specificity is substantial (k*»kA), 
aggregate economy benefits are minimal and internal control is necessitated. For 
intermediate degrees of optimal asset specificity, mixed governance, in which some firms 
will outsource, whilst others will internalise, is thought likely to arise.
Application of this Williamson analysis to increasing firm size, predicts that larger firms 
will integrate more functions than will small, ceteris paribus. Better able to realize 
economies of scale the AC curve for the larger firm falls everywhere as quantity 
increases. Thus, the vertical sum of AG + AC intersects the axis at a value of k', that
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progressively moves to the left as the quantity to be supplied increases. Analysis of 
findings shows Independent firm size, measured by Market Capitalisation, to be
positively associated with the Total Number of Licences Held (Spearman’s rho 
correlation coefficient = 0.549; Prob. value = 0.022). In essence, the larger the
Independent, the greater the volume of work in which it is involved. According to 
Williamson’s theory, Independents of larger size should internalise more functions than 
smaller Independents. Requiring a greater quantity of the out-sourced function than a 
smaller firm would, economies of scale shift k" to the left and internal provision is 
facilitated. Indeed, our results support this finding (Section 5.4.1.3). Examination of 
Table 5.4.1 for the functions of seismic analysis, petroleum engineering, development 
engineering, and software engineering reveals the smaller Independents (A to H) to show 
lower levels of internalisation relative to larger Independents (I to N). For example, for 
the function of seismic analysis, only 62% (5/8) of the smaller Independents have in­
house capability, whereas 100% (6/6) of the larger Independents do. Williamson’s 
theory may also explain the higher propensity for internalisation of functions among the 
North American Independents (Table 5.4.3), relative to the British firms. The North 
American Independent firm size is on average significantly larger than the equivalent 
British Independent (Section 5.2).
6.2.6 Reconciling the Two Theories
Williamson’s transaction cost approach presents an inviting system for analysis. 
However, it does not completely resolve the question as to why firms may move to 
source some functions completely in-house, before other functions, despite each function 
holding a similar level of asset specificity. The answer may be formulated through 
integration of a Penrosian (1959) resource-based interpretation, with a Williamsonian 
schema. Williamson’s (2002) comparative costs of governance chart, which displayed 
the transaction cost consequences of organizing transactions in markets (M) and 
hierarchies (H) as a function of asset specificity, can be modified to incorporate a 
Penrosian element. Hierarchies (firms) are composed of a range of functions that may be 
sourced in, or out-house. The point at which internalisation of a particular function into a 
hierarchy is shown to be preferred, will vary according to function. For functions that are
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most similar to the existing capabilities of the firm S(k), at a relatively low level of asset 
specificity (ka), comparative costs are such that it is already preferential to fully integrate 
the function (Fig 6.2.2). As asset specificity builds up, beyond intersect ‘a’, the 
transaction cost of organizing the transaction in the market M(k) exceeds the cost of 
internalising it S(k). In contrast, for functions that are less similar to the existing 
capabilities of the firm C(k), only at a higher level of asset specificity (kb), do 
comparative costs advocate internalisation. The theory developed is that firms can fully 
internalise certain functions at lower levels of asset specificity, provided those functions 
are of greater proximity to existing capabilities. The rationale to this action is because 
proximity confers integrating advantages, being similar to existing functions, managerial 
resources are already attuned to the co-ordinating techniques required. Pursuit of firm 
growth along channels of similarity means these proximate functions can be integrated 
more quickly and efficiently than those of greater distance. The result: functions of 
proximity to existing firm capabilities may be more easily integrated.
Closer examination of Williamson’s work (1985, p.96) reveals that he acknowledges 
asset specificity is relational, and that uniqueness is partially formulated with respect to 
the availability and efficiency of out-house contractors (market provision). Williamson 
also reasons that internal organisation influences the point of internalisation; he states 
the move from the U to M-form organisation, reduces AG, thereby shifting AG + AC to 
the left - encouraging integration at a lower level of asset specificity. Since the 
transaction cost theory incorporates the idea that internal organisation can influence the
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decision to integrate, it may also be reasoned that the level of similarity displayed by a
particular function to the firm’s existing capabilities will influence which functions are 
integrated. Ceteris paribus, those functions of greater similarity to the firm’s existing 
capabilities will be integrated before those of lesser similarity.
Although the gathering of evidence to support the above theory is beyond the time- 
constraints of this research, it is advocated as a future line of inquiry for resolving the 
differences between the resource-based and. transaction cost theories. If the type of 
functions internalised over-time are to be monitored, and their similarity to existing 
capabilities tested, a series of annual meetings with the same Independents will be 
required.
6.2.7 Availability of Contractors
The rationale for mixed provision is said by Williamson (1985) to lie in the property of 
varied asset specificity. In different geographic regions, for example, the ability to 
procure a component in the market will vary, this variation means the optimum level of 
asset specificity (k) in the two cases will not be identical. For locations where the market 
does not permit sufficient procurement opportunities, (e.g. where there are few 
contractors available or of a necessary standard) then the optimum level of k (when 
compared to locations where ample contractors are available) is reduced. With limited 
equivalent contracted resources available on the market, those developed internally by 
the company are highly inimitable. The threshold level of asset specificity at which 
internalisation will occur, is set for Williamson, in a relational capacity, relative to 
market provision. This theory may be used to explain the significantly greater utilisation 
of contracted facilities management among those firms with the majority of their 
production within the UCKS (Prob. value = 0.038). The availability of facilities 
management firms, such as Petrofac, increases the optimum level of asset specificity 
stimulating internalisation, therefore encouraging outsourcing. In contrast, for firms 
operating in geographical regions, where market provision of facilities management 
contractors is less established, or absent, the optimum level of asset specificity for 
encouraging internalisation is much lower. The Independent must provide the functions
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internally. For example, Independent C stated when undertaking operations in East 
Africa, many of the functions had to be provided in-house as the relevant contracting 
firms were not operating in that region,
6.2.8 Safeguarding Governance Structures
The most recent contractual schema developed by Willliamson (2002) outlines four 
contractual alternatives available to a firm (Fig 6.2.3). As in Williamson’s traditional 
nomenclature, k is a measure of asset specificity. Whilst 5 denotes the magnitude of 
safeguarding governance structures, such as information disclosure, penalties, specialized 
dispute resolution and verification mechanisms. These safeguards act as measures to 
mitigate contract manipulation or opportunistic behaviour. For the condition where no 
safeguards are provided s=0, whilst where safeguards are implemented s>0.
Simple Contracting Schema
C (Credible contracting)
D (Hierarchy)
Fig 6.2.3
The above schema may be considered a form of Game Tree, it progresses from the root 
node ‘R’, through intermediate decision nodes, to terminal nodes A, B, C and D. 
Terminal Node A, characterises the ideal transaction where there is no dependency 
between buyer and seller, and governance is achieved through competitive market prices. 
In the case of disputes, judicial court procedures are the norm and appropriate damages
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awarded. Terminal Node B, of ‘unrelieved contractual hazards’, is suggested by 
Williamson to be unsustainable. Specialized investments are exposed for which no 
safeguards are provided. Consequently, far sighted players are said to avoid such 
hazards. Thus the hybrid middle ground choice (Node C) for Williamson, where 
‘credible contracting’ becomes possible, is that for which safeguards are provided. 
Finally, should asset specificity and added uncertainty continue to accrue, Williamson 
details the increased need for ‘cooperative adaptation’ will be provided by complete 
internalisation, the player will choose (Node D) to internalise the function within its 
‘hierarchy’.
For Williamson’s theory founded on the tenet of opportunism, the likelihood of co­
operation appears restricted to the realm of the unified firm. Safeguards are regarded as 
essential if credible contracting is to be achieved under conditions of asset specificity. 
Giving some support to this reasoning, results as discussed in Section 5.4.2.1, do confirm 
some safeguards to be operative in the contracts established between Independents and 
drilling contractors. Both information disclosure and verification mechanisms were 
specified to be very important governance structures (Table 5.4.5). However, the 
incentivisation safeguard received a heterogeneous reception; «40% of British 
Independents did not utilise an incentivisation system with their drilling contractors (Fig
5.4.2). These Independents noted a simple day-rate to be adequate. Opportunism of the 
kind Williamson discusses does not appear to be apparent in the relations with drilling 
contractors as experienced by some Independents. This result accords with existing 
criticism that has been directed towards Williamson’s treatment of opportunism (Kay, 
1993; Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000). Kay (1993) rightly reasons that 
opportunism does not hold resolute application to all societies. Comparing Japan to the 
US, he recognises that group harmony rather than individualistic self-interest is more 
characteristic of Japanese economic behaviour. The suggestion is made that obedience is 
a more reasonable behavioural building block than would be opportunism for this 
society. Further criticism, stimulated by the re-assessment of General Motor’s 
acquisition of Fisher Body draws the conclusion that co-operation, not opportunism, 
characterised the relationship between the two firms (Coase, 2000; Freeland, 2000;
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Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000). The overturning of this, once classic case of 
opportunism, and the recognition of the ‘amicable nature of contractual relations between 
the two companies’ (Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000, p.77), highlights the 
contemporary potential that Richardson’s (1972, p.228) co-operative, safeguard freek, 
middle-ground may now receive. Co-operation, without safeguards, would suggest the 
importance of trust, ‘goodwill and reputation’ (Richardson, 1972, p.229) to commercial 
exchange. Two of the Independents (E & H) that did not incorporate incentivisation, 
stated “personal trust” and the development of a business “relationship” as a key reason 
for their firm’s association with the drilling contractor with whom they held the strongest 
ties. This resolutely contrasts with Williamson who maintains that in the absence of 
‘credible commitments’, ‘trust is irrelevant to commercial exchange’ (Williamson, 1993, 
p.469). On the issue of opportunism versus trust, safeguards versus co-operation, the two 
theories are clearly divided.
6.2.9 The Safeguard of Incentivisation
For those Independents that did incorporate incentives, budget and time-targeted bonus 
systems were the most common incentives, followed by a turnkey solution. With the 
drilling contractors reporting the Independents’ preference for turnkey to be a 
consequence of their desire to cap financial exposure and have a degree of certainty over 
the funds required, further emphasises the cost-control orientation of the Independent 
firm. Turnkey did not appear to be the consequence of opportunism by the drilling 
contractors, rather it was an internal motivation of Independents: knowledge of future 
costs would likely assist access to finance. Utilisation of a turnkey approach was 
reported to be more common among Independents than for Majors. Comparison of 
results for the British and North American Independent samples, reveals turnkey methods 
to be more common among the North American firms, 42% reported usage. These 
results correspond to the comments made by drilling contractor interviewees, who 
reported turnkey methods to be frequently used in the Gulf of Mexico. The perspective 
gained from these interviewees suggested that as more Independents enter the UKCS, 
and especially North American Independents, the demand for turnkey solutions was
7 Or as Richardson (1972, p.228) terms ‘no formal assurance'.
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likely to increase. The majority of drilling contractors also reported Independents as 
shifting a greater proportion of risk to the contractor; the mode of causation was 
frequently referenced as the utilisation of turnkey. With a fixed price arranged to cover 
the entire work programme, under a turnkey system the cost of delays and over-runs 
would be borne by the contractor. This additional risk was not negatively received, some 
respondents detailed this aspect to be a strength of undertaking contracts with 
Independents. Beyond the higher return that could be earned from the additional risk, 
drillers also reported the greater contractor involvement and acceptance of existing 
contractor specifications to be further strengths of undertaking work for Independents. 
This finding contrasts with previous research on fixed price at outset / turnkey 
incentivisation. Ibbs et al. (1986), in quantifying the impact of different contractual 
clauses on performance of 36 building construction projects, reported that turnkey 
systems encourage a more adversarial relationship, than a simple day-rate system, 
because risk allocation is mainly on the contractor (see Table 6.2.1). Drilling 
respondents did not report this aspect for operations with Independents. The majority of 
Drillers viewed working relationships with Independents positively. For example, 
Contractor B, which was dedicated to the use of turnkey, remarked that it was “easier to 
work for Independents”. Other contractors found the “greater autonomy” (Contractor A) 
and “contractor involvement” (Contractor D) to be further positive features of working 
for Independents. Indeed, Contractor D stated such autonomy led to enhanced work 
‘satisfaction’.
Comparing Fixed Price with Cost Plus Contracts in Construction
Fixed Price Day-Rate
Risk allocation rests mainly with Contractor Buyer
Incentives for quality Less More
Flexibility for change Less More
Adversarial relationship More Less
Source: Ibbs et al. (1986) Referenced in Bajari and Tadelis (2001).
Table 6.2.1
Penalty systems, although rightly considered in terms of their possible practicality by 
Kemp and Stephen (1997; 1999), were found by this research to be rarely utilised. 
Penalties were only implemented with respect to rig arrival, they were not incorporated 
for drilling / production in process. Once the contractor commenced work, penalty 
systems were usually absent.
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Summarising the above results it is clear that not all of Williamson’s safeguards are 
required for credible contracting to be enacted. Closer examination of the incentivisation
safeguard reveals that its incorporation does vary. Part of this variation is because an 
alternate co-operative middle ground can be sought without the presence of incentives.
Opportunism considered by Williamson to be a generic feature influencing the structure 
of all contracts should not be universally assumed; the players of certain countries appear 
more prone to opportunism in business relations than others. I would reason 
Williamson’s concept of opportunism is one tailored to the US context, a country where, 
the written contract (Kennedy, 1985) and its legal stature, holds primacy. Steeped in 
legal interpretation — citing John R. Commons — Williamson’s opportunism leaves no 
space for Richardson’s co-operative middle-ground. The frequency of incentives utilised 
amongst the North American Independents, may reflect the regional applicability of 
Williamson’s opportunism, however, for the British Independents a co-operative 
arrangement is clearly often present.
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6.3 NEGOTIATION
6.3.1 Approach Factors
Analysis of the approach factor results demonstrates a strong variation in the ranking of 
factors for Non-Western (Fig 5.5.1) as compared to Western (Fig 5.5.2) contexts. 
Differing approach factors are clearly required for the differing contexts. The most 
noticeable discordant factor is Accessing the appropriate government official. Ranked 
first for Non-Western countries, it is placed fourth for Western. Current findings are 
supported by Salacuse’s (2003) assertion that accessing the appropriate department and 
government official is a necessity for successful negotiation. The significance of the 
'Access’ factor is found to be higher in the Non-Western relative to Western context. 
This context differential may be partly explained through examining the writing of Ye 
(2003). Building upon the work of Wilson (1989), who identified the heterogeneity with 
which the work of government agencies actually gets defined. Ye (2003, p.4) notes that 
the rules and regulations among Non-Western countries are often ambiguous. In such 
situations, bureaucrats become the first to define the rules before they implement them. 
Consequently, their personal attitudes and beliefs, political ties, as well as other personal 
considerations, determine the definition of rules. Rather than the objective bureaucratic 
system as a whole determining action, authority often lies with a particular government 
official (Ye, 2003, p.4). In such circumstances, Salacuse’s (2003) concern with access is 
particularly magnified. For Western countries, where the overall bureaucratic system, 
rather than individual bureaucrat, mainly determines action (Ye, 2003, p.3); Persistence, 
not Access, is the fundamental behavioural approach required. As Jun (2000) notes, 
many Non-Western developing countries look to Western countries as they work to 
modernize the public institutions in their own countries. The increased consistency of 
rules (Dimitrov, 2003), and formalization, characteristic of Western bureaucracies, 
diminishes the importance of Access. An observation to be further developed (Section
6.3.3) is that the Western context aj^j^c^^ars to approxxmate more ccosely Max WebeEs 
‘ideal type’ bureaucracy than the Non-Western context. As is discussed in Sections 6.3.4 
and 6.3.5, such a difference may hold implications for the context within which 
Independents’ negotiating strengths are most applicable.
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In both contexts, the proposed Independents’ strength (Section 1.4) of greatest 
significance for the ranking questions was the Seniority of company personnel. Within 
negotiation literature (Kapoor et al, 1991), this factor is noted for its ability to hasten the 
negotiating process, and to facilitate access to senior personnel within the host 
government (Marsh, 2001). Utilisation of senior personnel, with the authority to commit, 
may negate the temptation of firms to engage in the ‘limited authority’ / ‘escalating 
authority’ ploys described by Kennedy (1998a). ‘Limited authority’ is when a negotiator 
claims their authority to vary a deal is strictly limited. ‘Escalating authority’, occurs 
where the deal is continually referred to the next most senior person in the organization 
for endorsement. As Kennedy reasons, the utilisation of ploys is insufficient for ‘longish 
negotiation’, as over several meetings the ploy is likely to be detected. Firms which 
traditionally send their most senior personnel with the authority to commit to negotiating 
meetings, from the perspective of these two ploys, are likely to be more decisive in their 
bargaining approach. Comparing the two contexts, seniority of company representatives 
was ranked more highly in Western countries. However, this is partly the consequence of 
the Accessing the appropriate government official factor being of substantially lower 
rank. The other proposed Independent strength, Use of the same company 
representatives, was found to be of lesser significance, relative to Seniority of personnel, 
in both Western and Non-Western contexts. Overall, neither of the proposed 
Independents’ strengths were shown to be the most important approach factor 
influencing award of licence in either Western or Non-Western contexts. Although both 
factors are noted as approach strengths, particular to Independents, other approach factors 
of general applicability to all sizes of firm, such as Accessing the appropriate government 
official and Persistence, are reported to be of greater influence in Non-Western and 
Western contexts respectively.
6.3.2 Content Factors (Technical)
Level of commitment to drill is the most important content factor influencing the award of 
licence in both Western and Non-Western contexts (Fig 5.5.5-6). As Van Meurs (1971) 
recounts, most governments welcome exploration and production investment. The UK 
DTI (2003) openly acknowledges that it attaches greater importance to a ‘firm’
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commitment to drill, than to a ‘contingent’ commitment. Results show all governments 
(Fig 5.5.5-6), Western and Non-Western, rank Commitment to drill above all other 
technical content factors. Governments seek and support activity, for activity equates to 
investment (Hann, 1986). From the list of typical government objectives, detailed in 
Table 6.3.1, Commitment to drill would likely result in increased local employment 
opportunities and use of local contractors. Taking the example of the North Sea, drilling 
rigs require staff both offshore and onshore to co-ordinate drilling activities (BP, 1977). 
Moreover, should drilling prove successful, and oil is struck, then a further government 
objective of enhanced domestic petroleum supply is achieved. In contrast, a contingent 
commitment does not necessitate activity (Section 3.3.1). For example, should 
geotechnical evaluation prove unpromising, then drilling will not commence, and few of 
the government’s objectives will be fulfilled.
______________ Government Objectives______________
- A significant share of the revenues___________________
- Employment for citizens____________________________
- Use of local contractors____________________________
- Training for citizens_______________________________
- Transfer of technologies____________________________
- Adequate sovereignty / control over the project
- Augmentation of domestic sources of petroleum_______
Source: Kennel (2000)
Table 6.3.1
For the Western context, findings show Geological assessment to be of greater 
importance than Financial capability. The reverse is true of the Non-Western context, 
where Financial capability ranked higher than Geological assessment. The findings 
indicate a differential in the technical content priorities of each context (Fig 5.5.5-6). 
Although not explicitly identified, the cause of this variation, may lie in Non-Western 
governments’ greater need for economic investment (O’Connor, 2000). Most developing 
countries are included in the Non-Western category.
6.3.3 Context Comparisons
Results show approach factors to be of overall greater influence in Non-Western 
countries relative to Western, whilst content factors are of greater influence in Western 
countries relative to Non-Western (Section 5.5.3.1). Combining an analysis of this result 
with the finding that selection procedures in Western countries are formally based, whilst
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those in Non-Western countries are relationship based (Fig 5.5.8-9), demonstrates the 
two are typically dissimilar in their operation. Explanation of these results can be sought 
through examining the constituent features from which the government context is derived 
(Fig 3.3.2). The most influential feature pertains to that of the governments’ 
predominating bureaucratic systems. Max Weber (1947) recognised the bureaucratic 
coordination of activities to be the distinctive mark of the modern era. He argued that 
bureaucracy, organised around formalized rules and procedures was an emerging 
institutional feature of the modernising West. Also, the prevalence of rational impersonal 
rules within the ‘ideal’ bureaucracy was associated with a high degree of administrative 
efficiency. The ‘ideal’ bureaucracy, in Weber’s sense is free of unstructured decision­
making. Calculated, rules-based rationality is the primary order. Application of Weber’s 
‘ideal’ bureaucracy to the government context in which petroleum licences are issued 
would, in theory, reduce the significance of approach factors to limited importance, 
whilst selection procedures would be entirely formally, rather than relationship, based. 
The decision of an ‘ideal’ bureaucracy would not be mediated by the particular approach 
methods adopted by a firm. Instead, a set of procedures would be institutionalised. 
Similarly, being wholly depersonalised in operation, an ‘ideal’ bureaucracy would be 
completely formal in its approach. Neither Western nor Non-Western contexts were 
found to fit this ideal scenario (Table 5.5.7 and Fig 5.5.8-9). This result is supported by 
Weber (1947, p.301), who recognised that the ‘ideal’ bureaucracy does not occur in its 
pure form. However, analysis of our findings does reveal the Western context of 
government to be a closer approximation to Weber’s ‘ideal’ bureaucracy than to the Non­
Western context. Approach factors, theoretically absent in the ‘ideal’ bureaucracy, were 
found to be of greater influence in Non-Western countries (Fig 5.5.7). Similarly, content 
factors, theoretically of greater influence in an ‘ideal’ bureaucracy, are of greater 
influence in Western countries. Content factors, containing the substance of a company’s 
proposal, would be the aspect to which an ‘ideal’ bureaucracy would strongly apply its 
strictly calculative rationality. Although this research assumes that in both Western and 
Non-Western contexts, content factors are of greater significance than approach factors 
in determining licence award, results show the two contexts to differ, in terms of the 
relative impact of each factor. Further evidence supporting the view that the Western
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context approximates to the bureaucratic ‘ideal’, is advanced by the finding that licencing
authorities’ selection procedures were mainly formally based (Fig 5.5.8). This strongly
contrasts with Non-Western countries, where the selection procedure is more relationship 
orientated.
Verification of this context differential may be noted in the writings of Peters (2001, 
p. 168). He recognises that the formal structure of most bureaucracies in the Non­
Western world, on the surface, does conform closely with Western administration. This, 
he attests, is partly a consequence of their colonial inheritance. Thus, compliance with 
certain formalities is necessary, if aid is to be received from developed nations and 
international organizations. However, Peters (2001, p. 168) notes the actual operations of 
these Non-Western structures are quite different; ‘non-bureaucratic criteria still tending 
to supersede the rules, procedures and hierarchy of the formal structure.’ With the 
current results of this thesis having confirmed the distinction between Western and Non­
Western contexts, focus now turns to the open questions which probed the strengths and 
weaknesses that smaller firm’s size was reported to confer upon applications made in 
either context (Question 3.5, Appendix 1.2).
6.3.4 N<^i^-^'W(^.st(^m Context
Analysis of results does suggest that Independents are in a stronger position when 
applying for exploration licences in Non-Western, as against Western countries (Section
5.5.3). As results to the open questions demonstrated (Section 5.5.3.2), all Independents 
recognised smaller firm size had conferred some advantage in the Non-Western context 
(Table 5.5.12). In contrast, for applications in Western countries, respondents often 
claimed no size advantage was conferred (Table 5.5.10). The greatest strengths reported 
for Independents making applications in the Non-Western context mostly related to 
approach factors, rather than content factors (Table 5.5.12). The principal approach 
factors given by respondents included: Seniority of company representatives and 
Communication (Section 5.5.3). Closer examination of both approach factors revealed 
respondents frequently referred to the ability of the smaller firm to establish 
relationships. The power of the personal relationship approach factor, although long
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overlooked in negotiation research (Greenhalgh,1987), has received considerable 
attention in recent years (Sondak, et al, 1999; Halpern, 1994; Mannix and Neale, 1993; 
Polzer et al, 1993; Shah and Jehn, 1993; Sondak and Moore, 1993). Within negotiation 
research, what constitutes a relationship has been given various definitions (Greenhalgh 
and Chapman, 1998). However, a useful framework of conceptualisation is employed by 
Halpern (1994). Drawing from the work of Schank and Abelson (1977) and Fiske and 
Taylor (1991), Halpern posits a relationship to be a ‘cognitive structure’ also called a 
‘script’, that mediates the way in which parties exchange information during a 
transaction. The ‘relationship script’ guides each party to an understanding of the set of 
behaviour expected of the other. This interpretation is close to that of Kennedy’s (1998a) 
writings on the relative linkage between ‘attitudes’ (similar to scripts) and resultant 
negotiating ‘behaviour’. The stronger a relationship, the more each party can cognitively 
anticipate the behaviour of the other party, and the greater the likelihood that the 
behaviour will be orientated towards maintaining the relationship into the future 
(Halpern, 1994).
The presence of a strong relationship is associated with joint negotiating gain 
(Greenhalgh and Chapman, 1998). Based on data from 117 negotiating dyads and using 
‘seemingly unrelated regression’ (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1981, p.323) to improve 
precision, Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998) found all of the regression coefficients 
between variables to follow the hypothesised directions. The directional linkage between 
each of the variables tested by Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998) are displayed below (Fig 
6.3.1). In this figure, only those coefficients which are significant at a Prob. value of less 
than 0.05 are detailed.
Coercive
(-)
Perceived
Str
Reh
*p < 0.05 Continuity
p <0.01 
p <0.001 Fig 6.3.1
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A strong relationship influences the behavioural actions of both parties. Halpern (1994), 
focusing upon the relationship script of friendship, found people to anticipate bargaining 
more intensely, by trying harder to get their price with strangers, rather than with friends. 
This supports the findings of Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998), where weak relationship 
was associated with coercive behaviour, and coercive behaviour negatively associated 
with joint gain (Fig 6.3.1). Behavioural actions displayed by parties to a negotiation may 
be considered as situated on a continuum between coercive (red) behaviour and passive 
(blue) behaviour (Kennedy, 1998a). Red behaviour is enacted when the relationship is 
weak, one party regarding the other as an ‘opponent’. Blue behaviour is played when a 
party considers more will be gained through co-operation. The two behaviours are 
equivalent to those in the classic prisoner’s dilemma1. Red action approximates a player 
defecting by confessing: blue action approximates the move to not confess. Should either 
or both of the players undertake a red strategy, and confess, joint gain is impossible 
(Kennedy, 1998a). Following the prisoner’s dilemma schema, the only outcome 
stimulating joint gain would be when both players follow a blue behaviour, the ‘win-win’ 
outcome (Kennedy, 1998a). In practice, the co-operative scenario is rare: ‘negotiators 
defect’ (Kennedy, 1998a). As Nash (1951) would reason for the prisoner’s dilemma, the 
game equilibrium is a non-co-operative outcome, both players confess1 2.
The polar extremes of red-blue do not map directly onto action. Behaviour exhibited is 
likely to be positioned somewhere on the continuum between the two. The results of this 
study suggest several Independents were more closely allied towards a blue behavioural 
orientation. Emphasis is placed upon their “personal approach”, the establishment of 
“relationships” and greater flexibility in deal structuring. Historically, greater deal
1 The prisoner’s dilemma considers the situation of two prisoners who each face the decision of whether to 
confess or deny a crime that they committed together. Each prisoner must make their decision without 
knowing what the other will say; there is no communication between them. If neither prisoner confesses 
then they are both held for 1 month only. However, if one prisoner confesses, then he would go free, and 
the other prisoner would receive 6 months in prison. If both prisoners confess then they each receive 3 
months in prison.
2 In opposition to von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) co-operative plays / coalitional games, Nash 
(1951) argued all co-operative games could be interpreted through a non-cooperative framework.
181
flexibility has been reported for Independents (Sampson, 1975; Vernon, 1976)4. The 
blue orientation of Independents does not infer a pure ‘giving’ (blue), rather than ‘taking’ 
(red) strategy. As Kennedy (1998a) argues, joint gain is feasible without both players 
conducting passive, pure blue action. The solution is for a trading negotiating tactic to be 
adopted. Kennedy refers to this as his purple principle of conditionality. It incorporates 
both give (blue) and take (red) behaviours. A simple, yet effective trading methodology 
to negotiation is conceived: “If you give me X, then I will offer you Y.” This concept 
should not be confused with our approach factors. The above conditionality principle 
relates to the final stage of the face-to-face bargaining mechanics of negotiation. It 
presents a fortuitous technique that is universal in its application. Complementary to this 
are approach factors. Varying according to context, the importance of approach 
precedes the use of the above conditional negotiating technique. Approaches channel a 
firm’s efforts so that they may be in an advantageous position to proceed with the final 
bargaining stage. As has been previously discussed, approach factors are of greater 
influence in Non-Western, compared to Western contexts. In establishing relationships, 
the strength of Independents as an approach factor, appears to fit with the relationship 
emphasis of Non-Western selection procedures3 4 (Fig 5.5.9). Three of the four principal 
strengths that smaller firm size conferred in Non-Western contexts, were approach 
factors (Table 5.5.12). Independents’ strength in approach factors may positively assist 
successful licence award in Non-Western countries. This strength may be a further 
stimulus to Independents mainly holding Operated licences in Non-Western countries, 
and Non-Operated licences in Western countries (Table 5.6.6).
Why relationship strength was particular to small, rather than large petroleum companies 
was not explicitly tested by this research. Nevertheless, from current findings (Section 
5.5), the following influences may be theorised. Firstly, that the use of senior personnel,
3 Aminoil’s unprecedented $7.5m down-payment for a Kuwati concession and Getty Oil’s $9.5m down­
payment for a Saudia Arabian concession in the late 1940s. The result proved that smaller companies 
‘offering far better terms than the majors, could still make large profitis’ (Sampson, 1975, p. 1-43).
4 The CEO of Independent a, reported the strength of relationship established with officials in the Iraqi 
Petroleum Directorate, to be of strong benefit. The example was given of Independent a staff being 
granted rapid access to see an oil minister, before that of a Major, Total representative — our ‘a’ staff were 
“rushed in”.
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with decision-making authority, increases the clarity of response and decision speed. 
Authority to commit may enable on-the-spot rapid decisions/offers to be taken, because 
fewer authorising personnel are necessitated for a decision to be made. Openness, alias 
information sharing, was significantly associated with joint gain (p < 0.05) (Greenhalgh 
and Chapman, 1998) (Fig 7.3.1); authority to commit should enable such clarity to be 
enacted (Kapoor et al, 1991). Secondly, the Independents’ senior personnel may be adept 
at cultivating relationships. This ability is unlikely to be an innate characteristic of the 
personnel themselves, rather one which has developed as a consequence of the business 
environment they experience. As Wickham (2001) reports for similar small sized 
entrepreneurial firms, customers, suppliers, employees and investors will all be drawn to 
the venture as a consequence of the ‘positive relationship’ they develop with the 
entrepreneur. Senior personnel in small firms are often strong in managing relationships 
(Exhibit 5.6.1), and it is this aspect that may also influence their reported strength in 
relationship establishment within the less formalized (Fig 5.5.9), Non-Western context. 
Strong relationships are a form of social capital (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992), 
considered to facilitate both the founding and later success of small firms (Westlund and 
Bolton, 2003).
Similar to results for the previous content ranking test, Financial capability was the most 
significant weakness of Independents applying for exploration licences in Non-Western 
countries. The Non-Western need for investment (O’Connor, 2000), was reported. The 
government objectives of ‘Training for local citizens’ and ‘Transfer of technology’, 
identified by Kennel (2000), were both referenced as features that Independents could 
rarely contribute (Table 5.5.13). As Independents D and I revealed, small petroleum 
companies are usually reliant upon the ability to hire local staff with existing experience. 
Independents would not undertake the training function so often sought by host 
governments (Kennel, 2000). Beyond investment, attention was focused upon an 
Independents’ abilities to deliver. Lacking the recognition of larger firms, Non-Western 
governments were concerned as to whether Independents could deliver. Overall, the 
majority of weaknesses reported concerned mainly content rather than approach factors.
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6.3.5 Western Government Context
Unlike the Non-Western context, most Independents reported smaller firm size to confer 
no advantage when applying for exploration licences in Western countries (Table 5.5.10). 
Only one approach factor. Decision-making speed was detailed as a particular strength 
that worked to the Independents’ advantage. In the Western context, approximating more 
closely to the formalized ‘ideal’ bureaucracy, alternate ‘personalised’ approach factors, 
such as Relationship establishment are less significant. Financial capability was given 
as the principal source of weakness that hindered Independents from being granted 
licences. The risk as to whether a company could “come up with the money” and fulfil 
stated commitments was specified as the principal concern of Western governments 
(Independent O). Similar to the financially intensive field development action, 
justification for Western governments’ concern over exploration licences may also be 
sourced in Calomiris and Hubbard’s (1990) work on ‘credit rationing’. Credit scarcity 
limits the number of firms with whom investment may be placed. The smaller the net 
worth of a firm the greater the collateral restriction - size of firm influences the credit 
apportioned by the lender (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990). Given supply restrictions. 
Independents may have difficulty in raising the necessary finance. Evidence of adequate 
financial provision being a primary condition of licence award assists in explaining why 
management capability in arranging finance remains a wholly internalised function of the 
Independent firm - regardless of size (Table 5.4.3-4).
Overall, results suggest Independents are in a stronger position when applying for 
exploration licences in Non-Western, as against Western countries. The stimulus to this 
differential is a consequence of the fit between Independents’ strengths in particular 
negotiating approach factors and the Non-Western context. Interviewees expressed that 
the ability of Independents to establish relationships with host government officials were 
a key aspect of their strength. This approach factor fits with the ‘non-ideal’ bureaucratic 
functioning of the Non-Western context, where a relationship-based, rather than a formal 
mode of selection procedure was followed. Although it is an assumption of this research 
that content factors are of ultimate significance in determining licence award in both 
Western and Non-Western contexts, the reported Independents’ strengths in the approach
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factors of, Decision-making speed, Authority to commit / Seniority of personnel, and 
Establishment of relationships, may confer a degree of comparative advantage when 
applying for licences in Non-Western countries. This advantage could be one of the 
causal influences that has resulted in Independents mainly holding Operated licences in 
Non-Western countries, and Non-Operated licences in Western countries (Table 5.6.6).
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6.4 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY
6.4.1 Why Internationalise?
Analysis of results (Section 5.4.1), reveals that the primary rationale for the 
Independents’ first expansion overseas was relatively heterogeneous. Indeed, seven 
differing categories of rationale were specified. Nevertheless, the modal category, given 
as the primary rationale by 40% of respondents was the Greater potential of oil/gas 
areas abroad. Each of the companies specifying this rationale was found to have made 
its first move abroad into countries such as Russia, Romania, Tanzania, and Papua New 
Guinea. These match O’Connor’s (2000) ‘non-traditional petroleum countries’ definition 
(see Section 3.4). Similar to Maponga and Maxwell’s (2000, p.208) conclusions for the 
internationalisation of‘Junior’1 Australian mineral companies, where ‘virgin’1 2 countries 
were targeted first, several British Independents likewise first targeted ‘non-traditional’, 
under-explored overseas areas. The perceived exploration potential of foreign countries 
most frequently stimulated Independents to initiate a move abroad.
Beyond this primary rationale, the factor noted by 60% of Independents (6/10) to be a 
complementary element influencing the overall decision to undertake activities in a 
second country (Fig 5.6.1), was the desire to Diversify the portfolio. Understanding why 
this factor was so often referenced may be explained by examining Markowitz’s (1970) 
theory of portfolio diversification. In analysing the process of portfolio selection, 
Markowitz focused attention upon the importance of covariance; the property of two 
events varying concomitantly. Markowitz found that the most efficient composite effect 
of risk and return is achieved by combining assets whose yields are not positively 
correlated. The ideal portfolio consists of assets whose yields are inversely correlated. 
Within the petroleum industry (Section 3.4), the balancing of differing risk categories 
within a portfolio is recommended (Bauquis, 2000; Foss, 2000). This recommendation 
may be interpreted as founded on the principles that Markowitz determined. To
1 Similar to the distinction made between ‘Majors’ and ‘Independents’ within the petroleum industry, for 
the mining industry the equivalent terminology is that of‘Seniors’ and ‘Juniors’.
2 Akin to O’Connor’s (2000) non-traditional petroleum countries, Maponga and Maxwell’s (2000, p.208) 
‘virgin countries’ are those ‘geologically prospective regions with more friendly operating environments 
than one or two decades ago’.
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demonstrate how diversification can reduce risk for a given return, Barry (1993) usefully 
applies Markowitz’s theory to a simple two-prospect, petroleum licence portfolio. The 
results generated demonstrate the importance of managing covariance within any 
portfolio of licences. An adapted version of Barry’s (1993) two-prospect scenario is 
related below.
An Independent exploration company is considering two licence prospects, A and B. 
Interpretation of seismic data reveals each prospect to hold differing probability density 
functions (Fig 6.4.1-2). Prospect A has a dry-hole probability of 60%, whilst riskier 
prospect B, has a dry-hole probability of 70%. Nevertheless, both prospects have the 
same expected monetary value (Table 6.4.1). The Independent has the choice of whether 
to invest solely in one of the prospects, or apportion its investment between them.
Two Prospect Portfolio - Calculating the Expected Value
Prospect Probability of 
Success
Mean Value 
(MMBOE)
Expected Value (EV) = 
Probability of Success * 
Mean Value 
(MMBOE)
(7
Standard Deviation 
about the Mean Value
A 0.6 50 30 30
B 0.3 100 30 50
Table 6.4.1
Beyond Prospects A and B’s differing probabilities of a successful find, the possible 
ultimate reserve size of a find is found to vary for each prospect. Prospect A has a 
smaller range of possible reserves (cr == 30 MMBOE) (Fig 6.4.1) relative to Prospect B 
(cr= 50 MMBOE) (Fig 6.4.2).
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Assumed to be risk averse, the Independent must choose the best course of action to 
minimise the risk of deviation from the expected value of 30 MMBOE that the 
Independent seeks. For this to be achieved, the combined c of Prospect A and Prospect
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B should be minimised3. Summing a 50/50 mix of Prospect A and Prospect B, an 
expected value of 30 MMBOE is derived (Table 7.1.2). However, whilst the two 
Prospects’ expected values may be summed, their standard, deviations cannot. Instead
the variances, the squared standard deviations (a2), must be added together with the
covariances:
Variance ofA + B = Variance ofA + Variance ofB + 2 x covariance between A & B (1)
Two Prospect Portfolio - Expected Values & Standard Deviations
Prospect Expected Value = 
Probability of Success * 
Mean Value 
(MMBOE)
O'
Standard Deviation 
about the Mean Value
A 30 30
B 30 50
50/50 Mix of A&B 30 ?
Table 6.4,2
Since COVab is the covariance and A x B are the respective means.
i=N
cov,„ = 
Z^ 4x B,
AxB (2)
N
Expressing the covariance relative to the (geometric) average of the variances of A and B
gives:
Correlation Coefficient = Rab = coyAB
JvARa xVAR, (3)
Or alternatively:
COVAlJ^ RAlixaAxaSi (4)
Substituting this into (1) gives:
VARa+b - VARa + V^Rb + 2 x Rab x aA x aB (5)
Letting Mbe a portfolio of A and B, with a fraction f of Prospect B and (1-f) of Prospect 
A, so in all cases we are talking about a portfolio comprising one net-interest prospect. 
(<tm)2 = ([1-/] x o-A)2 + (" xt B)2 + 2 x RAb x ([1-/] x < A) x (f x c b) (6)
Equation (5) is plotted on Fig 7.4.3.
3 A 100% holding in Prospect A is not a solution; with (7 = 30, there is the possibility that even if 
exploration is successful only 20 MMBOE of reserves will be found.
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Risk Profile for Two-Prospect Portfolio
Analysis of this chart reveals that anything less than perfect positive correlation 
(correlation co-efficient R = 1) between prospects A and B can potentially reduce risk4. 
If R = 0, a portfolio consisting of 73.5% of A and 26.5% of B would confer minimum 
risk — a standard deviation of 25.7 million barrels. The ideal scenario R = -1, is also 
displayed, but as Barry (1993, p.l51) reports ‘perfectly negatively correlated exploration 
prospects don’t exist in real life’.
Although the covariance of Prospect A relative to Prospect B, in Barry’s (1993) example, is measured 
with respect to technical risk (drilling success), the covariance of Prospect A relative to Prospect B could 
be measured with respect also to political risk or security. For example, let us consider only security risk. 
Prospect C is situated in a Western country with a stable democracy and resolute internal sovereignty. 
Prospect D is situated in a Non-Western country which habitually suffers from insurgency. This 
insurgency has occasionally affected the drilling activity being undertaken on Prospect B. Work has been 
halted in the past until the security situation stabilises. Comparison of the monthly hours of activity able to 
be undertaken on each prospect over the last 3 years, would enable a covariance measure to be calculated.
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Moving from a two prospect portfolio to a multi-prospect portfolio the following 
equation (6) can be generalised forN prospects:
N NN
(^/“E (Zx°'i)2+2xS E /,xJ\xR!,xa:xa. (6)
/=i i=1 j=\
for j < i
Assuming each of the N prospects is similar to Prospect A, with an Expected Value of 30
MMBOE and Standard Deviation of 30 MMBOE, then iso-correlation curves may be
plotted for a multi-prospect portfolio, as in Fig 6.4.4.
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As the graph displays (Fig 6.4.4), the first moves to diversify are those that have the most 
significant proportionate impact upon overall risk. The first few additional prospects 
added to the portfolio, rapidly cause risk to be reduced. The objective of reducing risk in 
this manner may explain why Portfolio diversification is the most frequently noted 
rationale for an Independent’s first internationalising move.
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An additional, contributory rationale given for the British Independents’ first 
internationalising move was to Utilise existing contacts (Fig 5.6.2). The Utilisation of 
existing contacts was mentioned by 40% of Independents (4/10). For example, 
Independent E reported its first overseas move into Country X was as a result of the 
Chairman’s historic ties to Country X. It was revealed that the present Chairman had 
emigrated to a Western state, following the murder of his father, who had been a political 
opponent of Country X’s oppressive Communist leader. In later years, with the existing 
Communist leader overthrown. Country X moved towards a capitalist system. Having 
established an Independent E&P company in another Post-Communist state, the 
Chairman sought to return to Country X where, it was reported, “within the 
establishment” he “knew a lot of people in a lot places there”. Utilisation of contacts was 
a key stimulus to this first internationalising move.
Comparing the above three factors, to the most significant factors unveiled in Landeau’s 
(1977) study (see Section 3.4.2) only the Greater potential of oil/gas areas abroad was 
specified in both studies. Clearly, a different set of factors stimulated British 
Independents to first internationalise than was present for US Independents. Part of the 
explanation for this difference may be because the majority of British Independents were 
‘Born Foreign’ (see Section 5.6.4). From start-up several British Independents were 
located in a comparative^ High Return area with Low finding costs, therefore their 
move into a second country was stimulated by other reasons, such as Portfolio 
Diversification and Utilisation of Existing Contacts.
The primary rationale given for an Independent’s first overseas expansion (Table 5.6.3) 
was found to differ from the current rationale of seeking to increase the extent of its 
international operations (Table 5.6.4). The main reason for the difference seems to lie in 
the Company’s oil/gas reserves expansion. This reason is found to be of minimal 
significance to an Independent’s first move abroad, and was only specified by 10% of
5 Compared to the US, which has the lowest average number of discoveries per exploration well in the 
world (Masseron, 1990, p. 18), countries such as Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Russia, Senegal are High Return, 
Low finding cost areas.
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Independents (1/10). Yet it is a key stimulus to current intentions to increase their 
international operations, as specified by 42% of Independents (5/12). The cause of this 
differential might be that Independents had few reserves when they first moved overseas. 
The reason why the first international move by Independents was not stimulated by the 
need to expand reserves may have been simply because the companies were still in the 
process of establishing initial reserve bases. They may not have had reserves to expand 
upon.
The prominent status that Company’s oil/gas reserves expansion receives as a key 
rationale for Independents currently seeking to increase their international operations, 
demonstrates their commitment to company net asset growth. As reported in Section 
3.4.2, investor valuation of Independents is focused upon reserves and reserves' growth 
(Bauquis, 2000; Antill and Arnott, 2000; Rose and Wilders, 2003). The Independents' 
emphasis on this rationale for further internationalisation, demonstrates an awareness and 
commitment to share-price performance.
Similar to results for the Independents' first international expansion, a further primary 
rationale for Independents currently seeking to increase their international operations 
was the Greater potential of oil/gas areas abroad (Table 5.6.4). This factor was selected 
by 30% of the Independents (4/12). The perceived under-explored potential of particular 
countries (O'Connor, 2000) clearly acts as an attractor for further international 
expansion.
1n summary, the three most frequently given reasons by British (Fig 5.6.2) Independents 
for currently seeking to increase their international operations are:
i) Company’s oil/gas reserves expansion.
ii) Greater potential of oil/gas areas abroad
iii) Portfolio diversification
Thus, the strong objective among Independents to increase their international operations
(12/14) is founded upon the desire to target under-explored areas, mitigate risk, through
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diversification and most importantly boost company share-price through an expanded 
reserve base.
6.4.2 The Non-International
Only Independents, D and F, were found never to have internationalised their operations.
Geographical focus was the rationale given by both firms for not seeking to expand 
abroad. Independent D was more internationally orientated than F, and plans had been 
drawn up for the company to expand overseas within the next five years. Further 
probing, on why Independent F did not strive to expand overseas, provided responses 
which were supportive of Hymer’s (1976) ‘liability of foreignness’ thesis. Hymer (1976, 
p.34) reasoned that the differences between markets meant the knowledge and 
capabilities developed by a firm within in its own domestic markets were not necessarily 
applicable to a new foreign market. Instead, new knowledge and capabilities must be 
acquired or developed. He proposed that foreign entrants into another market may face 
additional costs, not borne by indigenous competitors. For Independent F, these costs 
were “administrative”. Eight years earlier, the firm had attempted to internationalise into 
a foreign country, geographically close to its existing domestic operations. However, it 
had found the burden of a foreign language, as well as a differing tax system, to be overly 
cumbersome. Although the ‘liability of foreignness’ may be supported for this 
Independent, in aggregate, the high levels of international activity undertaken by the 
British Independents (17/21), would suggest the ‘liability of foreignness’ does not always 
hold for all firms. Hymer (1976, p. 12) also incorporated the idea that, under certain 
circumstances, there may be advantages to ‘foreignness’. For example, a foreign firm 
may have access to, or possession of resources unavailable to domestic firms. Hymer 
regarded this as being a possible scenario for companies of more advanced nations which 
were investing in less advanced ones. Should the company from the advanced nation 
have access to greater experience, finance, skilled personnel and technology than the 
domestic firm, then the foreign firm would possess a comparative advantage. Such 
comparative advantage might explain why the majority of British Independents 
undertook their activities outside of the UKCS. For example. Independent J 
acknowledged that it would only consider areas where it held a “competitive advantage”
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relative to others. The firm did hold activities in its “own backyard”, the UKCS, because 
each current member of their management team had at least 20 years of knowledge and 
experience of working in the North Sea. However, when the company sought licences 
abroad, it would only consider “new areas”6 7, those where “everyone [all the competition] 
has little knowledge”. It was in these new area6 that the firm could and would 
“compete”. The “Gulf of Mexico” and other “established areas” which “everybody 
knows about”, were to be avoided.
Returning to Independent F, part of the reason why internationalisation may not have 
occurred for this firm may also be a product of the knowledge possessed, and experience 
gained, by the founding Chief Executive Officer (CEO). With a background in 
investment management, this CEO was not typical of most Independents’ leaders who 
had worked for international petroleum companies prior to joining or founding their own 
or another Independent. The lack of international experience of this CEO may partly 
explain the company’s rationale for having never expanded overseas. The investigation 
of Manolova et al. (2002) into 121 small industrial technology firms, revealed a positive 
and significant relationship between the owner/manager’s international business skills 
and small firm internationalisation (p < 0.001). Their findings indicated that 
owners/founders of small firms were likely to draw on their international skills, 
competencies and experience when internationalising. The existing international 
business skills of the top manager were strong determinants of whether or not a firm 
would internationalise. Manolova et al. (2002) found strong support for a resource-based 
view of the firm, with respect to the internationalisation of small firms. Further 
corroboration of their resource-based reasoning is provided by our North American 
results. One of the rationales given, by 60% of the North American Independents (3/5), 
for not seeking to increase their international operations outside of North America, was 
because such a venture was Beyond staffs ’ experience.
6 The countries into which the firm had invested fitted O’Connor’s (2000) non-traditional definition.
7 Independents B, C, D, E, G, I, J, K, L, M, N all possessed CEO’s with international experience.
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From the above, it may be inferred that those companies which do not internationalise 
choose to do so out of resource weakness, rather than strength. For example, whilst it 
does appear that Independent F has not expanded abroad, because of its management’s 
lack of experience in the international petroleum field, this does not necessarily imply the 
company is competitively weaker. Indeed, its focus upon one market may be its source 
of advantage within that market. Nachum (2003), when discussing the performance of 
internationalising firms, expresses the importance of maintaining balance. Hymer’s 
(1976) thesis recognised both the strengths and weaknesses of foreign entrants vis-a-vis 
local competitors. Developing this argument, Nachum (2003) explicitly presents the 
notion of substitution between advantages and costs in determining the performance of 
internationalising enterprises. The formal presentation of her reasoning is as follows:
Where P, is the performance of foreign firm /, and X, ; C, represent vectors of advantages 
and costs, respectively. Applying Porter’s (1985) theory of focus to the above expression 
may justify a geographically focused strategy. Porter reasons that focus can confer 
competitive advantage by being cost reducing (Porter, 1985). The additional costs such 
as ‘discrimination by government, by consumers, and by suppliers’ (Hymer, 1976, p35), 
as faced by foreign entrants, should be greatly minimised by the geographically focused 
firm. With Geographical focus being the most frequently referenced rationale by both 
British (2/2) and North American Independents (5/6), for not seeking to increase their 
international operations, the importance of this factor must be acknowledged. As 
Independent F reported, a further reason for not international ising was to “exploit the 
goodwill we have created in Country Y, and build on our strong track record”. Such cost 
advantages of the geographically focused firm may place it in a strong competitive 
position, relative to the foreign entrant.
6,4.3 Mode of Entry
For 70% of responding Independents (7/10), their first licence abroad was undertaken as 
Operator (Section 5.6.3). This contrasts with our adaptation of the Uppsala model 
(Section 3.4.3), that would predict an Independent’s first licence holding abroad to be 
most likely undertaken as Non-Operator. To be Operator, and direct the activity
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undertaken on a particular licence, requires a greater commitment of a firm’s human 
capital resources than when holding the position of Non-Operator (Section 3.4.3). The 
Uppsala model predicts that a firm will enter new markets in an incremental manner; 
minimal resources are committed initially, but with time more resources are 
progressively applied8 9. The reason given by most Independents (3/5) for choosing to be 
Operator related to control. As Independent B commented on why control was 
important, it is “hard to add value as Non-Operator, invested in someone else’s ability.” 
Independent M reported they were “Operator from the beginning because they needed to 
control time and spending”. This position suggests, that whilst Operating does require 
more resources, the control confers benefit. The interviewee went on to state, that “if 
[they] hadn’t controlled, [they] would never have got to development and production”. 
Although Operating does require more resources, it appears Independents perceive the 
control-benefits conferred in proposing and directing a work programme, off-sets the 
additional resource costs. When Operator, an Independent has control over 
implementation of the project’s schedule - they can direct actions to be taken as and 
when it is most suitable to their company8. The desire for control as Operator may also 
be generated out of necessity. As Independent M reported, had they not Operated, the 
project would not have been implemented. Their idea and/or commitment to undertake 
the particular project was unique to their company. This response is similar to 
Independent A’s reasoning for taking the role of Operator. Being the first entrant into 
Country Z, the Non-Operator option was not available to Independent A. If their drilling 
ideas were to be executed, then they would have to implement them. Although, this 
concept of Operatorship through necessity appears fruitful, no interviewee expressed 
unwillingness towards taking on the responsibility of Operator. Whilst industry literature 
as to why companies seek Operatorship is sometimes simplistic, ‘Operating is fun’ 
(Barry,1993, p.5), the current research reveals the predominant reason is control.
8 In the Uppsala model, this meant a firm would first export to a new country before the more resource 
intensive move of FDI was enacted. FDI, for example, would involve the setting up of a production plant in 
the new country.9 For example, authority over the project schedule will enable a company to tailor the timing and size of 
cash input requirements in a manner that may be more convenient to their finance programme.
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Independents when first internationalising wished to maximise control of their FDI 
activities.
6.4.4 Choice of Country
A resource-based concept of internationalisation, akin to that formulated by the Uppsala
School® (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) (Section 
3.4) was found to be the most frequent primary rationale given by Independents for 
choice of country (Fig 5.6.6-7). Twenty-four percent of the countries in which 
Independents held activities were chosen, because the Independent already possessed the 
necessary Knowledge/Experience. As clarified in Section 6.6, the Knowledge / 
Experience category could include the following responses: that the firm's managerial 
personnel had knowledge / experience of working in the country before; that the geology 
was similar to, or a spatial extension of, the geological basin with which the firm was 
familiar; or finally, that the specialist techniques required of the asset were similar to 
what the firm had implemented elsewhere. The geographic expansion followed by 
Independents often appears to seek those countries where existing knowledge and 
experience can be applied best. As Zahra et al (2000) report, geographic expansion may 
be used as a method of applying existing core competencies across a broader set of 
markets. For 24% of the countries chosen by Independents, this is found to be 
applicable.
The next most important primary reason for country choice, was a country having been 
Under-explored (Fig 5.6.6). Once more, most of the countries for which an Under­
explored answer was specified11, corresponded with O'Connor's (2000) non-traditional 
petroleum areas. Fifteen percent of the countries in which Independents held activities 
were chosen because the countries were considered Under-explored. British 10 *
10 The Uppsala School found internationalising exporting firms to target those countries most akin to the 
markets they already served. The rationale supporting this finding, was that firm’s tended to leverage their 
existing knowledge and experience when choosing particular countries. As Anderson (1993, p.211) 
reports, in the Uppsala model the ‘outcome of one cycle of events constitutes the input to the next’. A 
firm’s existing knowledge about markets and operations determines the path of the next international move.
' 1 Countries specified as Under-explored by Independents included: Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, 
Mauritania, Montenegro, Myanmar and Pakistan.
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Independents appear to have a propensity for undertaking activity in the non-traditional
petroleum areas.
An additional primary reason specified for choice of country was Opportunistic' a 
suitable deal opportunity suddenly arose, to which the Independent reacted. Fourteen
percent of countries were chosen by Independents for this reason (Fig 5.6.5). The 
Independent had not specifically been seeking to do business in that particular country, 
but on becoming aware of a particular opportunity, moved rapidly to seize it12. Measured 
along this dimension, Independents displayed an entrepreneurial flair, for they appeared 
to exemplify Kirzner’s (1973, p.34) ‘alertness’ to new opportunities. Cross-referencing 
with our results for decision-making speed (Table 5.3.1), the process of securing new 
licences (Business Development), was stated as the area where Independents’ decisions 
were made most rapidly. Chen and Hambrick’s (1995) research would support this 
finding. Comparing the competitive behaviour of smaller firms to larger, they found 
small firms implemented their competitive actions more quickly. As Pech and Durden 
(2003) reported, decision-making speed can confer the ability to out-manoeuvre the 
competition, regardless of its scale. The ability of Independents to rapidly seize new 
asset opportunities may be a source of strength that works to the Independents’ 
advantage.
Having identified Existing Knowledge / Experience, Under-explored potential, and Deal 
Opportunity to be the most frequent primary rationales given by Independents for 
country choice, it must be recognised also that several alternative rationales were given. 
Displayed in Fig 5.6.5, the wide range of other reasons offered demonstrates the 
multiplicity of factors that influence country choice. Nevertheless, the above three are
12 For example: Independent C recollected that its move into a Post-Soviet Country A, was purely 
stimulated by chance. During casual conversation with an agent assisting them in a take-over bid, the agent 
made reference to a group of businessmen from Country A who were looking for a Western public 
company in which they could invest. In return, they would use their connections to “put things on [the 
appropriate officials’] desks”. “They would put money in [into Independent C] and introduce us to deals in 
Country A”. Another example was given by Independent L, in their recognition of a “market opportunity”. 
An asset for sale in Country B, was mainly recognised for its oil, and gas was currently flared off.
Differing from the common perception, Independent L valued the asset in terms of gas not oil. “Nobody 
realised the gas had value”, [so we seized the] “opportunity”.
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representative of the most common rationale given by Independents for country choice, 
and are therefore deliberately highlighted.
6.4.5 Born Foreign
The majority of Independents were ‘born foreign’ (Table 5.6.7). For example, the
company’s headquarters might be in the UK, but its first active interests might be in a 
foreign country. Independents were not found to adhere to the ‘born global’ terminology 
of Bell et al (2004) (Section 3.4.5), which would require a company, from its birth, to 
start with interests in several countries, almost simultaneously.
The foreign orientation of British Independents (Table 5.6.6) contrasts with the 
orientation of the North American Independents (Table 5.6.7). Apart from Edinburgh 
Oil and Gas, all British Independents were engaged in overseas E&P activity. Most were 
also international, 76% (16/21), holding licences in two or more countries. In contrast, 
only 44% (24/55) of North American Independents had activities outside of North 
America. For the British Independents, international activity is not associated with firm 
size. Both small and large British Independents are international in their activities (Table 
5.6.6)8. North American Independents differ. For them, size of firm is associated with 
the propensity to undertake international activities (Table 5.6.7). Most of the smaller 
North American Independents, those that are similar in size to British Independents, did 
not have activities outside of North America. Results show that British Independents are 
more international in their orientation, compared to North American Independents of 
equivalent size. The recent switch of the now British registered Global Energy 
Development Corporation, from its previous New York Stock Exchange Listing, is 
testament to the international orientation of Independents quoted on the London Stock 
Exchange. Global Energy reported the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the 
London Stock Exchange as having been chosen for ‘its receptiveness to internationally 
focused companies with potential for growth.’ (Annual Report, 2002, p.l).
13 A propensity to internationalise may be an emerging characteristic of the British petroleum industry. 
Thus, Keogh et al (1998) report the growing tendency of UK petroleum technology service firms to seek 
expansion abroad.
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The international orientation of British Independents of all sizes does not accord with 
existing empirical studies of FDI. Most research shows that the incidence of an
international move to undertake FDI abroad is positively associated with firm size (Yu 
and Ito, 1988; Baird et al, 1997; Kuo and Li, 2003). As Baird et al (1997) reported, for 
their study of 160 Indiana SME's, firms with an international strategy were significantly 
larger than non-intemationally orientated firms. In contrast to the British Independents, 
the North American Independent population does appear to support this traditional 
positive association between firm size and internationalisation. Cross-tabulation results 
show that the majority of large North American Independents ( > £1000m market 
capitalisation) do undertake international activities, whilst the majority of small North 
American Independents ( < £1000m market capitalisation) undertake only domestic 
activities (Table 6.6.7). Similar to Maponga and Maxwell’s (2000) findings for the 
increasing internationalisation of ‘Junior’ Australian mining companies, British 
Independents are now mainly internationally orientated"4. With recent research 
emphasising the importance of SMEs as a vector of Foreign Direct Investment (Oviatt 
and McDougall, 1997; Reynolds 1997; Urata and Kawai, 2000), British Independents 
should be regarded as part of the vanguard.
6.4.6 Business Model
Analysis of the population of British Independents reveals two distinctive polarities 
between which the Independents' business models tend to lie. The opposing polarities, 
as displayed in the spectrum diagram of Fig 6.4.5, are geographic focus and geographic 
diversification.
Country
Mature
Asset Regionahy SmSll Medium Large Portfolio
Focus Focused
1 1
Specialists Focused
1
Diversified
1
Divissified D^D■ivi^k-f
1
Approaah Djvei^fication 
1I 1 1 1 1 1
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ►
Increasing No. of Countries in which
Interests are held Fig 6.4.5
14 During the 1970’s the majority of the LSE listed British Independents were mainly focused upon the 
North Sea. Such companies included Aran Energy, Cluff Oil, Clyde Petroleum, Floyd Oil, GOAL, 
LASMO, Marinex Petroleum, Piet Petroleum, Premier Oil (Davis, 1981).
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Examination of the set of business models identified in Section 5.6, reveals each model to 
lie within the spectrum between these two polar points (Fig 6.4.5). A positioning 
orientated towards either node has associated strengths. Thus, geographic diversification 
can reduce the covariance of assets (Markowitz, 1970; Vickers, 1987), whilst geographic 
focus (Hymer, 1976; Porter, 1985) can confer competitive advantage through cost 
reduction (see Section 6.4.2 above). The consistent share price rises of both Portfolio 
diversified Paladin Resources (FT, 2004a) and Country Focused Edinburgh Oil and Gas 
(FT, 2004b) over the last four years, suggests that either orientation can be rewarding15.
Geographical focus versus geographical diversification may be considered as 
approximating to the internationalisation patterns of ‘Deepening’ and ‘Widening’ 
respectively, which were identified by Ietto-Gillies (1996) for UK firms. As Ietto-Gillies 
(1996) found, the ‘Deepening’ pattern occurred when a company continued to become 
more involved, in the same group of countries in which it already operated. By contrast, a 
‘Widening’ pattern was displayed when companies continued to spread their activities 
out over more and more countries. Within our population of British Independents, both 
patterns may be identified among the various business models. Among those business 
models characterised by a geographically focused strategy, such as Country Focused, 
Mature Asset Specialists, and Regionally Focused, the process of ‘Deepening’ may be 
detected for their relevant Independents. For example, ‘Deepening’ is illustrated by 
Sibir’s sale of its remaining UK and Italian assets in July 2001, which enabled the 
company to achieve its ‘goal to be solely focused on Russia’ (Annual Report, 2001, p.3). 
Further, Venture Production illustrates ‘Deepening’ by its growing commitment to the 
North Sea, with a further five asset acquisitions being made there in 2003 (Annual 
Report, 2003, p.4). Finally, Cairn Energy also illustrates ‘Deepening’. Its 2003 ‘disposal 
of non-core North Sea interests’ is because its new ‘core area of focus is South Asia’ 
(Annual Report, 2003, p.4). At the other end of the spectrum are those business models 
that imply more geographic diversification. For the constituent companies of these
15 This statement does not imply factors, other than international strategy, are not of influence. A reported 
strength of Paladin Resources, often detailed by investment analysts, is the ability of the company’s 
management at ‘valuing deals’ (Rose and Wilders, 2003, p. 17).
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models, a widening strategy may be observed. For example, Tullow’s operations, in the 
context of a range of emerging international prospects forecast for 2003, have been 
described as follows: ‘Business development and the acquisition of new interests have 
always been central to Tullow’s growth strategy.’ (Annual Report, 2002, p.4-)®. 
Similarly, Premier Oil, in the context of its ‘worldwide licence interests’ reported that 
‘Exploration new ventures have commenced in North East India and Gabon in 2002, 
continuing the regeneration and replenishment of Premier’s exploration portfolio’ 
(Annual Report, 2002, p. 10)n. A final illustration would be the wide scope of Soco 
International’s ‘portfolio of oil and gas assets’. Its ‘core areas’ now include the Far East, 
North Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. In summary, letto-Gillies’ (1996) 
identification of ‘Deepening’ versus ‘Widening’ internationalisation patterns appears to 
support the Geographical Focus versus Geographical Diversification approaches, 
respectively, exhibited in the business models of British Independents (Fig 6.4.4).
Although there is empirical support for most of the business models, on closer 
examination the dichotomy between ‘Deepening’ and ‘Widening’ is not evident for the 
Portfolio Approach business model. Independents within this category take a middle- 
ground. Whilst widening the international spread of their Non-Operated activities, they 
deepen their Operated commitment in only a few countries. Thus, Sterling, Dana, and 
Paladin only Operate licences in a total of 1, 3, and 2 countries respectively (Table 
5.6.14). As the DTI’s 22nd Licensing Round revealed (15dl September 2004), Sterling 
Resources continues to deepen its commitment to the UKCS; Sterling gained a further 6 
licences as Operator.
6.4.7 “Basket-case Countries” - A grain of truth?
Analysis of the countries in which Independents hold licences reveals a number of 
Independents to be more strongly orientated towards certain countries that are
16 Tullow’s date of incorporation (establishment) being in 1985, and Cairn Energy’s in 1986, show that, 
despite the two firms’ similar temporal origins, their internationalisation strategies followed differing paths. 
Cairn ‘deepened’ its commitment to India and Bangladesh; whereas Tullow continues to ‘widen’ its 
international operation.
17 Examination of Premier Oil’s 2001 annual report reveals that neither country featured in its portlTolio the 
previous year.
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characterised by relatively high political and/or security risks. In this respect, some 
Independents do target the “Basket-case” countries upon which Analyst A reported. 
Existing research demonstrates that both corruption and political instability within a 
country are negatively associated with foreign direct investment (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 
2000). Applying this finding to petroleum licensing, the greater the corruption and 
political instability within a country, the lesser competition there will be for licences. 
Closer examination of previous choice of country results reveals that 14% of the 
countries (9/64), in which Independents held interests, were partly chosen because of the 
Low Competition for licences (Fig 5.6.7). Countries included within this list were also 
shown to score poorly on both corruption and political stability indices (Table 5.6.16). 
Although the majority of Independents were shown to be working in some corrupt and 
politically unstable countries (Section 5.6.7), a few Independents are distinctive in that 
they are mainly active in such countries (Table 5.6.15). Included in this group are Sibir, 
Regal, Premier Oil, Emerald, Global Energy, Tullow and Soco International. As an 
interviewee from Independent L, one of this group stated, “Our company is less risk 
averse than some Majors”. This firm was more “happy with security risk” than others. 
The interviewee reported that, in the case of one country they had entered, the British 
Government told the firm to leave, but “We said, ‘No’”. He continued: “If you want to 
find something big, you have to go where no one has dared go before.” Independent E, 
another constituent of this grouping, related that competition in Country Z, was “still 
very low due to political risk, therefore not many are interested”. Such responses, 
together with the index findings (Table 5.6.15), show certain Independents to be more 
orientated towards high political/security risk countries than others. These findings 
corroborate those of Delios and Heinsz (2003). Examining the international expansions 
of 665 Japanese manufacturing firms, they found firms with extensive experience in 
politically hazardous countries had a 58.5% greater probability of entering another 
hazardous country, than a firm with no experience in hazardous countries. With certain 
Independents, there appears to be an active willingness to engage in countries with 
political risks. Although not the focus of Maponga and Maxwell's (2000, p.203) study, 
they similarly note many ‘Juniors to have opened new frontiers ignored by large 
companies' because of their ‘political and social risk'. The incidence of some smaller
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mineral and petroleum based resource companies, actively targeting countries of higher 
political and/or security risk, for reasons of lower competition, may have general 
application.
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7. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
7.1 Introduction
Set within the growing field of SME research, this thesis has explored the organizational 
strengths and competitive strategies exhibited by British Independent Petroleum 
Exploration and Production companies. This research topic was developed along four
principal channels of inquiry: 1) Strategic Decision-making Speed and Rapidity of Action 
2) Utiliso^tion of fSc^r^trr^c^tc^rs 3) Negotiation 4) Ir^te^rr^n^tic^r^n^l Strategy IT'h? mam findings 
of the research are founded on novel data (both quantitative and qualitative), gathered by 
the author through a series of semi-structured face-to-face intevviews with fourteen 
Independents and seven international drilling contractors.
7.2 Strengths
According to untested industry wisdom, Independents were thought to be faster in their 
decision-making speed than Majors (HCSC, 1988a, p.viii; Section 1.2). The present 
research supports this claim (Section 6.1.1.1.). The difference in decision speed between 
Independent and Major may partly be attributed to the difference in firm size. Inspection 
of the Independent sample reveals, smaller Independents to make faster decisions than 
larger Independents (Section 6.1.1.2). These findings correspond with Wally and 
Baum’s (1994) research, where larger manufacturing firm size was correlated with 
slower decision speed. In our study a range of structural variables were recognised as 
potential influences upon decision-making speed (Section 6.1.1.!.). These included: 
Centralization (concentrated decision-making authority), Vertical Specialization, 
Formalization, Horizontal Specialization, Spatial Proximity, Focus, and the Spectrum of 
Consultation. Specific investigation of the latter influence, suggested support of 
Hypothesis 3(a) (Section 3.1.2), that the greater the number of personnel consulted to 
enact a given decision, the longer will be the time taken to choose a course of action 
(Section 6.1.1.3.). Furthermore, firm size was significantly correlated with the spectrum 
of consultation; the larger the firm, the more personnel were consulted for a given 
decision (Section 6.1.1.3). These results suggest, that the reduced division of labour (and 
hence the greater requirement for flexibility) among firms of smaller size (Reid, 1989; 
Bernadette, 2004) may augment their strategic decision-making speed. Whilst the
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division of labour is associated with processing efficiencies for standard, routine tasks, 
this may not hold for non-routine, strategic decisions. Decisions of such magnitude 
require the simultaneous assimilation and assessment of all the necessary information. 
In a small firm, with the required information being held, by fewer persons, it can be 
gathered and assimilated more quickly. As Williamson (1996; 1967) reasons, small firms 
having fewer tiers of hierarchy are less likely to suffer from transmission distortion 
(Bartlett, 1932). Thus, an organizational strength of the small firm is its ability to make 
rapid decisions.
A further organizational strength of the Independent was their less formalized approach 
to business deals. Independents were reported to display more relationship-based, rather 
than formalized, business procedures (Section 5.3.1, 5.5.3). The power of relationship 
upon negotiating scenarios has been recognised by previous research (Sondak, et al, 
1999; Halpern, 1994). Indeed, Greenhalgh and Chapman (1998) show it to be associated 
with joint negotiating gain. Various Independents flagged their ability to develop 
relationships, as one of their key strengths when applying for exploration licences in 
Non-Western countries (Section 5.5.3). This strength fits the operating disposition of 
Non-Western government bureaucracies (Peters, 2001; Ye, 2003; Dimitrov, 2003), where 
licensing authority selection procedures were found to be more relationship than formally 
based (Section 5.5.3). Although as previously discussed (Section 6.3.4), Seniority of 
company representatives and their authority to commit will likely augment relationship 
development, the ultimate source of this relationship based approach, we argue, is 
derived from the organizational properties of the Independent firm. With fewer tiers of 
management in the smaller firm (Mintzberg, 1981), the principle-agent problem of 
information asymmetries between high echelon Directors and lower echelon workers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is likely to be reduced. The monitoring cost incurred by 
Directors (principals) for determining what workers (agents) are doing, is mitigated 
because of two factors. Firstly, transmission distortion is reduced (Bartlett, 1932) 
because information passes through fewer managerial layers before reaching Directors. 
Secondly, agents are strongly motivated to perform. As an interviewee from Independent 
E acknowledged: “I know what I do makes a difference to the company...very small
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difference between daily work and company performance.” These above properties 
reduce the need for formalized monitoring mechanisms in small firms. Indeed, ‘formal
controls are discouraged' and a more personal element prevails (Mintzberg, 1989, p.l 17). 
Our results show that this less formalized approach to internal organization is replicated 
in the approach adopted with external parties; namely, Non-Western government 
licensing agencies and drilling contractors (Section 5.5.3 & 5.3.1).
The in-house functional strengths possessed by Independents were found to match three 
general areas of capability (Section 5.4.1.1). These are: (1) value generation through deal 
making and managerial co-ordination; (2) assessing petroleum/reservoir dynamics in 
order to locate and extract the petroleum; and (3) monitoring and controlling the 
execution of drilling/production work programmes. The internal capability of 
Independents is grounded in human, rather than physical capital. The co-ordinating role 
of the entrepreneur is fundamental to their functioning. Focused upon these three 
capabilities, Independents show close resemblance in their structure to that set out by 
Mintzberg’s (1989) Entrepreneurial Organization. Thus, emphasis is upon the co­
ordinating Strategic Apex (Capability 1) and essential work, that is undertaken by the 
Operating Core (Capabilities 2 & 3).
7.3 Organizational Weakness
Although the identification of Independents' organizational weaknesses was not an 
objective of this thesis, the frequency with which results indicated Independents to be 
financially constrained should be noted (Section 5.3.2., 5.3.3., 5.4.2.2, 6.1.2.1., 6.I.2.3., 
6.2.9). Our results for Independents confirm the finding of Michaelas et al (1999) that 
smaller firms face higher financial barriers. Indeed, this was a feature recognised 
indirectly by McKie (1960, p.552), when he detailed that Independents undertook less 
expensive exploration wells than Majors (see Section 2.1). One can argue that the 
financial constraint of Independents is a consequence of the limited asset base that they 
can use as collateral for lenders. With fewer assets, compared to larger companies. 
Independents are more prone to suffer from both Gambler's ruin (McCray, 1975; 
Newendorp, 1996) and Credit rationing (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1990).
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7.4 Competitive Strategies
Application of organizational strengths is recognised in the competitive strategies and 
actions exhibited by Independents. In accordance with McKie’s (1960, p.570) 
observation that Independents take advantage of ‘flexibility and speed in detecting and
seizing available opportunities’, it was in the process of securing new licences (Business 
Development) that British Independents were reported to make their decisions most 
rapidly (Section 5.3.1, 6.I.I.5.). Independents behave as in Kirzner’s (1973) description 
of alertness to new opportunities (Section 6.4.4), as they readily seize licensing ‘windows 
of opportunity’ (Wickham, 2001). The importance of speedy decisions and action as a 
competitive tool to outmanoeuvre larger firms (Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Pech and 
Durden, 2003) is similarly suggested by our results.
With the internal organization of Independents being potentially limited in their 
formalization, it is unsurprising that formalized incentivisation schemes were not 
resolutely present in the contracts they established with Drilling firms (Section 5.4.2.2). 
Several Independents (-40% of our sample) themselves bore the risk of costly over-runs 
and delays in work completion (Kemp and Stephen, 1997; 1999) by solely formulating 
non-incentivised day-rate contracts. For such companies, the prevalent opportunism of 
which Williamson (2002) warns is seemingly not always apparent. Our result accords 
with existing criticism of Williamson’s concept of opportunism (Kay, 1993; Casadesus- 
Masanell and Spulber, 2000), and further points towards the substance that Richardson’s 
(1972) co-operative, trust based framework holds for interpretation of contracts between 
firms (Section 6.2.9). If a balanced perspective is to be achieved, both Richardson’s and 
Williamson’s interpretative schemas are required in analysing contractual arrangements.
Independents’ strengths in the approach factors of Decision-making speed., Authority to 
commit / Seniority of personnel, and Establishment of relationships, appears to fit the 
licensing authority context of Non-Western countries, where approach factors are of 
greater influence (Section 6.3.4). With findings showing Independents to hold mainly 
Operated licences in Non-Western countries and Non-Operated licences in Western
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countries (Section 5.6.3), this thesis suggests that such a result may be the consequence 
of Independents successfully applying their strength in approach factors to the Non­
Western context. By targeting the relationship-based selection procedures of Non­
Western licensing authorities, Independents may be leveraging their strength in
relationships to secure the position of Operator.
The majority of Independents (16/21) are international in their activity. The initial 
rationale which stimulated such a strategy was found to be the product of a combination 
of factors namely: 1) the Greater under-explored potential of oil/gas areas abroad', 2) 
Portfolio diversification, and 3) Utilisation of existing contacts (Section 5.6.1, 6.4.1.). In 
contrast to the predictions of the Uppsala Model (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Johanson 
and Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975) (Section 3.4.4), most Independents (70%) entered their 
first country abroad playing the resource intensive role of Operator (Section 5.6.2, 6.4.3). 
The reason given for this choice was that Independents perceived there were control 
benefits conferred in proposing and directing a work programme, which had greater 
influence than additional human capital costs. Although deviating from Uppsala School 
predictions for Mode of Entry, Independents’ behaviour regarding Choice of Country 
does confirm with a resource-based concept of internationalisation (Section 3.4.3). The 
most common primary rationale for a country being chosen was because the Independent 
already possessed the relevant Knowledge/Experience (Section 5.6.3., 6.4.4.). Being 
small and of limited resources, several Independents, rather than venturing into wholly 
novel areas, followed an international strategy which built upon existing capabilities. For 
many Independents geographic expansion is used as a method to apply existing core 
competencies across a broader set of markets (Zahra et al, 2000).
In contrast to McKie’s (1960, p.570) comments that Independents ‘specialize in restricted 
areas which they can study intensively’, the analysis of British Independents reveals that 
international strategies of both Focus and Diversification are utilised (Section 5.6.5., 
6.4.6.). Similar to the internationalisation patterns identified by letto-Gillies (1996) for 
UK firms, some Independents display a ‘Deepening’ strategy, becoming more focused 
upon a particular country or set of countries, whilst other Independents display a
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‘Widening’ strategy, and continuously spread their activities over more countries. 
Deviation from McKie’s (1960) observations may be because his sample was based upon 
US Independents, not British. Our results show British Independents have a greater 
propensity to engage in international activities than North American Independents of 
equivalent size (Section 5.6.4.).
A further aspect identified by McKie (I960, p.570) which appears applicable to some of 
the competitive strategies adopted by British Independents, is that ‘Independents 
congregate in areas where the relative advantages of Major firms are weakest.’ Our 
results show certain Independents to specialise in high political/corruption risk countries, 
“where no one has dared go before” (Independent L). Both corruption and political 
instability within a country are negatively associated with foreign direct investment 
(Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000). Similar to Junior mineral companies (Maponga and Maxwell, 
2000), some Independents appear to strategically target countries avoided by larger 
competitors (Section 5.6.6.). Indeed, as Delios and Heinsz (2003) found for Japanese 
manufacturers, experience in politically hazardous countries augments the propensity to 
internationally expand into further hazardous countries. Risk management strategies as 
expressed by Independent a, may be the source of this experiential competence.
Neglected by academic research, British Independent exploration and production 
companies act as a novel vehicle for exploring the organizational strengths and 
competitive strategies that can be deployed by smaller firms. In an industry shrouded by 
secrecy (Stevens, 1995), this thesis has aimed to demonstrate the necessity of fieldwork 
to challenge existing data frontiers. Adhering to a prescriptive theoretical framework 
(Bazerman, 2005), this thesis has aimed to show what the small firm can, rather than 
cannot do. The identified organizational strengths and competitive strategies used by 
Independents are unlikely to be restricted to the petroleum industry. Further research is 
necessary to test whether they may be applied to other Small and Medium sized 
enterprises in differing industries.
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Appendix 1.2
INDEPENDENT A
1. Strategic Decision-Making
A. OPERATOR Last
1.1 Answer all questions for the case of operator Successful
(Or alternatively majority partner)
Name your last successful exploration drilling
[Pass respondent show card 1.1] Name 1
For the exploration undertaken please give the calendar dates
of the following actions (mm/yy) Datemm/yy
Licence block awarded..................................................................
Drilling of the first unsuccessful test well commenced...........
Drilling of the successful test well commenced........................
Production on-line .......................................................................
Number of appraisal wells............................................................
Offshore or Onshore (delete as appropriate).............................. Off / On
Water depth..................................................................................... mDepth of successful well ................................. m
To which State jurisdiction did the licence block pertain...........
What was this company’s % shareholding in the block.............. %
Please name below the % shareholdings of the other companies who held an interest in the block 
Last Successful
Name (PRINT) % Share
1.2
Following appraisal well drilling, for your last field development as operator, how long did it take to 
formulate the overall field development decision prior to submission for state approval?
1.3
[Pass respondent show card 1.3]
For this field development decision please estimate the % of your total time spent on the following 
activities:
%
Contracting negotiations _______
Raising financial capital _______
Reservoir studies _______
Sales arrangements _______
Other (please name) _______
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[Pass respondent show card 1.4]
B. NON-OPERATOR
1.4 Answeral lquestions forthecacaofnon-nperetot Last
(Or minority partner)
Name yosr last successful exploration drilling
For the exploration undertaken please give the calendar dates of 
the following actions (mm/yy)
Licence block awarded..................................................................
Drilling of the first unsuccessful test well commenced...........
Drilling of the successful test well commenced........................
Production on-line .......................................................................
SccocsrSul
Name 2
Date
mm/yy
Number of appraisal wells............................................................
Offshore or Onshore (delete as app’^ro^I'^<^teO..............................
Water depth.....................................................................................
Depth of successful well................................................................
To which State jurisdiction did the licence block pertain..........
What was this company's % shareholding in the block..............
Please name below the % shareholdings of the other companies who held an interest in the block 
Last Successful Name 2
Name (PRINT) % Share
Off / On
________ m
________ m
%
1.5
Have you been an employee of a Major or SuperMajor in the past? Major A
Comparing your experience in Major A to current Independent A. for which particular operations do you 
notice there to be a differential in the decision-making speed?
Probes:
- internal consultations
- negotiating contracts
- drilling schedule
- resolving operating difficulties
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1.6
[Pass respondent show card 1.6]
What factors stimulate your efforts most to reduce the time between award of licence and producing on­
line? Please rank in order of importance, 1= most important and 6 = least important. Rank all 
alternatives and do not use tied ranks. If ‘other’ detailed, rank from 1 to 7.
Rank
Cashflow............................... ...............
Competitive advantage........  ...............
Cost of capital....................... ...............
Government incentives........  ...............
Oil price expectations...........  ...............
Production targets................. .......................
other (please name).............. ...............
1.7
[Pass respondent show card 1.7]
What factors hold you up most between award of licence and first test well drilling? Please rank in order 
of importance, 1= most important and 6 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied 
ranks. If ‘other’ detailed, rank from 1 to 7.
Rank
Block significance relative to partner firms’ total portfolio.....  ...............
Delayed capital contribution by partner firm(s)........................ ...............
Delayed drilling by contracting firm(s)...................................... ...............
Differing geological interpretations by partner firm(s)............. ...............
Establishing a drilling contract................................................... ...............
Partner approval............................................................................ ...............
Other (please name)..................................................................... ...............
1.8
[Pass respondent show card 1.8]
When holding operator status, prior to the execution of a test-well drilling, could you please detail the 
departments and the positions of personnel that will be consulted within your company?
Probes:
- Strategic apex - top management (CEO, Board of Directors)
- Middle line - middle management (Country Manager, Commercial Manager)
- Operating core - workers (Team Leader, Drilling workers, Contractors)
- Technostructure - analysts and systems designers (Engineering Consultant)
- Support staff - providers of indirect services (Administration)
In total how many personnel will be consulted before the decision is made to execute the test-well 
drilling?
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1.9
Returning to Name 1 (last successful test well as Operator). What was the departmental position of the
manager who made the final decision on whether to execute a test well drilling?
How many licence blocks enter within the decision-making jurisdiction of this manager?
1.10
[Pass respondent show card 1.10]
Please consider the following scenario.
A piece of test-well drill pipe has twisted off and requires recovery. The ‘fishing’ process is proving 
problematic. The choice is either to abandon the hole and leave the pipe as lost, or to hire a contractor 
with highly specialised retrieval machinery. The contractor’s expertise may enable drilling to 
recommence on the original hole following their work. The contractor’s charge is £ 2 million, the 
alternative of drilling a new test well beside the original is £10 million.
Please give the departments and the positions of personnel that would be consulted within your company 
to resolve this issue?
Probes;
- Strategic apex - top management (CEO, Board of Directors)
- Middle line - middle management (Country Manager, Commercial Manager)
- Operating core - workers (Team Leader, Drilling workers. Contractors)
- Technostructure - analysts and systems designers (Engineering Consultant)
- Support staff - providers of indirect services (Administration, Legal)
Please detail the approximate time it would take for the strategic decision making team to decide upon 
which course of action should be undertaken? _________
1.11
Out of your last 5 test wells (excluding appraisal & development) undertaken as Operator, how many 
made a commercially successful find?_________
1.12
What future production and reserves targets have you set?
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2. Contracting Significance
2.1
For how many of your current blocks are production operators provided in-house?_________
2.2
[Pass respondent show card 2.2]
Tick the functions that are provided in-house and not contracted out.
Mark a letter ‘M’ beside those functions that arte a mixture
Tick Function Tick Function
1. Commercial 14. Pipe laying
2. Data management 15. Pipeline engineering
3. Design & development engineering 16. Pipes / pipe handling equipment
4. Diving personnel / equipment / vessels 17. Process engineering
5. Drilling personnel 18. Procurement
6. Drilling equipment / vessels 19. Project management
7. Facilities management/ Prod’ operations 20. Reservoir engineering
8. Finance 21. Seismic analysis
9. Health, safety, environment (HSE) 22. Seismic survey
10. Human resource management 23. Software & system engineering
11. Maintenance services 24. Subsea design
12. Mechanical engineering 25. Subsea fabrication
13. Petroleum engineering 26. Other (please specify)
2.3
[Pass respondent show card 2.3]
Please rank the five contracting firms upon which the performance of your company is most dependent. 
Please also specify the function / service they provide to your company.
Contracting Firm Function / Service
Most dependent 1. ______________________ _____________________
2.   _____________________
3. ______________________ _____________________
4. ______________________ _____________________
5. ______________________ ___________________________ _
2.4
Name the contracted drilling operator with whom your firm has the strongest ties Contractor C. 
[Pass respondent show card 2.4]
For your relationship with Contractor C please rate the importance of the following governance 
structures sought'. Tick one box for each characteristic.
Characteristic Very
important
Quite
important
Indifferent Of little 
importance
Not
important
Information disclosure
Penalties for premature termination
Specialized dispute settlement mechanisms
Verification mechanisms
Other (please specify)
'Note; a full explanation of these Governance Structurne categories was given to each interviewee. The 
description provided followed that expressed in Section 5.4.2.I.
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[Pass respondent show card 2.5]
For Contractor C please rate the following factors according to their influence on strengthening ties. Tick
one box for each characteristic.
Characteristic Very
important
Quite
important
Indifferent Of little 
importance
Not
important
Intended quality delivered
On-time
Within budget
Other (please specify)
2.5
In the last 5 years have you formed an alliance with a drilling and/or production operations contractor? 
Please specify the company(s) and the rationale.
Confidentiality - For the following two questions company identities will be treated with strict
confidentiality. Firms will remain anonymous and will be referred to in my dissertation only as 
Company A, Company B, Company C etc.
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2.6
Do any of your drilling contractors receive a % share of the total sales from the field?
Please specify the company(s) and % share received.
Contractor % Contractor %
What alternative drilling contractor performance incentives do you incorporate?
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Rank Rank
= □ “
3. Negotiation
Please name one country outwith Europe & North America where your company has applied for an 
exploration and/or production licence Country A
Please name one country within Europe or North America where your company has applied for an 
exploration and/or production licence Country B 
[Pass respondent show card 3.1]
By reference to the list below, what factors most influence a licence being awarded in Country A?
Please answer by ranking the importance of the contributing factors, using the numbers 1 to 5 only where 
1 is most important and 5 is least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks.
By reference to the list below, what factors most influence a licence being awarded in Country B?
Please answer by ranking the importance of the contributing factors, using the numbers 1 to 5 only where 
1 is most important and 5 is least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks.
Country A Country B
3.1 Behavioural Factors 
Accessing the appropriate government official 
Persistence
Seniority of company representatives
Presence of a host-country national among company representatives 
Use of the same company representatives
[Pass respondent show card 3.2]
By reference to the list below, what factors most influence a licence being awarded in Country A?
Please answer by ranking the importance of the contributing factors, using the numbers 1 to 5 only where 
1 is most important and 5 is least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks.
By reference to the list below, what factors most influence a licence being awarded in Country B?
Please answer by ranking the importance of the contributing factors, using the numbers 1 to 5 only where 
1 is most important and 5 is least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks.
Country A Country B
3.2 Technical Factors
Rank Rank
Geological assessment (e.g. new play idea, lead) _____ _____
Level of commitment to drill (e.g. ‘Firm’ or ‘Contingent’ well) _____ _____
Innovative application or development of technology _____ I I _____
Rapidity of work programme _____ I___ | _____
Financial capability _____ _____
Confidentiality - For the following two questions both company identity and the countries referred to 
will be treated with strict confidentiality. Your firm will remain anonymous and will be referred to in my 
dissertation only as Company A; the countries as Country A, Country B.
3.3
Comparing Country A to Country B. in which country are behavioural factors of greatest influence? 
Comparing Country A to Country B. in which country are technical factors of greatest influence?
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3.4
[Pass respondent show card 3.4]
For Country A where on the spectrum between a formal approach and. a relationship based approach does 
the licensing authority’s selection procedure lie? Please circle the appropriate number on the scale
below.
Formally Relationship
Based Based
3 2 10 12 3
For Country B where on the spectrum between a formal approach and a relationship based approach does 
the licensing authority’s selection procedure lie? Please circle the appropriate number on the scale 
below. Formally Relationship
Based Based
3 2 10 12 3
3.5
What advantages may smaller firm size confer when applying for an exploration licence in Western 
countries?
Probes:
- Government policy — reduce market concentration
- NPV materiality
- bring new geological ideas
- speed of development
- focus
- application of technology - sweat the asset
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What disadvantages may smaller firm size confer when applying for an exploration licence in Western
countries?
Probes:
- availability of capital
- experience
- in-house capabilities
- dependence upon contracting firms
What advantages may smaller firm size confer when applying for an exploration licence in non-Western 
countries?
Probes:
- increased partnership opportunity
- seniority of company representatives
- communication facilitated
- cost conscious
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What disadvantages may smaller firm size confer when applying for an exploration licence in non- 
Western countries?
Probes:
prestige
availability of capital 
experience 
in-house capability 
connections
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4. International Strategy
Has your company expanded abroad?
[Holds licences in two or more countries]
Yes - [questions 4.1 - 4.3]
No - [questions 4,4 - 4.5]
4.1 Year Country
Please tell me the year and country of your;
First Operating shareholding abroad _______ _________
First Non-Operating shareholding abroad _______ _________
What was the rationale for this company’s first overseas licence block holding being undertaken as 
Operator / Non-Operator [delete as appropriate]?
Probes:
- risk management
- opportunity
- availability of capital
- diversify portfolio
4.2 Whenyyufirrs eopr^deOoovoreas ww^atwas therrhonnhlbehhin thisaationn 
[Pass respondent showcard 4.2]
4.2
Please tick the appropriate variables
Tick Rationale
□ Company's oil/gas reserves expansion
□ Diversify pnrtr'olin
□ Higher return abroad
□ Improved fiscal terms
ni Increased cost of finding oil/gas in Countrv A relative to abroad.
□ Greater possibility of control (Operator)
□ Greater potential of oil/gas areas abroad (Under-explored)
n Less competition abroad
□ Lower monetary commitment required
□ Proximity to market
□ Utilise existing contacts
in Other (please detail)
From the variables you have ticked or detailed, please select the one most 
important variable and mark a star (*) beside it.
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4.3 Do ooo seek tofurther rricir^£^{^<^your ini^e^ieii^l^^nall operations? 
What is the current rationale to this intectiuc?
[Pass respondent showcard 4.3]
4.3a YES
What is the current rationale to this intention? 
Please tick the appropriate variables
Tick Rationale
C Company’s oil/gas reserves expansion
0 Diversify portfolio
□ Higher return abroad
□ Improved fiscal terms
□ Increased cost of finding oil/gas in Couctrv A relative to abroad
□ Greater possibility of control (Operator)
□ Greater potential of oil/gas areas abroad (Under-explored)
□ Less competition abroad
□ Lower monetary commitment required
a Proximity to market
□ Utilise existing contacts
□ Other (please detail)
From the variables you have ticked or detailed, please select the one most 
important variable and mark a star (*) beside it.
4.3b NO
What is the current rationale to tliis intention? 
Please tick the appropriate variables
Tick Rationale
□ Administrative burden
□ Already sufficiently diversified
□ Beyond staff’s experience
□ Business model
□ Geographical focus
□ Insu'fficiect contacts
□ Potential of domestic oil/gas areas
□ Risk involved
□ Other (please detail)
From the variables you have ticked or detailed, please 
select the one most important variable and mark a star 
(*) beside it.
241
4.4 What ts sheearionala for this compatr^'yo1.txxai^H^ininabr(rKi?
[Pass respondent cSowcatn 4.4]
4.4
Please tick the appropriate variables
Tick Rationale
□ Administrative burden
□ Already sufficiently diversified
□ Beyond staff's experience
f3 Business model
□ Geographical focus
□ Insufficient contacts
□ Potential of domestic oil/gas areas
□ Risk involved
□ Other (please detail)
From the variables you have ticked or detailed, please 
select the one most important variable and mark a star 
(*) beside it.
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4.5
In the next 5 years does your company plan to expand abroad? 
What is the current rationale to this intention?
[Pass respondent showcard 4.5]
4.5a YES
What is the current rationale to this intention?
Please tick the appropriate variables
Tick Rationale
□ Company's oil/gas reserves expansion
□ Diversify portfolio
□ Higher return abroad
□ Improved fiscal terms
□ Increased cost of finding nil/oas in Countrv A relative to abroad
□ Greater possibility of control (Operator)
□ Greater potential of oil/gas areas abroad (Under-explored)
□ Less competition abroad
Cl Lower monetary commitment required
□ Proximity to market i
□ Utilise existing contacts
□ Other (please detail)
From the variables you have ticked or detailed, please select the one most 
important variable and mark a star (*) beside it.
4.5b NO
What is the current rationale to this intention?
Please tick the appropriate variables
Tick Rationale
□ Administrative burden
□ Already sufficiently diversified
□ Beyond staff's experience
□ Business model
□ Geographical focus
□ Insufficient contacts
□ Potential of domestic oil/gas areas
□ Risk involved
□ Other (please detail)
From the variables you have ticked or detailed, please 
select the one most important variable and mark a star 
(*) beside it.
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4.6
Please explain your reason for choosing the following countries. 
[Circle the primary reason given]
Country A?
Country B?
Country C?
Country D?
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Appendix 1.3
University of St Andrews
Torcail M Stewart 
MEIR M Phil Postgraduate 
C.R.I.E.F.F. Centre for Research into Industry 
Enterprise, Finance and the Firm
Mr Ed Story
Chief Executive Officer
SOCO International pic
Swan House
32/33 Old Bond Street
London
W1S4QJ
21st November 2003
Dear Mr Story,
I am a postgraduate student at the University of St Andrews undertaking research for my M.Phil thesis on British 
Independent Oil and Gas exploration and production firms. To-date these firms have received little input from 
academia, most research being directed towards the workings of the larger Majors. My research aims to adjust 
this discrepancy by giving voice to the distinctive contributory features that Independents bring to the oil and gas 
industry. Particular areas of research focus include the speed of decision-making, the utilisation of contractors, 
and the deploying of successful internationalisation strategies. As my M.Phil is of an interdisciplinary nature, 
drawing on Management, Economics, and International Relations, I would hope that the tools of analysis drawn 
from these subjects, in combination, will provide valuable findings, not only for research purposes, but providing 
new support for the independent oil and gas sector.
To advance this research, I would appreciate conducting an interview of an hour or so with you, at a time you find 
most convenient. I hope the interview itself will be thought provoking and informative. Based on past experience 
many people find that being interviewed in this way stimulates fresh insights. The research intends to determine:
1. How organisational size and accompanying structure influence the speed at which decisions are executed
2. The rationale for the various contracting approaches adopted
3. The advantages that small firm size may confer in negotiation situations
4. The rationale supporting the international strategy undertaken
1 attach the interview agenda. Following completion of my thesis, I will provide you with a summary report of 
my findings and conclusions. In terms of interview location, should you be away from your headquarters, my 
research allows me the flexibility to travel throughout the UK, and if necessary abroad. With respect to the 
interview, I enclose a basic data sheet, which it would be advantageous for you to complete before the interview.
Your participation in my research would be greatly appreciated. It will be invaluable to my postgraduate studies. 
I will be contacting you by telephone in the near future.
Yours sincerely,
Torcail M. Stewart 
MEIR M.Phil Postgraduate
Enc: Agenda Outline 
Basic Data Sheet
Department of Economics, St Salvator's College, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL, Scotland, U.K. 
Tel: (01334) 425056 Mobile: 07754 509504 Email: tms5@st-andrews.ac.uk
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Appendix 1.4
AGENDA OUTLINE
1. Strategic Decision-Making
- Chronology of a successful exploration drilling
- Factors hastecicg exploration
- Factors delaying exploration
- Influence of organisation structure upon decision-makicg speed
2. Utilisation of Contractors
- In-house driillicg acd production ueeratiucs
- Contracted dirllicg and production operations
- Governance structures sought
- Alliance formation
- Contractor iaceatiyisatrua
- Level of ictegratiua pursued
3. Negotiation
- Influence of team management acd behavioural factors
- Influence of technical factors
- Advantages of flim size
4. Interaational Strategy
- Rationale supporting first overseas expansion
- Rationale supporting increases in iaterllatiuaal operations
- Choice of region, country
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Appendix 1.5
BASIC DATA
It would help if you could complete tills before the intorviow. The data are probably contained in your 
firm’s current documentation, so if it would save you time, I could transcribe the data if you could provide 
mo with the documents. Many thanks for your cnnphsa)inn.
1. Data h ran m shablished ____________
2. Pleaso name the principal Departments within your organisation or preferably send, me a copy of your
organisational chart._________________________________________________________________________
3. I>Li^re^tc blockssalierenou ura Total No. Countries
Operator _______  ______________________
Nnn-Ophsa)ns
4. 2001 2002
Annual Oil Production...............................................  MMbbl  MMbbl
Annual Gas Production............................................. .....................MMscf _________ MMscf
Annual Total Production..........................................  MMboe  MMboe
5. Annual Total Production within tho UKCS......
Annual Total Production outside the UKCS..........
6.
Capital expenditure on exploration activities 
Capital expenditure on development activities
7.
Total loan capital..................................................
Bank loans and overdrafts due within one year....
Bank loans due after more than ono year..............
Mezzanine Finance.................................................
Venture Capital........................................................
Type (e.g. Start-up, Development________
_________ MMboo
_________ MMbon
2002
£m_________
£m___________
£m_________
£m_________
£m_________
£m_________ No. of Shares___________
£m___________ No. of Shares___________
Investment timescale (duration) ________ years
8. Which variables do you hedge (please tick)
% of total MMboe hedged in 2002.................
Average price per bon hedged........................
Oil Price□ Currency Interest Rates□
__ _______%
$________
9. Average price received per boe (excluding the effect of hedging) $______
10. Please complete for those directly employed.
Headcount
Total No. of omp^^s................................................................................................ ...................
No. of employees in exploration and production division....................................... ...................
No. of Direct or s............................................................................................................................................................... .............................
No. nrNnn-Exec Directors......................................................................................... ...................
No. of Technical staff (e.g. Seismic Analysts, Petroleum Engineers).................... ...................
No. of Support staff (Administrative, Legal, PR)...................................................... ...................
No. of Managerial staff (e.g. Offshore Installation Managers, Drilling Supervisors)_________
No. of Specialist operators (e.g., Mud Loggers, Motor Men, Derrick Men)........ ...................
No. of Labourers (e.g. Roustabouts, Roughnecks)................................................... ...................
Estimate
Av. Salary/ 
Wage (£)
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Appendix 1.6 
CONTRACTOR A
1. Scoop & Scale oo Opernttons
1.1
Please complete for those dir^<ctly employed: Headcount
Total No. of employees................................................................. ....................
1.2
Geographical scope of your operations:
Please came the countries is which your rigs are currently operating
1.3
Total No. of Countries....................................................................
Primary country of operation.........................................................
1A [Pass respondeat show card 1.4]
Rigs owned by your company according to rig type
Land
Rig
Barge Platform Tender-
Assisted
Rig
Jackup
(Self­
elevating)
Semisubmersible
(Moored)
Semisubmersible
(Dynamically
Positioned)
Drillship
(Dynamically
Positioned)
Tick □ □ □ n ri c c □
No. of rigs
1.5
Total No. of Offshore rigs..............................................................
Total No. of Onshore rigs..............................................................
1.6 [Pass respondeat show card 1.6]
Please estimate the proportion of your contracts undertaken with customers of the following sizes. Please 
detail in the hox below.
Size of Operator
Small
(Icdependeats)
Medium
(Indepecdents)
Large
(Majors)
Ex: Venture, Paladin, Cairn Ex: Kerr McGee, Apache, BG Group Ex: CococuPhrllips, BP, Exxon
North Sea % North Sea % North Sea %
Globally % Globally % Globally %
1.7
On average, what is the typical NPV value of a contract that your firm is involved ia?
£_____________ m
1.8 [Pass respondeat show card 1.8]
Please rate the five Operating firms upon which the performance of your company is most depeadect. 
Operating Firm
Most dependent 1. ______________________
2.  
3. ______________________
4. ______________________
5. ______________________
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1.9
Name the Operator with whom, your firm has the strongest ties.
Why this Operator?
Probes:
- Geographical
- international operations
- historic linkage
- Technical
- demand for particular drilling technology
- Economic
- high margins attained
- no. ofpotential future contracts
What factors have been influential in strengthening ties? 
Probes:
- Performance
- intended quality delivered
- on-time
- within budget
- HSE
- Frequency of Transaction
- trust
- mutual knowledge of practices
- Technical
- specifications incorporated
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2. X>^^j^s$nn,aR^ & Innentivvs
The following questions aim to evaluate your experience of contracts with Operator firms of differing size.
2.1
Comparing your experience of working for Independents relatt've to Majors, for which particular operations 
do you notice there to be a differential in the decision-making speed?
Probes:
Contract application procedure
- duration of tendering
- finalising terms & conditions 
During drilling
- Resolution of technical difficulties
What do you believe to be the cause of this differential?
Probes:
Bureaucracy­
- number of people consulted
- short chain of command (to the ultimate decision-maker)
- internal specifications
Experience —
- inter-field knowledge of Operating personnel 
Tendering Approach —
- on-line
- form filling vs. meetings based
- formal vs. relationship based
- trust
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2.2 [Pass respondeat show card 2.2]
For Independents where on the spectrum between a formal approach acd a relationship based approach 
does the contractual tendering selection procedure typically lie? Please circle the appropriate number on 
the scale below.
Formally Relationship
Based Based
3 2 10 12 3
For Majors where on the spectrum between a formal approach and a relationship based approach does the 
contractual tendering selection procedure typically lie? Please circle the appropriate number on the scale 
below.
Formally Relationship
Based Based
3 2 10 12 3
2.3
Could you tell me the smallest Independent for whom your company has provided drilling ia the last 5 
years.
<Icdepeadect A>
Could you tell me the largest Major for whom your company has provided drilling in the last 5 years. 
<Maior B>
2.4
Over-engineering (Over-speciflcation)
Over-engineering in customers ’ requirements involves, being forced to adhere to company-specific 
specifications rather than using industry-wide ones. Whereby your firm is needed to supply to prescriptive 
company standards rather than functional ones. This over-specification often occurs in non-critical areas.
Comparing <Icdepeadeat A> to "^Maior B> for which was a greater proportion of the total project cost 
attributed to over-engineering (over-specificatruc)?□
2.5
Late Design Change
The degree of change in customers ' requirements and specifications once work on a project had begun.
Comparing < Independent A > to < Major B > for which Operator was a greater proportion of the total 
project cost attributed to late project design changes?□
2.6
Comparing < Independent A > to < Major B > for which Operator was a greater proportion of the total 
project cost attributed to late payment? □
2.7
Comparing < Icdependent A > to < Major B > for which Operator was a greater proportion of the total 
project cost attributed to the Operator’s behavioural approach?□
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2.8
Comparing < Independent A > to < Major B > for which Operator were standardised terms and 
conditions (equivalent to those set out by CRINE) more closely followed.□
2.9
Comparing < Independent A > to < Major B > for which Operator was a greater proportion of the total 
project risk allocated to your firm?
□
<Independent A >
[Pass respondent show card 2.8a]
How was this risk apportioned?
< Maior B >
[Pass respondent show card 2.8b]
How was this risk apportioned?
Please tick the appropriate boxes.
Equity system (farm-in) i
% share of total field sales 11
Fixed price at outset (Turnkey) 11
Penalty system □
Bonus system D
Please tick the appropriate boxes.
Equity system (farm-in) 11
% share of total field sales 11
Fixed price at outset (Turnkey) 11
Penalty system □
Bonus system (]
If you have ticked Bonus system please select the 
performance measures that were incentivised 
through bonuses.
□ Budget targets
□ Health & Safety targets
□ Output targets
□ Quality target
□ Time targets
If you have ticked Bonus system please select the 
performance measures that were incentivised 
through bonuses.
0 Budget targets
□ Health & Safety targets
□ Output targets
□ Quality target
□ Time targets
2.10
Comparing Independents to Majors, for which size of Operator is a greater proportion of total project risk 
typically allocated to your firm?
2.11
What contractor performance incentives has your firm engaged in?
Probes:
- Equity system (farm-in)
- % share of total field sales
- Fixed price at outset (Turnkey)
- Penalty system
- Bonus system
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3. SWOT Amaj^sis
3.1 [Pass respondent show card 3.1]
What aro the strengths of undertaking a contract with an Independent?
Ploaso rank in order of importance, 1= most important and 5 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do 
not use tied ranks. If ‘other’ detailed, rank from I to 6.
Acceptance of existing contractor specifications _______
Decisiveness (fast decision-making spend) _______
Ease of negotiation _______
Improved contractor bargaining power _______
Quality of management _______
Other (please name) _______
Qualitative comment:
3.2 [Pass respondent show card 3.2]
What are tho weaknesses of undertaking a contract with an Independent? Please rank in order of 
importance, 1= most important and 5 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks. If 
‘other’ detailed, rank from 1 to 6.
Cost consciousness _______
HSE approach _______
Length of contract (short) _______
Materiality of project (low) _______
Quality of management _______
Other (please name) _______
Qualitative comment:
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3.3 [Pass respondent show card 3.3]
What are the opportunities of undertaking a contract with an Independent? Please rank in order of 
importance, 1= most important and 4 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks. If 
‘other’ detailed, rank from 1 to 5.
Greater contractor autonomy ______
Greater trust in contractor ______
Higher margin ______
High possibility of contract renewal ___
Other (please name) ______
Qualitative comment:
3.4 [Pass respondent show card 3.4]
What are the threats of undertaking a contract with an Independent? Please rank in order of importance, 
1= most important and 4 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks. If ‘other’ 
detailed, rank from 1 to 5.
HSE risk ______
Oil price feedback ______
Payment default ______
Technical error ______
Other (please name) ______
Qualitative comment:
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3.5 [Pass respondeat show card 3.5]
What are the strengths of undertaking a contract with a Major?
Please rank is order of importance, 1= most important and 5 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do 
cot use tied ranks. If ‘other’ detailed, rack from 1 to 6.
Financial security (payment) _______
HSE approach _______
Length of costract (long) _______
Materiality of project (high) _______
Quality of management ______ _
Other (please name) _______
Qualitative comment:
3.6 [Pass respondent show card 3.6]
What are the weaknesses of undertaking a contract with a Major?
Please rank ia order of importance, 1= most important and 5 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do 
sot use tied ranks. If‘other’ detailed, rack from 1 to 6.
Decisiveness (slow decision-making speed) _______
Ease of negotiation _______
High management turnover _______
Prescriptive engineering specifications _______
Reduced contractor bargaining power _______
Other (please same) _______
Qualitative comment;
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3.7 [Pass respondent show card 3.7]
What are tho opportunities of undertaking a with a Majm? Please rank in order of importance,
1= most important and 3 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks. If ‘nthhs’ 
detailed, rank from 1 to 4.
Drilling delay more acceptable ______
Greater willingness to spend ______
Possibility of several future contracts _____
Other (please name) ______
Qualitative comm^n^:
3.8 [Pass respondent show card 3.8]
What are the threats of undertaking a contract with a Major? Please rank in order of importance, 1= most 
important and 4 = least important. Rank all alternatives and do not uso tied ranks. If ‘other’ detailed, rank 
from 1 to 5.
Intrusive supervision ______
Legalistic approach ______
Lower contractor autonomy ______
Operator's aversion to risk (risk transferred to contractor) ______
Other (please name) ______
Qualitative comment:
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4. Pricinn,Teehnology & Competitioo
4.1
[Pass respondent show card 4.1]
Please consider the following scenario.
Your company has been contacted by two Operating firms. Firm A and Firm B. Both are requesting 
utilisation of a specific drilling rig held within your rig portfolio. Currently, this is the only rig available 
and able to meet the rapid timing constraints that Firm A and Firm B have set. Each firm has offered a 
contract of identical monetary value. Your choice is whether to accept the contract from either Firm A or 
Firm B.
Operating Firm Sizes
Firm A Market Cap = £ 1,000m
Firm B Market Cap = £100,000m
Which firm would you choose?
[ Firm A / Firm B ] (delete as appropriate)
What is the rationale supporting this choice?
4.2
Does your firm engage in differential pricing according to a customer's willingness to pay? 
[ Yes / No ] (delete as appropriate)
Comparing Independents to Majors, with whom does your firm typically detect a greater willingness to pay 
for a given good or service?
4.3
Does your firm engage in differential pricing according to Operator firm size? 
[ Yes / No ] (delete as appropriate)
Comparing Independents to Majors, with whom does your firm typically achieve a higher price for a given 
good or service?
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4.4
Comparing Independents to Majors, during a period of low oil price with which size of Operator would you 
be more willing to undertake transactions with?
Could you please give the reason for this choice.
4.5
Comparing Independents to Majors, during a period of high oil price with which size of Operator would 
you be more willing to undertake transactions with?□
Could you please give the reason for this choice.
4.7
Comparing Independents to Majors, by which size of Operator is more sophisticated diilling technology 
typically employed? □
4.8
Comparing Independents to Majors, by which size of Operator is more expensive drilling technology 
typically employed? □
4.9
Please give examples of the range of drilling technology typically utilised by Independents?
Probes:
- Workover technology
- Directional Drilling - bit, mud motor, MWD tool (inclination + azimuth), driller callers, stabiliser
- Horizontal drilling of production wells
- CO2 Injection
- Through-tubing rotary drilled (TTRD) wells
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4.10
Please give examples of the types of drilling technology typically only accessed by Majors?
Probes:
- Workover technology
- Through-tubing rotary drilled (TTRD) wells
- Directional Drilling — bit, mud motor, MWD tool (inclination + azimuth), driller callers, stabiliser
- Horizontal drilling of production wells
- Wireline logging — log suites available'.
- CO? Injection
4.11 [Pass respondent show card 4.11 j
Rank tho following areas according to tho level of competition there is between drilling rig suppliers to 
secure customers. Please rank according to the level of competition, 1= most competitive and 8= least 
competitive. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks.
Offshoro
Asia / Pacific ______
Caspian Sea ______
East Coast Africa
Gulf of Mexico ______
Latin America ______
Middle East ______
North Sea ______
West Coast Africa
4.12 [Pass respondent show card 4.12]
For the following areas, how does tho level of competition between drilling rig suppliers to secure 
customers vary. Please rank according to the level of competition, 1= most competitive and 7= least 
competitive. Rank all alternatives and do not uso tied ranks.
Onshore
Africa ______
Asia / Pacific ______
Europe ______
Latin America ______
Middle East ______
Pnst-Snvio) states _____
US
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Appendix 1.7
AGENDA OUTLINE
1. Scope and Scale of Operations
- Geographical range
- Rig portfolio
- Customer orientation
2. Engineering Designs & Risk
- Operators’ decision-making speed
- Project management by Operators
- Project risk allocation
- Performance incentives
3. SWOT analysis
- Independent E&P companies
- Majors’ E&P divisions
4. Pricing, Technology & Competition
- Differential pricing
- Oil price scenarios
- Drilling technology utilised
- Regional competition
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Appendix 1.8
If 0 0
Mr Per Johasssos 
Sr VP Technical & Operations 
Dolphin Drilling Ltd 
Howe Moss Drive 
Dyce, Aberdeen
AB21 OGL
University of St Andrews
Torcail M Stewart 
MEIR M Phil Postgraduate 
C.R.I.E.F.F. Centre for Research into Industry 
Enterprise, Ficacce acd the Firm
28“ March 2004
Dear Mr Johasssos,
I am a postgraduate student at the University of St Andrews undertaking research for my M.Phil thesis os British 
Independent Oil and Gas exploration asd production firms. A fusdamestal element within this research is to 
examine the reliance of Independents upos Drilling Costractors. To-date this relationship has received little input 
from academia, most research being directed towards that involving the larger Majors. My research aims to adjust 
this discrepancy by giving voice to the distinctive contributory features that Independents bring to the oil asd gas 
industry, asd is particular, how this is manifested through their utilisation of drilling costractors. Areas of research 
focus include the differing behavioural approach adopted by Independent Operators towards costractors, the 
appropriateness of varying risk allocations, asd the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities asd Threats (SWOT 
analysis) attributed to Operators of smaller firm size.
To advance this research, 1 would appreciate cosductisg a ose-hour interview with you, at a time you find most 
convenient. I hope the interview itself will be thought provoking asd informative. Based os past experience many 
people find that being interviewed is this way stimulates fresh insights. The research istesds to determine:
1. How Operator size asd accompanying structure influence the behavioural approach adodteo towards 
costractors.
2. The appropriateness of varying risk allocations asd whether these differ according to Operato t size.
3. SWOT analysis for drilling contractors engaging wth smaller O)e>t;i^aif^ra
4. Drilling technology employed by smaller Operators
(I attach the interview agenda.)
At all times confidentiality will be respected. No individual firm identities will be revealed. Is terms of interview 
location, should you be away from your headquarters, my research allows me the flexibility to travel throughout the 
UK.
As my M.Phil is of as istee-discielisary nature, drawing os Management, Economics, asd Isaorsrtiosrl Relations, I 
would hope that the tools of analysis draws from these subjects, is combisatios, will provide valuable findings, sot 
only for research purposes, but for providing sew support for the working association between Independents asd 
Drilling Contractors
Following completion of my thesis, I will provide you with a summary report of my findings asd conclusions. This 
will include feedback from the CEOs asd Technical Directors of British Independents whom 1 have already 
interviewed.
Your paeticieatios is my research would be greatly appreciated. It will be invaluable to my postgraduate studies. I 
will be contacting you by telephone is the sear future.
Yours sincerely,
Torcail M. Stewart 
MEIR M.Phil Postgraduate
Esc: Agenda Outlise
Department of Economics, St Salvator's College, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL, Scotland, U.K.
________Tel: (01334) 425056 Mobile: 07754 509504 Email: tma5@st-andeewa.ac,uk_______
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Appendix 1.9 - Postal Qucst-immaii^'o
INFORMATION
SHEET
Return Address 
Torcail M. Stewart 
MEIR M.Phil Postgraduate 
Department of Economics 
St Salvator's College 
St Andrews
Fife KY16 9AL Contact Details
Scotland, UK. Tel: 144 (0) 1334425056 
Mob: +44 (0)7754509504 
E-mail: t.ms5@si-andsews.ac.uk
1.3
What factoss stimulate your elTosts most to 
reduce the time between award of liconco 
and producing on-line? Pleaso sank in 
order of impns)anen, I - most important 
and 6 = least important. Rank all 
alternatives and do not use tied ranks. If 
‘othos’ detailed sank from 1 to 7.
hi
Rank
Cash How.......................
Cnmrhiitivn advantage.
Cost of capital..............
Gnvnsnmen) incentives. 
Oil price expectations. ..
Production targets.........
ntees (ploaso name).....
1.1
Fallowing appraisal well 
drilling, for sous last field 
development as nresains, how 
long did it take to rnnnulalc the 
overall field development 
decision psios to submission for 
state approval?
1.2
Fos this field development decision 
please estimate tho % of your total time 
spent on tho following activities:
%
Contracting negotiations _______
Raising financial capital _ _____
Reservoir studios _______
Sales arrangements
Othos (pleaso name)
1.4
What factoss hold you up most between award of licence and fiss) test well 
drilling? Pleaso nuik in order of importance, I - most important and 6 - 
leas) imrnrttni. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks. If ‘oilies’ 
deiailod rank from 1 to 7.
Rank
Block significance relative to partner firms’ total pnrI.)rnlo.....
Dolayed capital cnnisibu)inn by partner firm(s)........................
Delayed drilling by contracting firni(s)................. . ................... ....................
Differing geological interpretations by partner fism(s)............
Establishing a drilling contract...................................................
Pastnos appsov;d........................................................................... .............
Other (please name)..................................................................... ..............
i2~it>iXT*SvKSrCSSS2rS
2.1 Da ysoi senO to .^11^0 i nnrroaeyous i nteernllonal 
operations?
If yee ploase go to question 2.2 
If ho ploase go to question 2.3
2.2 YES
What is tho cussont. rationale behind this intention?
Tick Rationale
: • Company's oil reserves expansion
1 ■ Diversify rnrtfolin
i : Higher return abroad
I ' Improved fiscal terms
Increased cos) of finding oil/gae in US relative to abroad
Groates possibility of control (Orosains)
Gsoatos potential of oil/gae asoas abroad
Lose competition abroad
I Lower monetary commitment required
1; Proximity to market
Utilise existing contacts
Other (ploaso detail)
From the variables you have licked os detailed, pleaso select tho ono 
mns) important variable and mask a star (*) bosido it.
2.3 NO
What is the cussent rationale behind this intention?
Ploaso tick tho appropriate vasiablns
'Tick Rationale
1 Administrative burden
I Already suffici^ntls diversified
i Beyond staffs’ experience
Business model
f Geographical focus
; Insufficient contacts
Potential of domestic oil/gae areas
1 Risk involved
Other (please detail)
From tho variables you have ticked os detailed, ploaso 
select the ono most important variable and mask a star 
(*) bosido it.
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Appendix 1.9 - Postal Questionnaire
3.1
- For your company tick the functions that are provided in-house and not contracted out.
- Mark by an ‘M' those functions that are a mixture (i.e. sometimes in-house; sometimes
[contracted out)- Mark by an ‘O’ those that are exclusively contracted out.
Tick Function Tick Function
I. Commercial 14. Pipe laying
2. Data management 15. Pipeline engineering
3. Design & development engineering 16. Pipes / pipe handling equipment
4. Diving persoiuic! / equipment / vessels 17. Process engineering
5. Drilling personnel 18. Procurement
6, Drilling equipment / vessels 19. Project management
7. Facilities management/ Prod’ operations 20. Reservoir engineering
8. Finance 21. Seismic analysis
9. Health, safety, environment (USE.) 22. Seismic survey
10. Human resource management 23. Software & system engineering
11. Maintenance services 24. Subsea design
12. Mechanical engineering 25. Subsea fabrication
13. Petroleum engineering 26. Other (please sperify)
3.2
Please detail the function/ service 
provided by the contracting firm 
upon which the performance of 
your company is most dependent.
3.3
What drilling contractor performance incentives do you utilise? Please tick the appropriate boxes.
Equity system (farm-in)
Fixed price at outset (Turnkey) 
Bonus system
% share of total field sales 
Penalty system
If you have ticked Bonus system please select the performance measures that arc incentivised through bonuses.
' Budget targets ' Health & safely targets Output targets Quality target Time targets
4.1
By reference to the list below, what factors most influence a licence being awarded in the USA?
Please answer by ranking the importance of the contributing factors, using the numbers I to 5 only where I Is most 
important and 5 is least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks.
USA 'Country I3>
RankRankBehavioural Factors 
Accessing the appropriate government official
Persistence _____
Seniority of company representatives _____
Presence of a host-country national among company representatives
Use of the same company representatives
What factors most influence a licence being awarded in <Countrv B>?
Please answer by ranking the importance of the contributing factors, using the numbers I to 5 only where I is most 
important and 5 is least important. Rank all alternatives and do not use tied ranks.
Comparing USA to <Country B> in which country are behavioural factors of greatest innlu^ncc?_____________
4.2
For USA where on the spectrum between a formal approach and a 
relationship based approach does the licencing authority's selection 
procedure lie? Please circle the appropriate number on the scale below. 
Formally Relationship
Based 3 -2 -I -0 -1- 2 -3 Based
For <Country B> where on the spectrum between a fomial 
approach and a relationship based approach does the 
licencing authority's selection procedure lie? Please circle 
the appropriate number on the scale below.
Formally Relationship
Based 3 - 2 - 1 - 0 - 1 - 2 - 3 Based
END OF INFORMATION SHEET. THANK YOU FOR YOUR HELP 
PLEASE POST TO ADDRESS AT TOP PAGE ONE
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Appendix 1.10
Mr C. Howard Murrish
Executive Vice President - Exploration
McMoran Exploration Co.
1615 Poydras Street
New Orleans 
LA 70115 
USA
University of St Andrews
Torcail M Stewart 
MEIR M Phil Postgraduate 
C.R.I.E.F.F. Centre for Research into Industry 
Enterprise, Finance and the Firm
20th March 2004
Dear Mr Murrish,
I am a postgraduate student at the University of St Andrews undertaking research for my M.Phil thesis on US 
and British Independent Oil and Gas exploration and production firms. To-date these firms have received little 
input from academia, most research being directed towards the workings of the larger Majors. My research 
aims to adjust this discrepancy by giving voice to the distinctive contributory features that Independents bring 
to the oil and gas industry. Particular areas of research focus include the speed of decision-making, the 
utilisation of contractors, and the deploying of successful internationalisation strategies. As my M.Phil is of an 
interdisciplinary nature, drawing on Management, Economics, and International Relations, I would hope that 
the tools of analysis drawn from these subjects, in combination, will provide valuable findings, not only for 
research purposes, but also for providing new support for the independent oil and gas sector.
To advance this research, I would appreciate if you could complete the enclosed two-page information sheet, 
which should only take 9 minutes. Based on past experience, many respondents have found the topics covered, 
and the methods of answering them a stimulus to further examining, and better understanding, their own 
procedures. Questions are categorised by colour, and relate to the following research areas:
Red - How organisational size and accompanying structure influence the speed 
at which decisions are executed
Green - The rationale supporting the international strategy undertaken 
Purple - The utilisation of contractors relative to firm size
Blue - Behavioural factors required for successful negotiations
At all times confidentiality will be respected. No individual firms’ identities will be revealed, and conclusions 
reached are based on average tendencies for the sample as a whole, rather than specific cases.
Following completion of my thesis, I will provide you with a summary report of my findings and conclusions. 
This will include feedback from the CEOs and Technical Directors of British Independents whom I have 
already interviewed.
Your participation in my research would be greatly appreciated. It will be invaluable to my postgraduate 
studies.
Yours sincerely,
Torcail M. Stewart 
MEIR M.Phil Postgraduate
Enc: Information Sheet
Return Envelope
Department of Economics, St Salvator's College, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL, Scotland, U.K. 
Tel: (01334) 425056 Mobile: 07754 509504 Email: tms5@st-andrews.ac.uk
264
